

ARTH 383 - Art & Philosophy

Lecture 4 - Kant's Third Critique and Aesthetic Judgement (HEAVY)

- Kant- "Transcendental Idealism"
 - 'we can have no direct knowledge of things, we only have intuition.'
 - world outside our perception = noumena
 - we can only experience : phenomena
- imagination > apprehension, comprehension, reproduction
- judgement= subject + predicate (ie. stop sign)
- 3 kinds of judgment:
 - **cognitive**/speculative
 - **practical**/moral
 - **aesthetic**
- cognitive: description, experience > intuition + identifying (can be subsumed under)
- practical: moral - what should be. prescription.
- aesthetic: power/faculty, judgment of taste/beautiful
 - neither cognitive nor practical. discontinuity in judgment
- Kant: You can see an object from 3 different angles (NOT 'art for arts sake')
- cognitive: description can be validated
- aesthetic: taste can be disagreed upon
- in evaluation, language can change contexts > concept differs
- K: aesthetic judgment only possible intuition to a concept
 - our aesthetic judgment has no bearing on what object actually is or what we're seeing
- Analytic of the Beautiful: (see pic)
 - Judgement of taste is...

1. aesthetic & disinterested (quality)
2. singular & universal (quantity)
3. formal & reflective (relation)
4. necessary & exemplary (modality)

Aesthetic

- based on a feeling. Feeling is guideline rather than predefined concepts.
- sensation & subjectivity

Disinterested

- no personal interest, differs from concept of 'good'
- interest is practical, judgment of taste is irrespective of usefulness of an object
 - distinguishes between the 'agreeable' [sensation (empirical)] and the 'good' [usefulness (concept)]

Universal

- can be cognitively validated, a universal belief can not
- aesthetic judgment has subjective universal validity > something is true if everyone agrees
- connection to disinterest > practical, no vested interest
- *Freeplay* > concepts are not connected > we experience (singular) object rather than know it (cognitive)
- implicit universality to a singular judgment

Break

- pleasure/displeasure is exception to cognitive judgement
- aesthetic judgment contributes nothing to our knowledge
 - while of our faculties are engaged (differently)
 - judgement
- interest: faculty of desire engaged/concerned with real existence of an object

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- judgment of beauty is contemplative > must be completely indifferent to an object real existence
- not every sensation that pleases is agreeable
 - excluded > practical reason/ morality
- aesthetic judgment > subjective sensation > agreeableness
 - NOT cognition
 - not interested in real existence of object

faculty of desire: (note: ***these are NOT interchangeable***)

- 'good': an end/purpose
 - please as mean [usefulness] > chair (for sitting) > purpose, utility
 - pleases in itself [absolute good] > well-made, meets definition of what it's supposed to be
- 'agreeable': rests entirely upon sensation, please us immediately
 - ex. SPICY meal > agreeable as you're eating, Not GOOD after
 - pleasure is agreeable but not necessarily good (highest good)
 - gratification, happiness
- K: moral good carries highest interest (highest good)
 - the agreeable is pathological (subjective sensation)
 - the good is pure practical
- the agreeable and good requires real existence, taste (judgment of beauty) does not
 - the agreeable gratifies (available to irrational animals)
 - the beautiful pleases (disinterested/free delight)
 - the good esteems (only available to rational beings)
- 'taste/judgement can only be shown in the absence of hunger/interest '
- moral taste / judgment of the good makes no claim to beauty
- judgment of beauty devoid of interest must assume universal same liking
- universality of moral law based on concepts

- judgment of taste requires universal subjectivity
- judgment of the agreeable may not be shared, but by definition the beautiful must be shared by everyone
 - the act of judging beauty demands universal agreement
- K: if we disagree, its a misapplication of this faculty of judgement
- formal ..
- 'purposiveness' > must have a purpose
- 'end' > causality of concept in respect to its finality: destination, final purpose
- K: A judgment of taste can't rest on purpose
 - rests on a priori basis > pleasure (no circular cause)
- example of purposiveness: sea urchin > sense 'as if' somethings been designed with a purpose but we don't know/ cant imagine what it is
 - a feeling of a purpose
 - precedes feeling of pleasure
- 'charm'/emotion based on feeling but distinguished from aesthetic judgment
 - paraga (Derida)> doesn't intrinsically belong to object but part of presentation (ie. the frame)
 - not essential, simply accessory. NOT pure judgment of taste
- judgment of taste is independent from concept of Perfection
 - perfection is judgment of the good
- emotion is conceptual, feeling is subjective pleasure
 - for example Melodrama appeals to our emotions
- distinguishes
 - free beauty: represents nothing > pure taste.. ie. flowers, birds, instrumental music, etc.
 - accessory beauty: impaired with a purpose.. i.e. decoration of a church

Necessary

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- not objective, super sensitive
- judgment of taste is implicitly phrased conditionally (but not practical). common sense > everyone 'MAY' have the same judgment
- presupposes a 'Common Sense' based on our attuned mental state, as we can communicate
- 'this is beautiful' (supersensitive) suggests universal assent > not that everyone will agree but that everyone ought to agree (or might agree, but can't be proven)
 - beyond the possibility of being demonstrated, like numina
- imagination: lawful but follows free judgment
- Kant on geometric forms (Malevich) > why so gratifying?
 - geometric regularity speaks to purposiveness without purpose
 - freeplay of imagination not sufficient for judgment of taste
 - a fireplace may charm but is not necessarily beautiful
- we only make judgments to appeal to others
 - 'exemplary' to serve as an example (not necessitate agreement)