

1. Property dualism

- Mental states are irreducible attributes of brain states
- Mental phenomena are non-physical properties of physical substances
- Consciousness: Example of a non-physical property of physical substances
- Some properties of our mental states have non physical properties; qualia or a characteristic feel

2. Externalist theory of content

- The content of mental state is determined by its relational properties, relations to other things determine
- Pictorial content supervenes upon relation properties of representation, not just intrinsic properties
- Content supervenes upon some relational properties
- Can explain linguistic content
- Ability to have thoughts that have content depends on being embedded in a larger environment because content is not supervening on intrinsic properties, but relational properties outside of the mind

3. Internalist theory of content

- Descartes
- Content of a mental state is owed to its intrinsic properties alone
- Mental content that a state has depends upon the intrinsic properties of that state
- Mental content supervenes of intrinsic properties of our brain/mind
- The content is determined by its intrinsic properties, independent from anything in the world

○ Ex. colour, shape

Painting Example

- Someone whose content blind sees a picture that you can read
- If you take the lines and colours on the canvas and arrange them in a different way, it will not have the same content
- What it represents is a function of how the paints, lines, and colours are arranged on the canvas
- Entirely arranged based on its intrinsic properties

Grass is Green Example

- Rearrange chemical events, molecules and nerve cells, it will cease to be a belief about grass

- By adjusting and altering the internal properties you will get a result of the representation or a different representation

Photograph Example

- Photo taken of Ted who has an identical twin brother Fred
- Ted and Fred confused easily
- Fred takes picture of Ted for his passport photo - Does the picture of Ted become a picture of Fred?
- Cant tell them apart of the pictures because the intrinsic properties of picture of the same
- What distinguishes them? Ted showed up at the studio and was at beginning of causal change that lead to the formation of the picture; that is why it is a photograph of Ted
- Difference in pictorial content without difference in intrinsic pictures
- Photograph of Ted can serve when a photo of Fred is needed - Although it can be used as a picture of Fred, it is still a picture of Ted
- Internalist theory: A portrait of Ted is the same as a portrait of Fred
 - Intrinsic properties are not enough for linguistic content
 - Same sounds and spelling with different meanings
 - Different meaning = different linguistic content = same intrinsic features
 - Different linguistic conventions = different meaning

4. Anomalous monism

- Donald Davidson
 - Anomalous monism: Variant of interpretivism
 - Developed to give an alternative to the idea that our talk about people's mental states are part of some theory about them
 - Ontological monism coupled with conceptual dualism
 - Ontological monism; only one kind of thing in existence (material/physical things)
 - Anomalous: Outside (separate) from law
 - When we talk about our minds there is an aspect of the physical that lies outside the reach of physical law
 - Core of anomalous monism; there are aspects of physical that cannot be captured by physical laws
 - Monism: Only one realm
- Davidson's example: Hurricanes
- Law: All hurricanes cause flooding

- Event reported on page 1 of the newspaper; Hurricane (this event)
- Event recorded on page eight; My basement was flooded (caused this event)
- No law that says events recorded on page one cause events recorded on page eight
- No causal law
- Re-describe same 2 events in a way that leaves no causal connection between them

3 Claims- Davidson

1. Mental events can causally interact with physical events
 - Mind can affect body and body can affect the mind
2. Events that causally interact are related to one another by some physical laws
 - Physical law that governs interaction
3. Mental events are not related to any physical event by any physical law
 - No bridge laws

5. **Phenomenological fallacy**

The blue-triangle after image that I experience = some neurological event

- U.T. Place denies there are blue triangle after image
- Instead you'll get an experience of a blue triangle after image but it doesn't exist, the experience does
- Experience of hallucinating
- After image you experience is another thing
- People encounter objection as soon as they mistake the thinking as being mental or physical
- Distinction between the mental act and object
- Taking properties of the object that you have imagined or experienced but it is different than the properties of the mental act
- Take properties of the mental object and assign them to our mental act (fallacy)

6. **Zombies**

Zombie Hunch - Daniel Dennett

- An intuition
- Need to see the source of the intuition and the alternative to relying on it
- Intuition that zombies are at least possible

Zombies

- Exactly like us functionally
- 1. Functionally equivalent
- 2. Physically equivalent
- 3. Not mentally equivalent because they lack qualia; there is nothing that its like for them to engage with environment - striped away
- Lack qualia = lack consciousness
- 4. Have non conscious mental states
- What you conceive of a zombie is functionally equivalent but lacking consciousness
- If that is possible, then functionalism is false

Daniel Dennett

- Can you find a zombie in a room? Cant dissect
- Functionally and physically indistinguishable
- If you are a zombie you wouldn't even know it
- There is no real mental difference between us and zombies
- Functionally equivalent to us
- Other states are accurately described by functionalism
- Realize zombies have to be exactly like us in terms of their beliefs and intentions
- What is it like to be a zombie?
- There is nothing that its like
- Zombies believe they have experiences as well
- Functional equivalence
- You could look at the world through the eyes of a zombie and you would not know because they are functionally equivalent to us
- Zombies are like us in all kinds of ways but so much that if we were zombies, we wouldn't know it

7. Interpretivism

1. Davidson = anomalous monism
 2. Dennett's intentional stance theory
- Theory about the mind that is at a high level of abstraction and includes both anomalous and intentional theories
 - General idea: When we attribute mental states to anyone whatsoever, that's an interpretive strategy, there are certain by-products of the strategy (like beliefs and desires) or artifacts (results of interpretive strategy)

- Strategy for navigating around the world - maps and globes, lines of latitude and longitude and equator, but the earth doesn't really have a physical line (equator = artifact of our scheme for navigating around the world)
- Mental states are artifacts that we use to interpret each other
- 1. Mental states are artifacts of interpretive schemes
- Mapping system
 - Lines of latitude and longitude; schema that we have devised
 - Components are not designed to represent some prior reality
 - Imposes structures that are not supposed to be there in reality
 - Map represents reality doesn't mean it tried to portray a prior reality that is already there
 - Tools designed to meet needs of particular interest; draw boundaries
 - Kept and used because they are tools that have certain functions
- Ways of organizing time; calendars and clocks (arbitrary)
- 2. Mental states are intrinsically rational
- Logical behaviourism: S has M = If C obtains, then B ensues
- Functionalism: Adds explanatory holism (S has M = If C obtains, and S has M1, M2, M3... then B ensues)
- Interpretivism: Adds an additional point (S has M = If C obtains, and S has M1, M2, M3 and behaves rationally... then B ensues)
- To be a mental state, you have to be rational (not every mental state you have is rational but you have to be creature that behaves rationally for the most part)
- When you don't behave rational, the scheme doesn't work to characterize behaviour
- Dismiss Theory-Theory
 - Folk scientific theories would not mandate to rationalize behaviour
- 3. Our attributions of mental states can be true
- Distinguish from limited materialism
- "She believes that grass is green"
- So, she has a belief
- So, there are such things as beliefs for her to have

8. Twin Earth thought experiments

- Externalist theory = supported
- Any thought experiment = all intrinsic properties are the same and relational properties differ
- Ex. Ted photo = light bouncing off ted and into the camera, Fred photo = light bouncing off Fred and into the camera

- Different because relationally, one is ted and one is Fred
- Twin earth: the two situations have different content
- So Fred and ted's photos, are different in content because one is Fred and one is Ted
- Difference in content can be explained by relational properties because the intrinsic properties are the same
- The intrinsic properties alone don't explain the content

Putnam's example:

- Planet inaccessible to us, identical to earth (everything in it and going on = even you have a perfect doppelganger: does the same thing you do, made the same way you were, etc) the ONLY difference, is we have water, but they have something that looks the same and they call it water, ours is H₂O and there's is a different, more complicated molecule: XYZ
 - They look, taste, etc the same, so until chemistry was invented we wouldn't know that we had H₂O and they have XYZ
- Putnam asked: when we use "water" and they use a word, that sounds and looks the same "water" but this word refers to something chemically completely different than the stuff our word is referring to
 - Is "water" on earth and "water" in twin earth have the same meaning - no because it refers to a different substance, despite using the same word
 - When twin earth claire thinks water she sees XYZ, she sees the same thing as Earth claire when she thinks water and sees H₂O
- Different languages can use the same word but mean different things:
 - Ex. "WIT" in English = "mental sharpness and inventiveness; keen intelligence" whereas in Afrikaans = the colour white
- Meanings of words are not in your heads - what is in the head of twin earth Claire and earth Claire are the same, but the meaning is different because twin Claire interacts with XYZ and has never interacted with H₂O whereas earth claire interacts only with H₂O and not XYZ

9. Eliminative materialism

- Paul and Patricia Churchland
- Created in 1950's
- Form of materialism
- All of our discourse that refers to mental events; everything we say in that discourse is false
- Does not really exist

- Part of mythology we have adopted
- Facilitates coping and interacting with one another
- Predict and explain behaviour
- Still a fiction
- Neuroscience theory that allows us to do all the same things but better
- Folk psychology employs talk about mental states but this theory is false
- Theory-theory: Idea psychological discourse is part of a theory of mind
- Discard folk psychology
- Maintain way of talking about ourselves even though we know its not true
- Still use Neuton's theory because it is simple and easy
- Starting point is that folk psychology is a theory in competition with the more scientific psychology
- Theory because it functions to explain behaviour