

3 Politics which can be observed by studying Russia

Russia: how states deal with collapse; 1) revolution and rebuilding (i.e. Soviet 1991 collapse)

Gorbachev's failures are his changing policies before changing the state (i.e. privatization 2 years before the new constitution was adopted).

2) newness undermines the old institutions; tendency to create more bodies and institutions to deal with old problems (bureaucracies undermine one another, allow room for corruption);

3) Democratization: institutions and norms have been reversed under Putin

Economic Reform

Rapid shock therapy

impact of collapsed USSR on global economy

What was supposed to happen?/What did happen?

Price Liberalization

Tight control of money supply

Privatization

Fiscal austerity program State retreat from control of the economy Bankruptcy

Theory (J. Sachs) that simultaneous liberalization, privatization and globalization was the fastest route to economic recovery.

Lack of fiscal options.

Political advantages of shock therapy.

Political problems associated with the Russian economy, by late 1990s:

Barter, tax evasion _budget deficits and low social spending

Unemployment, wage & benefit arrears political discontent and opposition

Politicization of lawmaking

Market Reform:

corruption: bribes and favours for preferential treatment

state capture: certain groups use their power to avoid law (i.e. paying taxes)

rent seeking: government using control over resources to control access to the economy

Constitutional Reform

September---October 1993 Political Crisis

December 1993 Adoption of Russian Constitution

The Russian Constitution: Key Principles

Presidential system Divided executive: President/Prime Minister

Federalism

Judicial review

Parliament: Duma/Federation Council

Elections

Duma (and reforms)
Federation Council (until reforms, 2000)
President
Trends in Elections, 1993---2000
Government support/opposition support
Major political parties
Relations between Duma and President

In Transition: Yelstin to Putin

Chechnya - republic in north caucasus
1991 Declared independence under President Dudaev
1994 First Chechnya war (Russia invades)
1996 ceasefire and 1997 treaty did not end conflict

Key events in transition

August 1998 financial crisis
PM crisis 98-99
Chernomyrdin-Kiriyenko March 98; Kiriyenko-Primakov Sept 98; Primakov-Stepashin
May 99; Stepashin-Putin August 99
Yelstin Impeachment hearings May 99
Fall 99 Resumption of Chechnya war
December 1999 formation of Unity party and duma elections
Yelstin resignation
March 2000 Putin elected

Yelstin legacy

The good:

Relatively peaceful transition from communism (minus chechnya)
Stable control over soviet nuclear arsenal
Relative to 2000- open and democratic
Initiation of major reform efforts

The bad:

Inconsistent reform efforts and contradictory laws
Crisis of social welfare and living standards
Neglected avenues of democratic cooperation and dialogue
Strength of nationalist/commie opposition

Changing political discourse

Growing backlash against the west
Nato expansion 98
August 98 financial crisis
Kosovo spring 99
Second Chechnya war fall 99

Perceived crisis of national morality, leadership and values
Growing backlash against the West
NATO expansion, 1998

August 1998 financial crisis

Kosovo, 1999

Discourse of perceived *crisis* of national morality, leadership and values

Comparisson of the transition looking at other post-communist states:

Thorough collapse of the soviet state/ cpsu enabled asset-stripping and insider privatization

Weakness of state left regions in a federal system with strong powers

State captured at an early stage in transition

Greater concentration of privatization of wealth

The “who lost russia” debate, IMF/World Bank support too personal, not institutional

Oil and gas dependancy (resource curse)

Influence of Opposition Nationalist Discourse:

Held that Russia’s crisis went beyond economic and institutional weakness (symptoms of a corrupt elite morality) spread into society enabled by western-style democracy.

Putin successfully co-opted this discourse

Putin’s Priorities

Dictatorship of law

The oligarchs

Re-start economic reform

Federal system reform

Restore public confidence

The Federal System

89 SUBJECTS (1992) → 82 SUBJECTS (2009)

republics (e.g. Tatarstan) nominally autonomous, each has its own constitution, president, and parliament; is represented by the federal government in international affairs; and is meant to be home to a specific ethnic minority.

regions/*oblasts*, *krais* most common type of federal subjects with federally appointed governor and locally elected legislature

cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg

Heads of executive:

republics -- a *President*

regions (*oblasts*), -- a federally appointed *governor*

Cities have an elected Mayor.

Soviet Federal Legacy

Soviet principles of regional self-government and ethnic self-determination

Soviet centralization gave regions few real decisionmaking powers, but regional and local governments delivered and implemented federal policy.

Perestroika

Weakened all Soviet central institutions

Established regional government executives

Competitive elections

Enhanced the power bases of industries within their regions.

Foreign policy change → less spending on defence → more resources for society

Less central planning → more scope for economic innovation → more efficiency

More democracy → less power for party bureaucracy → more new ideas
GREATER PARTICIPATION + GREATER ECONOMIC POTENTIAL = INCREASED LEGITIMACY

Shock Therapy's Impact on Federalism

Weak Central Government

Elevation of importance of taxation as revenue source

Delay in adopting new constitution

Problems with Federalism in the 1990s

Separatism and Sovereignty movements (Chechnya Tatarstan)

Political opposition to Yeltsin's reforms

Economic disparities

Weak institutional cohesion and

Poorly-defined budgetary system

Putin's reforms on Federalism

Federal districts (*Pol'predy*)

Reform of Federation Council (Senate)

Increased presidential powers to remove governors and mayors

Increased clarity and transparency in social welfare spending (the monetization reform)

Post-Beslan (North Ossetia hostage crisis September 2004) reforms:

Governors are nominated by Russian Federation President and confirmed by the legislature

Increased presidential powers to dissolve regional legislature and dismiss the governors

Nonconfidence vote in governor only valid if approved by RF President

Regions no longer elect candidates to the State Duma

Political parties required to have a stronger regional presence

The Question of Federalism in Russia

Still has elected regional parliaments, but Constitutional Court tends to uphold powers of President over regions

Rise of United Russia party in the regions

Federalism and Democracy

September 2010: Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov dismissed by President Medvedev.
Luzhkov: was mayor since 1992 and won three elections

Democratic Reversal

Declining independent centers of power

Rise of United Russia (majority seats in Duma since 07)

Electoral and party reforms

Administrative Resource: A term used in Russia to describe a perceived situation in which governing elites use state power, including employer---employee relationships, in election campaigns.

Parliamentary Elections

State Duma(lower house of parliament) 450 Deputies: *225 elected by proportional representation

In order to register, parties must have a quota of signatures to demonstrate nation---wide support

Parties needed 5% of the popular vote in order to be represented in the Duma (7% as of 2005; 2009 reform)

*225 elected in single---member districts (first---past---the---post in electoral districts)

Until 2005, candidates could run as members of a political party or as independents

Elections held after 2 years, thereafter every 4 years

*** As of 2005, Duma deputies elected by Proportional Representation only.

*** As of 2008, will be elected for a 5 year term.

Alternative Ideology

Sovereign Democracy

Democracy by majority/ economic stability

Turning Points in Democratic Reversal

Orange Revolution in Ukraine 2004

Yukos Affair 05-06

Death of Anna Politkovskaia 2006

Rose Revolution

Georgia: independent state (former Soviet republic) south of Russia

Fall 2003: President Eduard Shevardnadze resigned following demonstrations protesting a contested presidential election

Mikhail Saakashvili elected new president

Orange Revolution

Mass demonstrations protested the result of a presidential election contest between Viktor Yanukovich (who Putin supported) and Viktor Yushchenko

Ukraine's Supreme Court declared the election invalid

A new election voted in Viktor Yushchenko

Led to a new law limiting NGO activity in Russia

The Yukos Affair

A recent case study: Mikhail Khodorkovsky/the Yukos affair

Privatization(1990s) of former state---owned enterprises led to controversies over the legitimacy of the wealth of successful new businesses.

Khodorkovsky convicted in December 2010 for alleged crimes, connected with his business activities of the oil firm Yukos.

Khodorkovsky was nearing release from prison for his previous (2005) conviction.

Casts doubt on legitimacy of capitalism

Deficiencies in rule of law

Vulnerability of political opposition

Fraud, tax evasion and a series of other things; embodied everything wrong with the disparity of wealth between russians in the new capitol-driven federation (people were exploited, taken advantage of etc to get rich).

Debate of privatization - state selling off assets to gain finances after failing to implement a successful stateist policy series

What the case reveals: was he guilty? claimed he went to great pains to act lawfully (held a law degree, contacted lawyers and government workers). Was the rule of law upheld(fairness of the trial etc)?

Khordokovsky as the fall-guy and Putin's facade

Extreme Nationalist Movements

Manezh

Nashi

2008 Presidential Elections

Dmitry Medvedev became Russia's president; Putin became Prime Minister
January 2009: Presidents term increases to 6 years (effective 2012 elections)

Medvedev's Reforms

November 2008 address to the Federal Assembly already called for more active state encouragement of democracy

Partial relaxation of restrictions on NGOs

Electoral reform, to enable parties with 5% to gain some representation in Duma and regional legislatures and to simplify party registration for elections

Increase in openness of parliamentary/government proceedings via digital technology

Said modernization requires free discussion and fair competition

Argued that vote-counting inaccuracies, difficult party registration requirements, and excessively high voter threshold should not be permitted to impede democracy

Regional elections should meet the same standard as national elections

Hybrid regime: A regime which is more authoritarian than democratic, but which has democratic elements (especially elections with limited competition).

Putin/Medvedev Social Plans and Policy

National Projects to improve housing and health care

Pronatalism; measures to encourage births and discourage abortion, protect and promote family values

Migration policy: facilitate legal migration, discourage illegal migration

Post-Communist Russia Foreign Policy

A rejection of ideology

The primacy of domestic politics over foreign policy

A desire to maintain international influence and to react in response to losses of influence

Soviets 1950-1980

Superpower status – nuclear weapons

Increased international influence

Scientific achievements (e.g. space program)

High rates of industrialization and growth

86-91: The New Thinking

Changed foreign policy direction under Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Initiated nuclear arms reductions
Emphasized Europe over third world
Reduced Soviet influence in Eastern Europe
Ended Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

Proactive FP under Gorbachev

START I Treaty signed (strategic nuclear weapons reductions)
CMEA (Council on Mutual Economic Assistance) and Warsaw Pact dismantled
Foreign trade was opened and expanded
USSR cut military spending and reduced presence in the third world Sought loans and assistance from international institutions.

Foreign Policy 91-92 Andrei Kozyrev

Recognizing independence of Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Taking over Soviet Union's international rights and obligations (e.g. UN Security Council seat, USSR's foreign debt)
Seeking Western/international assistance with *design* as well as funding of market reform.

Early Failures

Failure of CIS to gain consensus, influence
Dependence on IMF/World Bank and August 1998 crisis
NATO Expansion, began 1998
Failure to resolve conflict in Chechnya

Frozen Conflicts

Russia was recognized internationally as having a role to play in managing ethnic conflicts, but there was no resolution:
Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia/Azerbaijan)
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia)
Trans-Dniestr Republic (Moldova)

Reactive Foreign Policy

Domestic backlash against Western influence in Russian economy, former Soviet republics

Perceptions that Russia was being left out of important international decisions (NATO expansion; Kosovo)

Became more oriented towards Eurasian space (e.g. Shanghai Cooperation Organization)

2000: The sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine and the fire that damages the Ostankino television tower mark the decline of Russia as a power

2000: the first suicide bombing in Chechnya

Aug 2000: A corruption scandal erupts about the Three Whales shopping mall, owned by a former FSB chief, Sergey Zuev

Dec 2000: The officer investigating the Three Whales scandal, Pavel Zaitsev, is arrested

2001: Russia's share of the world's gross domestic product is only 1%

2001: there are 20 million Muslims in Russia (15% of the population)

2002: 120 Russian soldiers die when Chechen rebels shoot down a helicopter

2002: Chechen guerrillas directed by Basayev take 700 Russians hostage in a Moscow theater (129 die when Russian soldiers storm the theater with poisonous gas)

2002: suicide bombers kill 80 people in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya

2003: mass graves are discovered in Chechnya with thousands of bodies

2003: 59 people die in a bomb attack on Russians in Chechnya

2003: Chechen suicide bombers hit a rock concert in Moscow and kill 15 people

Jul 2003: Yury Shchekochikhin, a member of parliament who is investigating the Three Whales scandal, dies of a mysterious disease

2003: 50 people are killed in a suicide bombing at a military hospital in North Ossetia

2003: the FSB arrests Yukos' chief executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky (who owns 36.6% of the company), one of the richest men in the world

2003: Eduard Shevardnadze resigns as president of Georgia amid mass protests

2003: Chechen rebels blow up a train and kill 40 people

2003: between 1999 and 2003, Russia economy has grown by about 33%

2003: the Putin government acquires all national tv stations

2003: Viktor Cherkesov is appointed director of the Federal Drug Control Service

2004: Chechen terrorists bomb the Moscow underground, killing 39 people

2004: Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia join the European Union

2004: Chechen president Akhmad Kadyrov is killed by Chechen terrorists of Shamil Basayev's group in a spectacular stadium bombing

2004: Chechen rebels kill 92 people in neighboring Ingushetia

2004: Chechen terrorists of Basayev's group blow up two Russian airplanes, killing 89 people

2004: Chechen terrorists led by Shamil Basayev take more than 1,000 hostages in a Beslan school and kill 331, mostly children

2004: Chechen leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev is assassinated by Russian agents in Qatar

2004: due to low birth rate and high death rate, the population of Russia declines by 3.5 million between 1991 and 2004

2004: pro-western opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko wins elections in Ukraine after rigged elections had initially favored pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich ("Orange Revolution")

2005: Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov is killed by Russian forces

2005: the opposition in Kyrgyzstan forces the resignation of president Askar Akayev, who is replaced by Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the winner of national elections

2005: hundreds die in anti-government protests in the Uzbek city of Andijan (the USA and Britain protest, China supports the crackdown)

2005: a Caspian oil pipeline opens that bypasses both Russia and the Arab countries

2005: Russia ends its de facto dollar peg and aligns the rouble with the euro

2005: four bombs explode in the southern republic of Dagestan and kill eight people

2005: USA television channel ABC interviews the most wanted terrorist in Russia, Shamil Basayev

2005: Russian cosmonaut Sergei Krikalev sets a new record for the most cumulative time in space (800 days)

2005: 50 Chechen militants are killed when they attack the southern Russian city of Nalchik

Mar 2005: former Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov is killed by Russian troops

2005: Nambaryn Enkhbayar is elected president of Mongolia

2005: Russia sells "defense" missiles to Iran

2005: a row between Russia and Ukraine causes shortages of Russian gas supplies to Europe

Dec 2005: Chechen prime minister Ramzan Kadyrov, the son of assassinated Chechen president Akhmad Kadyrov, introduces elements of Islamic law shariha in Chechnya

2006: Russia shuts down two newspapers that reprint ironic cartoons about the Islamic prophet Mohammed

2006: Russia authorizes the FSB to carry out assassinations abroad

Mar 2006: Chechen prime minister Ramzan Kadyrov introduces a law that mandates the Islamic headscarf for women in Chechnya

2006: the Uzbek government jails dissidents Sandjar Umarov and Mukhtabar Tojibayeva

2006: Russia starts building an oil pipeline near Lake Baikal, that holds more than 20% of the Earth's nonfrozen fresh water

Jun 2006: Prosecutor general Yury Chaika, an ally of Viktor Cherkesov, reopens the Three Whales case and arrests Sergey Zuev

2006: Chechen leader Shamil Basayev is killed

2006: Anna Politkovskaya, a journalist who was a critic of Russia's policies in Chechnya, is murdered

2006: Turkmenistan's president Saparmurat Niyazov dies and is succeeded by Gurbanguli Berdimukhamedov

Nov 2006: Alexander Litvinenko is poisoned in London, and the British authorities blame former FSB agent Andrey Lugovoy

2007: Ramzan Kadyrov, suspected of human-rights abuses and of involvement in the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, is elected president of Chechnya

2007: for the first time since the death of Czar Aleksandr III in 1894 the Orthodox church presides over the funeral of a state figure (former president Boris Yeltsin)

2007: ethnic Russians riot in Estonia to protest the removal of a Soviet monument

2007: Andranik Markarian dies of heart attack and Serzh Sargsyan is elected prime minister of Armenia

2007: Putin threatens to retaliate against a proposed USA anti-missile defense system in Europe

2007: Russian president Vladimir Putin appoints Victor Zubkov prime minister

2007: Driven down by AIDS, alcohol and suicide, the population of Russia declines by 700,000 people a year

2007: serial killer Aleksandr Pichushkin confesses to 61 people

2007: Putin is the first Russian leader to travel to Iran since 1943

2007: Vladimir Putin's party wins more than 60% of the vote in parliamentary elections

Sep 2007: Russia establishes the Investigative Committee under Alexander Bastrykin, an ally of deputy prime minister Igor Sechin, thereby reducing the power of prosecutor general Yury Chaika

Oct 2007: Several senior officers of the Federal Drug Control Service are arrested by agents of the FSB and the Investigative Committee in what is widely viewed as a feud of the clan of Viktor Cherkesov (and prosecutor general Yury Chaika) against the clan of deputy minister Igor Sechin (and the FSB)

2007: Russian scientists dive underneath the North Pole leading Russia to claim half of the Arctic seabed

Jan 2008: Russia uses supplies of natural gas as a political weapon against the Ukraine

March 2008: Dmitry Medvedev wins elections in Russia and succeeds Putin, who is appointed prime minister

May 2008: Cherkesov is removed from his post at the Federal Drug Control Service

August 2008: Russia sends tanks into Georgia and bombs Georgian air bases after Georgia launches a military offensive to retake the breakaway province of South Ossetia

September 2008: Russian stock markets lose more than 50% of their peak value of May 2008

October 2008: Russia's Supreme Court rules that the last czar, Nicholas II, should be rehabilitated as a victim of political persecution

Nov 2008: The attorney Sergei Magnitski, who had exposed police corruption, is arrested

2008: Youstol Dispage dies

2008: Russia supplies 28% of Europe's natural gas

October 2008: A Russian military convoy is attacked by Muslim separtarists in Ingushetia

Jan 2009: Russian patriarch Aleksy II dies and is succeeded by metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk

Apr 2009: The counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya is officially ended

May 2009: Unemployment skyrockets in Lithuania (from 4.3% in 2008 to 16.8%), Latvia (6.1% to 17.4%) and Estonia (3.7% to 13.9%)

Jun 2009: A sniper kills the interior minister of Russia's Muslim region of Dagestan and a suicide car bomber tries to assassinate the president of Russia's Muslim region of Ingushetia

Jul 2009: Russian human rights activist Natalya Estemirova is assassinated in Chechnya, following the murders of human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov (January, Moscow), former Kadyrov bodyguard Umar Israilov (January, Vienna), former Chechen commander Sulim Yamadayev (March, Dubai), Yamadayev's brother Ruslan (September, Moscow)

Jul 2009: the Russian economy declines by 11% over the previous year

Aug 2009: 20 people are killed by a suicide bomber in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia

Sep 2009: Yielding to Russian pressure, the USA cancels a missile defense system in Eastern Europe

Oct 2009: The verse "Be thankful or grateful to God" from the Quran mysteriously appears on the leg of a nine-month boy of Dagestan, Ali Yakubov

Nov 2009: The attorney Sergei Magnitski, who had exposed police corruption, dies in prison

Nov 2009: Islamic terrorists from Ingushetia bomb a train in Russia killing 39 people, the first deadly terrorist attack outside Chechnya since 2004

Nov 2009: A report from the New York Academy of Sciences estimates that, due to the Chernobyl disaster, almost one million people have died, mainly from cancer, between 1986 and 2004

Nov 2009: Police officer Aleksei Dymovsky reveals police corruption in two videos posted on the Internet and is immediately fired and arrested

Dec 2009: 112 people die of an explosion at a nightclub in Perm caused by fireworks

Dec 2009: Due to the world economic crisis, Russia's GDP contracts 7.9% in 2009

Jan 2010: Russian police kill three Islamic fighters and a suicide bomber kills six police officers in Dagestan

Feb 2010: Viktor Yanukovich wins democratic elections in Ukraine against prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko

Mar 2010: Muslim women from the Caucasus stage a double suicide bombings on the Moscow metro that kills 39 people

Mar 2010: The opposition led by Roza Otunbayeva stages a coup in Kyrgyzstan and deposes president Kurmanbek Bakiyev

Mar 2010: In response to Aleksei Dymovsky's videos, the Russian parliament establishes harsh penalties for officers who criticize their superiors

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Jun 2010: Ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan kills more about 2,000 people

Sep 2010: A suicide bomber kills three Russian soldiers in Dagestan

Sep 2010: A suicide bomber kills 17 people in Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia

Sep 2010: Islamic militants kill 23 soldiers in Tajikistan

Sep 2010: Moscow's flagrant corrupt mayor Yuri Luzhkov is deposed by president Medvedev

Oct 2010: A report by Transparency International ranks Russia as the most corrupt country in Europe and one of the most corrupt in the world

Dec 2010: Riots in Moscow among football fans escalate into racial riots between ethnic Russians and North Caucasians

Jan 2011: More than 30 people are killed by a suicide bomber at Moscow's Domodedovo airport and Chechen warlord Doku Umarov takes responsibility
Apr 2011: A subway bombing kills 12 people in Belarus' capital Minsk

Assigned Reading List with Summary

Week 2. THE SOVIET SYSTEM (January 13)

Andrew Kuchins, "Why Russia is so Russian," *Current History*, vol. 108, no. 720, October 2009, pp. 318-24.

Russia never was a nation-state, but rather developed as an empire from the very beginning.

Natural Darwin geography of Eurasia

Third Rome Manifest Destiny - Successor of Byzantine

Insecurity of military, cultural, political, industrial, and agricultural backwardness: core features, and driving factors evident through czarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet Russian history: highly centralized and unaccountable political authority, weak and often virtually nonexistent institutions of private property and rule of law, and a great power mentality that is deeply militarized as well as colored by messianism and xenophobia

Remington, pp. 31-49; 89-100; and 120-50.

Reiterates absence of natural defense (p31) and harsh climate/low yield as a reason for a centralized, expanding power. Asserts Russian sentiment of national spiritualism because of strong ties with the orthodox 'national' church.

Absoluteism: ruler has absolute control

Patrimonialism: state perceived it owns and doesn't recognize distinct political interests

Discussing the vastness of the empire, he states the regimes reach extended its grasp
Makes the point on scepticism between state and citizens

Paradox of communism: real attempts at communism (the intent being to dismantle the state) have always resulted in the state wielding more control over its populace.

Week 3. *PERESTROIKA*, 1985-91 (January 20)

R. Judson Mitchell and Randall S. Arrington, "Gorbachev, Ideology and the Fate of Soviet Communism," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 33 (2000), pp. 457-74.

S. we may consider a provisional explanation concerning the connection between the demise of the old CPSU and the rise of the new CPRF. It has been argued here that the main strength of the CPSU lay in its tight internal organization based on "democratic centralism" and that this was also its greatest weakness, in that the party leader's dominance over ideology left the way open for a Gorbachev to

delegitimize the party. The CPRF has adopted the old organizational approach while its leader Zyuganov has rejected the Gorbachevian ideological deviations.

T. Lenin had set out a model of a highly centralized, authoritarian organization that could succeed only with maximum internal control and discipline. This model was to be the basis of organization for the ruling Communist Party; its central idea was incorporated in the Party Rules under the rubric of “democratic centralism.

Joachim Zweynert, “Economic Ideas and Institutional Change: Evidence from Soviet Economic Debates 1987–1991.” *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 58, no. 2, March 2006, pp. 169-192.

A key characteristic of a utopian ideology is its being related to the future, so for it to be sustained ‘it is of crucial importance that reality should at least develop in the right direction’.¹¹⁵ Yet the road to recovery was much more painful and tedious than predicted not only by the Russian, but also by the Western neo-liberal experts. As the neo-liberal doctrine still fundamentally contradicted the Russian intellectual traditions, almost nothing remained of it when it failed to fulfil its promises quickly. In this second phase of the transition debate, which started around 1993, the ideas that had been imported from the West would undergo a gradual adaptation to the path-dependent shared mental models prevailing in Russia.

Remington, 50-6; 100-104.

Week 4. THE SOVIET COLLAPSE: GROUP WORK DISCUSSION (January 27)

Viktor Sheinis, “August 1991: a Pyrrhic Victory,” *Russian Politics and Law*, vol. 45, no. 5, Sept-Oct 2007, 6-25.

Nowadays there is no division among those who have established themselves in power and firmly control not only the levers of state power but also most public institutions in Russia. at least, no division is visible yet. most well-known politicians and admins in power and out proclaim their loyalty to the president and his course...apparently a divided ruling elite is now a necessary although not a sufficient condition, a precondition for revolutionary reform.

Alexei Yurchak, “Soviet Hegemony of Form: Everything was Forever, until it was no More,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 45, 3, July 2003, pp. 480-510.

Alexander N. Yakovlev, *The Fate of Marxism in Russia*, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993, pp. 139-52 and 224-30.

Week 5: RADICAL REFORM (February 3)

Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, *Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Chapter 2, 19-43.

Remington, pp. 57-74, and chapter 7.

Week 6. CONSTITUTIONAL CRISES; ELECTIONS (February 10)

Jane Henderson, “The Russian Constitutional Court and the Communist Party case: Watershed or whitewash?” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 40, no. 1, March 2007, pp. 1-16.

When the trial started, three verdicts seemed possible: The President's edicts would be found legal, and the party unconstitutional; The edicts would be found unconstitutional and the party legal; The edicts would be found to have exceeded the President's authority, but the CPSU was unconstitutional in any case...The Russian Constitutional Court had only been functioning for a couple of months when it was presented with the first petition that led to the monumental Party case. It had barely had time to establish itself a workable modus operandi. Nevertheless the court managed to steer a path towards a resolution that bore one hallmark of success, namely, that both sides could claim some sort of victory. Thus the Constitutional Court judgment in the Communist Party Case was neither watershed nor whitewash; to a large extent it succeeded in being both.

Matthew Wyman, "The Russian Elections of 1995 and 1996," *Electoral Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1997, pp. 79-86.
Remington, 104-115.

Week 7. Class discussion: POLITICAL PARTIES, OPPOSITIONS AND SOCIETY (February 17).

Marcia Weigle, "Political Liberalism in Post-Communist Russia," *Review of Politics*, vol. 58, no. 3, 1996, pp. 469-503.

Andrei V. Berezkin, Mikhail Myagkov, and Peter C. Ordeshook, "The Urban-Rural Divide in the Russian Electorate and the Effect of Distance from the Urban Centers," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, vol. 40, no. 6, September 1999, pp. 395-406.

Remington, pp. 151-80.

FEBRUARY 21-25 WINTER BREAK – NO CLASS

Week 8. REFORM AND THE TRANSITION FROM YELTSIN TO PUTIN (March 3)

Gerald Easter, "The Russian State in the Time of Putin," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 24, no. 3, July-Sept 2008, 199-230.

Remington, 222-40.

Keith Gessen, "Cell Block Four," *London Review of Books*, vol. 32, no. 4, 25 February 2010, pp. 3-7.

Week 9. FEDERALISM; SOCIAL WELFARE (March 10)

Elena Chebankova, "The Unintended Consequences of Gubernatorial Appointments in Russia, 2005-6," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, vol. 22, no. 4, December 2006, pp. 457-84.

Reuter, Ora John. "The Politics of Dominant Party Formation: United Russia and Russia's Governors." *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 62, no. 3 (2010), pp. 293-327.
the Third Wave of 'democratisation' failed to reach the shores of certain long-lived autocratic regimes. We know now that many of these regimes failed to democratise because regime leaders successfully appropriated nominally democratic institutions in order to entrench their rule. A dominant party is one that has the leading role in

determining access to most political offices, shares powers over policy making and patronage distribution and uses privileged access to state resources to maintain its position in power. Some authoritarian leaders use a dominant party to secure victories at the ballot box, reduce transaction costs and bind allies to the ruling coalition. Others prefer to rule through a combination of charisma, patronage and coercion, rather than sharing power with a party. In the 90s Russia failed to attract significant support either from important regional elites or the Kremlin and thus never materialised into a true dominant party...the main hypothesis tested in this article is that individual elites with significant stores of political, personal and economic resources, that are difficult for state leaders to repress or control, are less likely to commit to a nascent dominant party. In other words, when elites can survive and prosper politically without relinquishing their autonomy to a dominant party, they will not bind themselves to such a party. The article tests this hypothesis with data on the timing of Russian regional executives' decisions to join the now-dominant party of power, United Russia. I argue that regional governors with autonomous resources delayed joining the party for longer than those without such resources....The ruling strategy of Russia's new authoritarian regime depends upon maintaining this elite cohesion so that opposition forces cannot field credible candidates. Once this is achieved, securing high turnout is the only remaining task.

Week 10. DEMOCRATIC REVERSAL (March 17)

Henry A. Hale and Timothy J. Colton, "Russians and the Putin-Medvedev 'Tandemocracy:' a Survey-Based Portrait of the 2007-2008 Election Season," *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 57, no. 2, March/April 2010, pp. 3-20.

Most observers contend that Putin continues to call the shots, but they acknowledge that Medvedev wields significant powers that may enable him eventually to move out from under the shadow of his patron. The result has been an injection of political uncertainty and, possibly, latent instability into Russian politics...It remains to be seen what would happen if Putin's team were ever to face an election in a time of grave crisis when it was unable to win the support of voters regardless of its attempts to manipulate popular opinion.

In light of these realities, policymakers would do well to avoid two pitfalls. One would be to put too many eggs in the Putin basket and rule out the possibility that Medvedev will eventually build up a power base of

his own, perhaps even one rooted in public attitudes. Russian voters as of 2008 seemed open to such a possibility. The other would be not to understand that the ruling duumvirate's appeal to the population is not based primarily on anti-Westernism or an anti-market animus but instead on guardedly pro-Western sentiment and a broadly pro-market economic orientation. While they may yet shift stance, to date they have not been willing to ride roughshod over public opinion. As we go ahead, therefore, close monitoring of the public mood will provide important clues as to how Russia will behave— and how far it will go to challenge Western ideals and norms—at home and abroad.

Archie Brown, "Forms without Substance," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 20, no. 2, April 2009, pp. 47-51.

Remington, 180-92 and 241-52.

Week 11. STATE AND SOCIETY: DISCUSSION (March 24)

Orlando Figes, "Putin vs. the Truth," *New York Review of Books*, vol. 56, no. 7, April 30, 2009, pp. 25-28.

Laura A. Henry, "Redefining Citizenship in Russia: Political and Social Rights," *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 56, no. 6, November/December 2009, pp. 51-65. Freedom House, for example, ranks states based their observance of political rights and civil liberties. Its assessment of Russia's observance of these rights has dropped steadily from 1991 to 2008. On a scale of 1 to 7 (with 1 as full protection of rights and liberties), political rights have fallen from 3 to 6, and civil liberties from 3 to 5, garnering Russia a designation as "not free."³...The need to deliver on technocratic promises in a context of financial crisis could destabilize the current political status quo, presenting a major challenge for President Medvedev. As he noted in his April 2009 interview with *Novaya gazeta*, a leading opposition newspaper, the social contract in Russia has been characterized as "sausages in exchange for freedom"; his administration, Medvedev agreed, should offer both freedom and prosperity

Elena Chebankova, "Evolution of Russia's Civil Society under Vladimir Putin: a Cause for Concern or Grounds for Optimism?" *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, vol. 10, no. 3, September 2009, pp. 394-415.

Week 12. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STATE (March 31)

David W. Rivera and Sharon Werning Rivera, "Yeltsin, Putin and Clinton: Presidential Leadership and Russian Democratization in Comparative Perspective," *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 7, no. 3, 2009, pp. 591-610.

Whether examined in cross-national or longitudinal perspective, we find that Russian democracy under Yeltsin was, relatively speaking, a success. We conclude that the Clinton administration's policy of support for Yeltsin both served various American foreign policy interests and strengthened the prospects for democratic consolidation in Russia, thereby fulfilling the dictates of both real- and idealpolitik. In addition, the relative success of Russia's democratization in the 1990s, the reversal of that pattern in this decade, and the magnitude of the transformation of the polity under Putin all demonstrate the pivotal role played by presidential leadership in Russia's transition...Russia's relatively strong performance in terms of democratization in the 1990s, its relatively weak performance in this decade, and the magnitude of the transformation of the polity under Putin all demonstrate that the ability of Russia's leaders to shape political outcomes is great. Moreover, such might very well be the case in any country in which the success or failure of democratic transition is by no means foreordained by elite or societal consensus.⁹⁴ In other words, while theorizing about the post-communist transitions has illuminated the impact of numerous structural and institutional variables, the role played by leadership has received less attention than it deserves.⁹

Charles King and Rajan Menon, "Prisoners of the Caucasus," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 89, no. 4, July/August 2010, pp. 20-34.

Remington, chapter 9.