

Machiavelli - The Prince Ch5/15/17/17/21

- 3 options for states that have been acquired (previously had own laws/freedom)
 - Destroy them
 - Live there in person
 - Let them live under own laws + establish an oligarchy loyal to the prince
- No safe way to keep states other than to destroy them
- Becomes master of city used to freedom + doesn't destroy it -> expect to be destroyed
- Hatred/desire for revenge in conquered states
 - Safest is to destroy or live in the state
- Virtuous men are met with what destroys them + evil in the world
 - Necessary for successful princes to know how to do wrong + when it's necessary to use it
- Better/safer to be loved than feared
 - Love -> obligation -> broken promises when it's convenient to subjects
 - Fear of punishment -> more powerful
 - Inspire fear so if he doesn't win love he avoids hatred
- Remarkable/unusual action makes a prince esteemed
- Respected by deciding to align himself with one party vs another
 - Better than being neutral
 - If aligned with winner -> favour, if aligned with loser -> knows who to fear

Hobbes “Leviathan” - Notes contributed by Phoebe Warren

Chapter 13 - Nature has made men so equal in their physical and mental capacities that, although sometimes we may find one man who is obviously stronger in body or quicker of mind than another, yet taking all in all the difference between one another is not so great that one man can claim to have any advantage.

Most men think that they are superior to other when in fact there are very few people who are truly exceptional. It's just a fact about human nature that however much a man may acknowledge others to be more witty, eloquent, or most learned, he won't easily believe that many men are as wise as he is because he sees his own wisdom close up and other men's at a distance. This shows the equality of human beings rather than their inequality.

The three principal causes of discord:

Competition - The equality of ability produces equality of hope for the attaining of our goals. If any two men want a single thing that they can't both have, they become enemies.

Distrust - Because of the distrust among men, the most reasonable way for any man to make himself safe is to strike first by force or with cunning subdue other men. People who would otherwise be glad to be at ease within modest bounds have to increase their power by further invasions, because without that, in a purely defensive posture, they wouldn't be able to survive for long.

Glory - Every man wants his associates to value him as much as he values himself and any sign that he is disregarded or undervalued leads a man to try, as far as he dares, to raise his value in the eyes of others

Competition makes men invade for gain by using violence to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle. Distrust makes men invade for safety by defending themselves, their families, and their property. Glory makes men invade for reputation for trifles - a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of a low regard for them personally if not directly then obliquely through a disrespectful attitude to their family, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.

As long as men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in the condition known as “war” and this is the war of every man against every other man. There are these times of war and then there is peace. Normal, daily actions like locking the doors to our house show war and men trying to destroy one another. This is not to criticize man's nature - the desires and other passions of men aren't sinful in themselves nor are the actions that come from those passions.

It may be thought that there has never been such a time as there is now but there are many places where people live like that even now. In this war of every man against every man nothing can be unjust. Anything that a man can get is his for as long as he can keep it. If a man is placed in poor conditions by nature, he can take himself out of this situation partly through his passions and partly through his nature. The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire for things that are necessary for comfortable living, and a hope to obtain these by hard work.

Politics Among Nations- Morgenthau

1) A Realist Theory of International Politics

- Theory of international politics isn't an abstract, but rather empirical and pragmatic
- Must meet an empirical and rational test, is the theory consistent with facts?
- Two schools of thought
 - o Rational and moral political order can be achieved here and now, trusts education and reform
 - o The world is inherently imperfect and can't be made perfect, only better. Work to develop a better system of checks and balances (realism)
- Six principles for political realism
 - o Politics are governed by laws that have their roots in human nature
 - o Interest is defined in terms of power
 - o Realism doesn't fix the meaning of interest (power once and for all). Rather power may be anything that establishes and maintains the control of man > man
 - o Realism is aware of the moral significance of political action and of the tension between the moral command and the existence of successful political action. Universal moral principles can't be applied to the actions of the state
 - o Refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe
 - o The difference between realism and other schools of thought is profound
- Realism= how things are, rather than how we want them to be

2) The Science of International Politics

- There are different approaches to understanding international politics
- Purposes:
 - o Detect and understand the forces that determine international political relations
 - o Comprehend how these forces act upon each other
- Limitations to understanding
 - o The biggest difficulty is the ambiguity of the material
 - o We learn principles of international politics from comparing events
 - o Don't forget that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions impossible
- Understanding the problem of international peace
 - o A 3-fold revolution in political structure:
 - New bi-polar system
 - Incompatible systems of thought and action
 - Total destruction is possible

3) Political Power

- As means to the nations ends, states seek power to achieve these various goals
 - o Not every action that nations perform with respect to other nations is political
 - o Not all nations are at all times involved to the same extent in international politics
- Power: mans control over the mind and actions of others
 - o Physical power
- Political power: the mutual relations of control among the holders of political authority and the people at large
 - o Psychological power
- The depreciation of political power
 - o The struggle for power is universal
 - o Domination is a tendency of all human relations
 - o 2 roots of depreciation of political power
 - The philosophy of IR from the 19th century
 - The circumstances that determine the relations of the US to everyone else
- 19th century philosophy
 - o Domination of the middle class by the aristocracy
 - o Unable to see the political nature of legalized relations
 - o Politics were open and violent
- The American experience
 - o The uniqueness of the US

4) The Struggle for Power: Policy of the Status Quo

- Nations are either preparing for, engaging in, or recovering from violent conflict
- All politics reveal 3 patterns (and policies correspond)
 - o Keep power
 - o Increase power
 - o Demonstrate power
- Status quo Ante Bellum
 - o Aims to maintain distribution of power

The False Promise of International Institutions – John Mearsheimer

Introduction

- Institutionalism rests on the belief that institutions are a key means of promoting world peace
- Academic institutionalists consider institutions to be a powerful force for stability
- John Ruggie maintains, “There seems little doubt that multilateral norms and institutions have helped stabilize their international consequences.
- Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world
- They have no independent effect on state behavior

What are Institutions?

- A set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other
- They prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior

Realism

- International Relations is a constant state of war with the possibility of war always in the background
- International system is anarchic
- States inherently possess some offensive military capability
- States can never be certain about the intentions of other states
- States want to maintain their sovereignty

Cooperation in a Realist World

- States contemplating cooperation must consider how the profits or gains will be distributed among them
- States motivated by relative gains concern when considering cooperation
- Cooperation more difficult to achieve when states are attuned to relative gains logic rather than absolute gains logic

Institutions in a Realist World

- Most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power or even increase it
- Balance of power is independent variable that explains war

Variety of Institutional Theories

Liberal Institutionalism

- Focuses on the less ambitious goal of explaining cooperation in cases where state interests are not fundamentally opposed
- Each side has incentives both to cooperate and not to cooperate
- Theory focuses on economic and environmental issues
- Institutions contribute to international stability
- A theory that explains how institutions push states away from war

Causal Logic

- Cooperation is easier to achieve than realists recognize
- Principal obstacle to cooperation is the threat of cheating
- They accept that states operate in an anarchic environment and behave in self-interested manner
- Rules can work to counter the cheating problem

Flaws in the Causal Logic

- Liberal institutionalists assume that states are not concerned about relative gains, but focus exclusively on absolute gains
- A theory that accepts realism's core assumptions must confront the issue of relative gains if it hopes to develop a sound explanation for why states cooperate
- The theory has little utility when one accepts that states worry about relative gains
- Relative gains considerations pose a serious impediment to cooperation and must therefore be taken into account

Can Liberal Institutionalism be repaired?

- Powell maintains that relative gains considerations matter little, and that states act in accordance with liberal institutionalism when the threat of aggressive war is low
- Liberal institutionalism has little new to say about when states worry about relative gains
- Liberal institutionalism does not provide a sound basis for understanding international relations and promoting stability in the post Cold War world

Collective Security

- The problem of power is not a problem to be eliminated but a problem to be managed
- Difficult to find scholarly work that makes the case for collective security without simultaneously expressing grave doubts that collective security could ever be realized in practice (eg failure of League of Nations)

Causal Logic

- Collective Security assumes that states behave according to the dictates of realism
- Collective Security allows for changes in the status quo but those changes must come via negotiations
- “The evil-doer is supposed to find himself virtually isolated in confrontation with the massive forces of the international posse comitatus” Claude
- States must trust each other

Flaws in the Causal Logic

- Collective security does not provide a satisfactory explanation for how states overcome their fears and learn to trust one another
- Claude “collective security assumes the satisfaction of an extraordinary complex network of requirements”
- It is difficult to determine who is the troublemaker and who is the victim
- Theory assumes that all aggression is wrong but many occasions where conquest is warranted

Problems with the empirical record

- Collective security has never really worked when it mattered most (League of nations failed and United Nations was not involved during the Cold War)

Fallback Positions

- Peacekeeping and concerts might make the theory realizable
- However peacekeeping has no role to play in disputes between great powers
- Concerts are more likely to emerge in the wake of great power wars in which a potential hegemon has been defeated
- However they tend to only last a few years

Critical Theory

- Aim to transform the international system into a world society where states are guided by norms of trust and sharing
- Discourse largely shapes practice
- Aim is to “seek out the contradictions within the existing order for change to emerge”
- The theory says little about the desirability or feasibility of achieving that particular end

Causal Logic

- States behave according to the same norms or institutions that underpin collective security

- All states consider war as unacceptable practice
- Transform how states think about themselves and other states
- Top-down theory whereby elites play the key role in transforming language and discourse about international politics

Flaws in the Causal Logic

- It cannot serve as the basis for predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about the direction change takes
- They make arguments that directly contradict their own theory but which appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging

Problems with the empirical records

- There is little empirical evidence to support their claims and much to contradict them

Conclusion

- Institutionalism relates more to American values than Realism which explains its emergence and its significance
- Eliminates security competition amongst states and creates a more peaceful world
- However these theories do not accurately describe the world, hence policies based on them are bound to fail
- Institutions have mattered rather little in the past
- Misperceive reliance on institutional solutions is likely to lead to more failures in the future

Realism; Neo Realism, and War

Gideon Rose (1998) “Neoclassical Realism and Theories for Foreign Policy”

-Neorealists consider interactions among states, leaving issues of behaviour of individual states to foreign-policy theorists. Some, like Waltz, consider foreign policy too complex for theory, which could never parsimoniously make all the contributing factors endogenous. Many others, however, do confront foreign policy issues, falling into four main schools, which Rose terms “Innenpolitik theorists,” “offensive realists,” “defensive realists,” and “neoclassical realists.”

Four Theories of Foreign Policy

-Innenpolitik assumes that foreign policy is a direct outgrowth of domestic politics. Issues such as ideology, culture, and economics are oft-cited factors shaping states’ foreign policies. Rose criticizes Innenpolitik theorists for failing to explain why similar states behave dissimilarly (and vice versa).

-Offensive realists – also termed “aggressive realists” – posit a Hobbesian world wherein states seek to maximize what little security they have. Foreign policy then consists of ‘nervous states jockeying for position within’ this anarchic framework. (149) According to Rose, offensive realism falls short because states in similar structural positions often behave dissimilarly.

-Defensive realists also conceive of the system as fundamentally anarchic, but the anarchy is more innocuous. States can deal with most external threats through tweaks of the power balance; only in certain fear-breeding situations or with irrational rogue states does international violence break out. Foreign policy consists of (largely peaceable) reactions to systemic factors.

-Neoclassical realists reject the assumption that states’ sole aim is security; instead, states attempt to use their power to direct the international system towards their own goals and preferences. Therefore, states that are more powerful will prosecute foreign policies that are more far-reaching. Unit- level factors also matter, though; factors such as state structure and élites’ psychology refract international politics and determine responses.

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers

There have been three waves of books since 1980 dealing with relative power and its impact on foreign policy. All have noted the long-term link between economic growth and expanding military/political influence; conversely, when relative economic decline sets in, less sweeping policies result. These observations lead to a central tenet of neoclassical realism: “states use the tools at their disposal to gain control over their environment.” (157)

Perception and Misperception in International Relations

According to neoclassical realists, decision-makers' beliefs strongly affect the relationship between relative power and foreign policy. These beliefs may be incorrect or cause distortions unforeseen by the structural realist. The neoclassical perspective thus allows for quirks such as Gorbachev's destruction of the USSR through his attempts to strengthen it.

Bringing the State Back In

Another common neoclassical-realist concern is the ability of various state apparatuses to exploit their societies' power; i.e., state power vs. national power. By postulating a failure of some governments to convert fully the means of their society, neoclassical realists can explain empirical cases wherein states with great power would be expected to have more expansive foreign policies than they in fact did.

-Various neoclassical realists also inject other, idiosyncratic explanatory variables, such as Schweller's characterization of states as "status quo" or "revisionist."

Designing Social Inquiry

Methodologically, neoclassical realists begin their studies at the systemic level, but also consider how units operationalize systemic forces. Thus neoclassical realism demands expertise in the history and culture of the units under consideration before one can make foreign policy analysis. Neoclassical realists claim that power directly shapes only the generalities and not the specifics of foreign policy, and that the theory is therefore loose enough to make mid-range theorizing practicable.

NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND THEORIES OF FOREIGN POLICY

By Gideon Rose

- Neorealism tries to explain the outcomes of state interactions
- Theories of foreign policy seek to explain what states try to achieve in the external realm and when they try to achieve it
- Foreign policy is driven by both internal and external factors-
- Most common school composed of *Innenpolitik* theories- stress the influence of domestic affairs on foreign policy
- Offensive realism reverses *Innenpolitik* logic and argues that systematic factors are always dominant
- Defensive realism argues in practice that systematic factors drive some kinds of states behaviour but not others
- Neoclassical realism- explicitly incorporates both internal and external variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought, argues that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven foremost by its place in the int. system and its relative material power capabilities.
- Further- the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex due to systematic pressures
- NC realists argue that relative material power establishes the parameters of a country's foreign policy
- Because political leaders make foreign policy choices it is here perceptions of relative power that matter, not the actual quantities of physical resources or forces
- Countries with comparable gross capacities but different state structures will likely act differently
- *Innenpolitik* theories argue that internal factors (political and economic ideology, national character, partisan politics or socioeconomic structure) determine how countries behave to the outside world.
- Problem with *Innenpolitik* theories is that they do not account for why states with similar domestic systems often act differently and why dissimilar states act more alike in similar situations
- Offensive realism: assumes int. anarchy is generally Hobbesian- security is scarce and states try to achieve it by maximizing their relative advantage
- Rational states pursuing security are prone to conflict
- Domestic differences not important because pressures internationally are strong enough to make similar states behave alike regardless of internal characteristics
- Defensive realism: assumes that int. anarchy is often more benign, security is plentiful, normal states learn this from experience
- Only need to respond to external threats, which they balance and try to avoid conflict.

- Foreign policy activity is the record of rational states reacting properly to clear incentives, conflict only when absolutely necessary- disrupted when rogue states misread or ignore true security incentives
- Innenpolitik privileges domestic independent variables whereas offensive privileges systematic ones
- Innenpolitik theories are misguided because the dominant factor shaping foreign policies over time is there relative material power
- Defensive realism emphasizes countries response to threats and overlooks that ones perceptions of the thereat are shaped by ones material power
- Neoclassic realists use power to refer to the capabilities or resources with which states influence each other
- NCs assume states respond to uncertainties of international anarchy be seeking to control and shape their external environment
- Why there are so many different kinds: authors differ greatly in assumptions, objectives, and methodologies.

154 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 1
FOUR THEORIES OF FOREIGN POLICY

<i>Theory</i>	<i>View of International System</i>	<i>View of Units</i>	<i>Causal Logic</i>
<i>Innenpolitik theories</i>	unimportant	highly differentiated	internal factors → foreign policy
Defensive realism	occasionally important; anarchy's implications variable	highly differentiated	systemic or internal incentives factors → foreign policy (two sets of independent variables in practice, driving "natural" and "unnatural" behavior respectively)
Neoclassical realism	important; anarchy is murky	differentiated	systemic incentives (independent variable) → internal factors (intervening variables) → foreign policy
Offensive realism	very important; anarchy is Hobbesian	undifferentiated	systemic incentives → foreign policy

- Foreign policies change as states change rank
- Connection in the long run between a great powers economy and military power
- Changing capabilities helped to drive policy makers perceptions of external threats, interests, and opportunities.
- Stalin should have balanced against and not bandwagoned with Germany. Stalin mistakenly perceived Europe as tri-polar and not bipolar system; he expected a war of attrition in the west. Should have given Hitler the prospect of a two front war to deter him

- National political power- “the ability of state leaders to mobilize their nations human and material resources behind security policy initiatives.”
- Realism knows: systematic forces and relative material power shape state behaviour
- neoclassical realism predicts that an increase in relative material power will lead eventually to a corresponding contraction.
- Also that the process will not necessarily be gradual because it will depend on how political decision makers subjectively perceive them,
- NC predicts countries with weak states will take longer to translate an increases in material power into expanded foreign policy activity
- NC does not claim that power related forces will drive all aspects of foreign policy
- Conclusion: realism calls for emphasis on how relative material power is shown in the behaviour of decision makers

Kenneth Waltz (1988), “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory” (excerpts in Betts, Conflict After the Cold War (4th ed., 2013), pp. 100-106).

By: Peter Furberg peter.furberg@mail.mcgill.ca

Very brief context of the author / reading

Kenneth Waltz is the founder of the IR theory Neorealism and one of the most renowned International relations theorists. This article outlines some of the key neorealist concepts and how they relate to War and the outbreak of conflict. It was originally published in 1988 a year before the end of the cold war.

Key concepts and quotes from the reading

“neorealism maintains the main tenets of *realpolitik* but means and ends are viewed differently, as are causes and effects.” P, 100

Security- Whilst a Classical realist (Morgenthau) sees power “as an end itself”. Neorealism sees it as a potentially useful tool, however too much or too little of it could be risky. The ultimate concern of a state should not be **Power** rather it should be **Security**

“international politics can be understood only if the effects of structure are added to the unit-level explanations of traditional realism.” (p.102), therefore neorealism is commonly referred to as **structural realism**. Because of “how structures affect actions and outcomes, neorealism rejects the assumption that man's innate lust for power constitutes a sufficient cause of war in the absence of any other” (p.102)

“The essential structural quality of the system is **anarchy**-the absence of a central monopoly of legitimate force” (p.102)

Neorealism does not pay attention to difference between states. “The questions are then answered by reference to the placement of the units in their system and not by reference to the internal qualities of the units” (p.103)

Competition and conflict amongst states stem from (p.103)

1. Assumptions of anarchy: states must provide for their own security, and threats or seeming threats to their security abound
2. Preoccupation with identifying dangers and counteracting them become a way of life.

3. Relations remain tense; the actors are usually suspicious and often hostile even though by nature they may not be given to suspicion and hostility
4. Individually, states may only be doing what they can to bolster their security. Their individual intentions aside, collectively their actions yield arms races and alliances

Security dilemma: measures to enhance one state's security typically diminish that of others. Because of anarchy one state's comfort is another's worry (p.103)

“In an anarchic domain, a state of war exists if all parties lust for power. But so too will a state of war exist if all states seek only to ensure their own safety.” (p.103).

The origins of hot wars lie in cold wars, and the origins of cold wars are found in the anarchic ordering of the international arena. (p.103)

“In the great-power politics of a multipolar world, who is a danger to whom and who can be expected to deal with threats and problems are matters of uncertainty. In the great-power politics of a bipolar world, who is a danger to whom is never in doubt” (p.105)

“In a two-power competition, a loss for one is easily taken to be a gain for the other. As a result, the powers in a bipolar world promptly respond to unsettling events. In a multipolar world, dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear, and definitions of vital interests easily obscured” (p.105)

Miscalculation by some or all of the great powers is a source of danger in a **multipolar world**; **overreaction** by either or both of the great powers is a source of danger in a **bipolar world**

Which is worse: **miscalculation** or **overreaction**? **Miscalculation** is the greater evil because it is more likely to permit an unfolding of events that finally threatens the status quo and brings the powers to war. **Overreaction** is the lesser evil because at worst it costs only money for unnecessary arms and possibly the fighting of limited wars.

Brief description of how the concepts differ from others in the course

Neorealism vs Classical realism

- Security Vs Power
 - States do not necessarily lust for power (some might) as is assumed by classical realism

“Although neorealist theory does not explain why particular wars are fought, it does explain war's dismal recurrence through the millennia” p.103. Neorealism is therefore a grand theory, which many of the other concepts are not

Neorealism vs liberalism

Neorealism does not take into account nor consider internal conditions in a country, what liberalists refer to as preferences

.

Waltz – The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory

**Theory obviously cannot explain the accidental or account for unexpected events

**A theory indicates that some factors are more important than others and specifies relations among them.

Morgenthau

- believed “rational” statesman as ever striving to accumulate more and more power
- viewed power as an end in itself
- acknowledged that nations at times act out of considerations other than power
 - then their actions are not “of a political nature”

The struggle for power arises because men want things

Marxists

- like liberals, have linked the outbreak of war or the prevalence of peace to the internal qualities of states
 - Governmental forms
 - economic systems
 - social institutions
 - political ideologies

**Yet, although causes are specifically assigned, states with widely divergent economic institutions, social customs, and political ideologies have all fought wars.

- Variations in the characteristics of the states are not linked directly to the outcomes that their behaviors produce, nor are variations in their patterns of interaction. (618)

Neorealism

- international politics can be understood only if the **effects of structure** are added to the **unit-level** explanations of traditional realism (619)
- If an approach allows the consideration of **both unit-level and structural-level** causes, then it can cope with both the changes and continuities that occur in a system. (619)

Neorealist theory

- competition and conflict among states stem directly from the twin facts of life under conditions of anarchy
 - states in an anarchic order must provide for their own security
 - threats or seeming threats to their security
- Preoccupation with **identifying dangers and counteracting them** become a way of life
 - “**security dilemma**” - measures that enhance one state’s security typically diminish that of others. (620)

Neorealist argues that a state of war will also exist if all states seek only to ensure their own safety. (620)

KEEPING WARS COLD: THE STRUCTURAL LEVEL

Alliances are made by states that have some but not all of their interests in common (620)

The common interest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states

Divergence comes when positive interests are at issue (621)

The defeat or the defection of a major ally would have shaken the balance, each state was constrained to adjust its strategy and the use of its force to the aims and fears of its partners

In a two-power competition, a loss for one is easily taken to be a gain for the other. As a result, the powers in a bipolar world promptly respond to unsettling events. (622)

In a multipolar world, dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear, and definitions of vital interests easily obscured. (622)

Miscalculation by some of all of the great powers is a source of danger in a multipolar world.

Overreaction by either or both of the great powers is a source of danger in a bipolar world. (623)

Overreaction is lesser evil.

The separation of their (US and USSR) reduces the occasions for dispute and permits them, if they wish, to leave each other alone even though each defines its security interests largely in terms of the other. (624)

Self-dependence of parties, clarity of dangers, certainty about who has to face them: these are the characteristics of great-power politics in a bipolar world. (624)

KEEPING WARS COLD: THE UNIT LEVEL

But to believe that bipolarity alone accounts for the "long peace" between the US and the Soviet Union is difficult. Given the depth and extent of the distrust felt by both parties, one may easily believe that one of another of the crises that they have experienced would, in earlier times, have drawn them into war. For a fuller explanation of why that did not happen, we must look to that other great force for peace: **nuclear weapons**. (624)

Nuclear weapons dissuade states from going to war much more surely than conventional weapons do. (625)

Had the atom never been split, those two nations would still have much to fear from each other. Nuclear weapons reverse or negate many of the conventional causes of war. Wars can be fought in the face of nuclear weapons, but the higher the stakes and the closer a country comes to winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks of its own destruction.

Do we expect to lose one city or two? Two cities or ten? When these are the pertinent questions, political leaders stop thinking about running risks and start worrying about how to avoid them. (626)

In a nuclear world, a country cannot sensibly attack unless it believes that success is assured. (626)

The probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero. But the “real war” may, as James claimed, lie in the preparations for waging it. (627)

Nuclear weapons are not relative but absolute weapons. They make it possible for a state to limit the size of its strategic forces so long as other states are unable to achieve disarming first-strike capabilities by improving their forces. (627)

WARS, HOT AND COLD

In bipolar world, each of the two great powers is bound to focus its fears on the other, to distrust its motives, and to impute offensive intentions to defensive measures.

Hot wars originate in the structure of international politics. So does the Cold War, with its temperature kept low by the presence of nuclear weapons.

Stephen Walt: *Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning*

This reading by Walt is essentially about two types of state behaviour in alliance formation: balancing and bandwagoning. The question is whether states tend to join together and oppose a threat, or “bandwagon” with it and join in the conquest. Walt explores these two opposing behaviours and discusses which one is more prevalent.

Balancing:

- Essentially entails allying against an aggressor, joining with less powerful states to balance a threat
- This maintains security because weaker states are less of a threat and pose less of a risk of turning on their allies and conquering them
- Also increases a state’s influence in an alliance, since they hold more relative power and are essential to maintaining the balance

Balancing Implications on IR:

- Balancing behaviour leads to a safer and more stable world
- Aggression is less profitable and less likely because states will anticipate resistance
- The best example of balancing behaviour would be the Allied resistance to Hitler’s rise

Bandwagoning:

- The behaviour of allying with the stronger power or aggressive states in order to join them in their success
- Captured by the phrase “nothing succeeds like success” (111), meaning the more powerful and successful a state is, the more likely other states will join and their power will be reinforced

Bandwagoning Implications on IR:

- If bandwagoning behaviour is more common, a highly competitive and violent world is more likely
- If states ally with strong or aggressive states, then states will apply force to appear powerful in an attempt to gain more support
- Perceived losses also become unacceptable, as it is not just a loss in relative power but will impact the momentum of the balance of power
- This theory is best reflected in American containment policy, the idea that losing one country to communism would start a “domino” style collapse of American alliances

Walt’s hypotheses on when states balance/bandwagon:

- “In general, we should **expect balancing behaviour to be much more common** than bandwagoning, and we should expect **bandwagoning to occur only under certain identifiable conditions**”
- Great powers are more likely to balance a threat
- Weak powers will usually balance, unless facing an extreme threat from a great power

- Balancing is more likely when potential allies are abundant
- **Bandwagoning is generally only expected from weaker states facing a close and dangerous threat, lacking alternative allies.**

This reading falls under the category of neorealism and is an expansion of Waltz' theories on balancing and bandwagoning as an aspect of the global structure. By asserting that balancing is more common, it supports Defensive Realism's claim that security is plentiful and threats will usually be balanced.

Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity (Snyder and Christensen)

-Experts must cross-fertilize Walt's theory on foreign politics w/ other theories to come up w/ an accurate explanation of events → consider state's position in the international system and introduce role of perception

A. Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks

- Waltz argues that the structure of the international system determines what types of international behaviors will be rewarded (process of selection), and what types of foreign policy seem prudent to actors in the system (the process of socialization)
 - International anarchy selects states to form alliances in order to survive security threats → polarity affects efficiency of the balancing process
 - Multipolarity, an alliance between two equal powers impedes efficient power balancing because each state is dependent on the other for security (causes unrestrained war)
- Argues neither chain-ganging nor buck-passing can arise in bipolarity
 - Don't need to form alliances w/ small reckless countries because aren't dependent on allies for security
 - Superpowers also don't pass the buck to smaller states because smaller states can't defeat other superpowers
 - Super powers tend to overreact to threats in the periphery. Super powers should only intervene in peripheral conflicts if the assets at risk are worth it (limited intervention).
- Argues a system of two is more stable than a system of many
- Fails to specify when chain-ganging and buck-passing are likely to occur

B. Polarity, The Security Dilemma, and Perception

- Must consider all elements of international structure (i.e. polarities, technology, geography)
- Perception of strategic incentives must be introduced as an autonomous factor
- Waltz and Jervis argue that intensity of security dilemma changes w/ vulnerability of the state
- Both argue vulnerability leads to self-help strategies that leave everyone less secure
 - International order = anarchy
 - Less vulnerability → greater tendency to pass the buck
- Biases that affect perceptions of the structural incentives
 - Soldiers and policymaker's perceptions of international structural incentives are shaped by their formative experiences, especially the last major war.
 - Uncontrolled militaries favor offensive strategies

The Security Dilemma

	Perceived Defensive Advantage	Perceived Offensive Dilemma
Polarity	Multipolarity	Chain-ganging
	Bipolarity	Neither buck-passing nor chain-ganging

C. Alliance Strategies before WWI and WWII

- Alternative explanations for the differing alliance patterns
 - Franco-Soviet ideological differences: some argue it was due to France and the Soviet Union failing to create balancing alliance in 1930's. Doesn't take into account that France and Russia had an alliance before WWI.
 - Lesson that tight alliances cause war: in 1914 people believed this was true
 - Cost minimization: some say states make strategic decisions based on how costly the action/war would be. Others argue states make decisions based on security interests.
 - Germany's Greater Relative Power: Logically France and England shouldn't have passed-buck when fighting Germany because they had less power and other tactics would have been equally effective

D. Chain-ganging and buck-passing in WWI and WWII

- Perceptions of offensive advantage were associated w/ chain ganging
- Perceptions of defensive advantage were associated w/ buck-passing
 - States prefer to be on offensive
- Buck-passing is not only used to limit casualties and expenses

Hughes, "The Origins of WWII in Europe: British Deterrence, Failure, and German Expansionism"

- Origins of WWII from 2 views
 - o 1. Indictment of Hitler's aggrandizing choices and preference for violence, as well as questioning the judgement and strategy of the appeasers, aka Neville Chamberlain
 - o 2. Secular changes in relative power between states; to the relation between states' commitments and their ability to uphold and protect them; and to domestic, economic, and cultural dynamics that individually, or in combination, predisposed the situation to conflict
- Britain had worries of its imperial empire; didn't want war
- Chamberlain wanted to develop air power in hopes of deterring Hitler

British Strategy in the 1930s

- Britain thought it had a threat of an economic blockade against Hitler but Hitler replied with his invasion of Poland to absorb more wheat and oil

Chamberlain's Strategy, 1933-1936

- Chamberlain knew that Germany was not to be trusted and believed that disarmament was a bad idea
 - o He predicted war within 5 years with Germany and wanted to build up the air forces for when the time came

Bureaucratic Structure, Military advice, and Air Strategy, 1919-1936

- The RAF, Royal Air Force, in the 1930s became a unique and central part of the military that was used as an independent, strategic offensive deterrent and strike force
 - o Created conflict with the navy, decreased interservice coordination

Hitler's Strategy and Conceptions, 1933-1936

- Hitler first envisioned Britain as an ally to Germany in 1933, hoping that Britain would not care if Hitler's expansionist aims only encompassed the continent

Chamberlain's Strategy, 1937/38

- Britain was worried about air strategy and a first attack from Germany in 1937
- Britain believed Germany to have economic vulnerabilities and would therefore be interested in cooperating with Britain
- Munich Agreement was held and Chamberlain felt as if he achieved peace and time to arm troops but recognized the consequences if Hitler decided to go back on the agreement
 - o War was inevitable

Hitler's conceptions and Strategy, 1937/38

- Hitler was frustrated at Britain after the Munich Agreement because they didn't want to pursue an alliance on his terms

Chamberlain's Strategy, 1939/40

- Britain was looking first to Poland and Rumania as allies after Hitler took Prague in 1939
- The Soviets were not yet trusted militarily by Britain but considered a possible alliance with them in May 1939

Hitler's Strategy and Diplomacy, 1939/40

- Hitler thought that his diplomatic win with the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939 would shock Britain into resignation over eastern Europe
 - o Wanted to isolate Poland so Britain couldn't save Poles
- Hitler was not expecting war to begin when he invaded Poland but soon saw it was evident after Britain's treaty with Poland

Churchill and Continuity in British Strategy, 1940

- Churchill's strategic thinking was actually closer to Chamberlain's than people recognize concerning faith in the bomber and economic sanctions as a weapon
- Chamberlain should be given more credit than he has because of his programs during peacetime that Churchill employed during his time of power

Strategic Puzzles of Prewar Diplomacy

- Argues Chamberlain had a strategy in the 1930s to address threats Britain faced
- British diplomatic strategy was conducted with one eye on the European continent and the other on imperial defense
- Britain wanted to remain diplomatic with Italy and Japan and arm themselves against Germany and hope that if war broke out they wouldn't have to fight all 3 powers
- Britain didn't choose to align with the Soviets instead of Poland because they believed that if the central European states were left to decide a side to pick they would choose Germany
- Hitler was afraid that a war of attrition with Britain and France would deplete Germany's resources and decided that attacking first would be the best option

On Appeasement, Deterrence and the Munich Analogy

- Appeasement is not always a bad strategy but carries the reputation of that because of Hitler's aggression
- Britain practiced a strategic deterrence which failed but combined appeasement and deterrence concerning air power

POLI 244

Article Notes: Robert Art "To What Ends Military Power"

Contributed by Elisey Sirko

- The Four Functions of Force:
 - Defence
 - Deterrence (the most difficult to demonstrate)
 - Compellence (easiest to demonstrate, but hardest to achieve)
 - "Swaggering" (most difficult to pin down analytically)
- The measure of the capabilities of a states military forces must be made relative to those of another state.
- A state that can compel another state can also defend against it and usually deter it.
- Defence is the goal that all states aim for first, if defence is not possible, deterrence is generally the next priority.
- **DEFENCE:**
 - Deployment of military power
 - Ward off an attack and to minimize damage to oneself if attacked
 - Will direct its forces against those of potential or actual attacker, but not against own unarmed population
 - If a state strikes first when they believe an attack upon is imminent, it is launching a preemptive blow. If it strikes first, when it believes an attack is inevitable but not momentary, it is a *preventive blow*.
 - It is better to strike first than to be struck first. "The best defence is a good offence"
- **DETERRENCE:**
 - Deployment of military power so as to be able to prevent an adversary from doing something that one does not want him to do and that he might otherwise be tempted to do

by threatening him to do and that he might otherwise be tempted to do by threatening him with unacceptable punishment if he does it.

- Deterrence is the threat of retaliation

- Deterrence employs force peacefully
- A deterrent threat is made precisely with the intent that it will not have to be carried out. Thus, threats are made to prevent action from being undertaken.
- Defence is possible without deterrence, and deterrence is possible without defence.
- Defence, therefore, does not necessarily buy deterrence, nor deterrence defence.
- Whether a given state can defend or deter or do both vis-à-vis another depends on two factors (1) the quantitative balance of forces between it and its adversary; and (2) the qualitative balance of force, that is, whether the exact military technology favours the offence or the defence.

- **COMPELLENCE:**

- The deployment of military power so as to be able either to stop an adversary from doing something that he has already undertaken or to get him to do something that he has not yet undertaken.
- Involves initiating an action that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds.
- Compellence can employ force either physically or peacefully
- A state can take actions against another that do not cause physical harm but that require the latter to pay some type of significant price until it changes its behaviour.
- The distinction between compellence and deterrence is one between *active* and *passive* uses of force. The success of a deterrence threat is measured by its not having to be used. The success of complement action is measured by how *closely and quickly* the adversary conforms to one's stipulated wishes.

- **SWAGGERING:**

- The deployment of military power for purposes other than defence, deterrence or compellence.

- Force is not aimed directly at dissuading another state from attacking, at replying attacks, nor at compelling it to do something specific.

- Involves only the peaceful use of force and is expressed usually in one of two ways:

- Displaying one's military might at military exercise and national demonstrations

Robert Art Reading:

Focuses on 4 strategic functions of military force:

1. Defence
2. Deterrence
3. Competence
4. Swaggering

-Not all four are necessarily well or equally served by a military posture
-only great powers can use two functions at once

Defensive:

-deployment of military power
-direct threat or potential or actual attacker
-can strike first or use after an attack
-only when they believe an attack is inevitable

Purpose

-dissuade an adversary from attacking
-minimize damage if attacked

Means

-adversaries victory is made less likely and more costly

Deterrence

Purpose

-dissuade an adversary from attacking
-prevent something undesirable from happening
-employs force peacefully

Means:

-credible threat of retaliation with unacceptable damage

*deterrence and defensive are alike as they strive to protect its state and allies

Compellent

-persuade an adversary to change behaviour
-to stop it from doing something, or to start it from doing something
-will continue to hold sanctions over a country until it stops or starts to do what they want
-active use of force

Swaggering

-Increase prestige
-show off military power
-could also be considered a form of deterrence

Reading Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons by Scott D. Sagan

2015-12-04 5:44 PM

Written 1996-97

Purpose of the article: challenge the conventional wisdom on the question, which is that states do so when they face threat and that alternative methods are not enough to resist such a threat

3 alternative theoretical frameworks are suggested:

- The security model
- The domestic politics model
- The norms model

Context: even with non proliferation treaty (NPT) many states will come to have a status of latent nuclear weapons capability because it allows them to do so (because the NPT encourages development of power reactors in exchange for imposition of safeguards)

Author says that there will be tensions in the future between U.S. deterrence policy (made to address security of potential proliferators) and U.S. NPT policies (made to increase international norms against nuclear use and acquisition)

The Security Model: Nuclear Weapons and International Threats

- like a chain reaction (if a state of your state gets nuclear power for an enemy, then you're threatened and you get it too)
- According to neo-realism theory must balance against rival to maintain national security
- and if you're a weak state you find a nuclear ally
- example of WWII: no one was certain that the development of nuclear weapons was possible but all knew the others would be ready to work on it or were already
 - after Hiroshima Stalin was like guys get me atomic weapons ASAP
 - then London and Paris built nuclear weapons because of the Soviet threat
 - Then China developed it because threat of the US after Korean war
 - After China did it India had to do it

Explaining the nuclear restraint

- South Africa built small nuclear weapons because of Soviet expansionism threat
- But destroyed them in 1991 because the threats they were facing from Cold War, Namibia and Angola were no more
- Former Soviet members didn't do it because didn't see Russia as a huge threat and knew they had the U.S. if something happened

Policy implications of the security model

- maintenance of U.S. nuclear commitments to key allies is considered crucial
- Article VI (to not pursue nuclear race) of the NPT is not significant because it will not change the security status of non-nuclear states

Problems and evidence

- we move backwards to find the event in international politics or national security threat that "must" have caused the decision to develop nuclear weapons
- Sagan suggests we should open the black box of decision-making

The Domestic Politics Model: Nuclear pork and parochial interests

- nuclear weapon acquisition serves some individuals' bureaucratic or political interests
- according to the literature, these bureaucratic actors create favorable conditions to weapon acquisition
 - overestimating threats, lobbying, promoting supporting politicians
- such ideas often developed in state labs
- scientists interested in the prestige and \$, find sponsors
- creation of a coalition in the legislative or executive branches
- in this view, nuclear programs are result of looking for a solution to a problem that justifies the program

Proliferation revisited: addressing the India puzzle

- the state actors were divided between those who wanted to develop after the Chinese nuclear test and those for global disarmament
- Homi Bhabha was a loud lobby, head of atomic energy commission
- many say that Indira Gandhi accepted to test a peaceful Indian nuclear device to address domestic political concerns, not international threats
 - she didn't consult the military

- defense minister was only informed later
- wanted to get better public opinion after a recession, riots
- could explain why it didn't develop after China's test, but shortly
- not a symbol of success of national security, symbol of failure because had to join the pro-bomb lobby to cover the costs

Development and denuclearization: South Africa revisited

- reversals of weapon decisions occur with major internal political changes
- in fact the research really started when building explosives for mining activities
- same for the destruction of its stockpile: fear of ANC control of nuclear weapons
- Example of Argentina and Brazil retraining too even if threat didn't decrease
 - because liberal coalitions didn't want to impede international market access

Policy implications

- calls for a broader set of diplomatic efforts
- economic limitations
- demanding estimates of investments in nuclear program could be a good motivator for anti-proliferation coalitions
- alternative sources of employment than weapons program
- Different perspective on NPT emerges: NPT can be a tool to empower domestic actors against nuclear, monitoring enforcement incentives

The Norms Model: Nuclear Symbols and State Identity

- symbolic function of weapon acquisition
- motivation: what is considered appropriate in international relations, shared belief of what is the modern behavior
- same model can be applied to anti-colonialism, abolition of slave trade
- are part of the modern state image
- coercion and power play more important role than norms, but social movements/causes motivated by those normative beliefs can prompt creation of rules

- Yet, NPT created a shift in nuclear norms, constrained the powerful actors
 - 60's: joining the nuclear club was cool and in 90's joining the NPT club was cool

Proliferation revisited: French grandeur and weapons policy

- reduce France's dependence on the US and vulnerability to Soviet blackmail
- but security model not plausible
- wanted to return to its pre WWII great status

Restraint revisited: The NPT and the Ukraine case

- Independent Ukraine already had 4000 nuclear on or under its wail
- anti-nuclear positions in Kiev to support claims of national sovereignty, separated from Soviet union
- pressure that if they were not part of NPT there'd be bad econ consequences (from US and NATO allies)

Policy implications

- adjusting US policies to increase likelihood that norms will motivate others towards policies that will serve US interests
- (NPT has influenced US policy)
- but this will be difficult because the US's nuclear first use doctrine influences potential proliferators decision of is getimate or not to possess weapons
- This model produces a more optimistic vision of potential future of nonproliferation
 - but need nuclear powers to reaffirm their commitment to global nuclear disarmament

Conclusion:

- True that most of past proliferant cases explained by security model,
- but multicausality is at the heart of proliferation problem
- no single policy can improve future problems
- It will be to the U.S. to chose between 1) a non proliferation task and guaranteeing no production and stop getting allies and promising them nuclear protection, 2) or to maintain to make new nuclear states

Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? By Scott Sagan

In his article, Sagan wants to debunk the popular belief that states will only and solely develop the nuclear weapon if they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative means. Indeed, the author analyzes three alternative theoretical frameworks in order to explain why states decide to build or refrain from developing nuclear weapons. These 3 models are the security model, the domestic politics model and the norms model.

The Security Model

This model is the most commonly used to explain the reason why states acquire the bomb and is based on basic Classical Realist theory. According to this model, states will build nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially nuclear threats. Its main argument is that because of the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, any state that seeks to maintain its national security must balance against any rival state that develops nuclear weapon by gaining access to a nuclear deterrent itself. Moreover, it is based on the argument that “proliferation begets proliferation”. Indeed, every time one state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear threat to another state in the region, which then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons program to maintain its national security. The most easily understandable example for this model is the Soviet Union’s program, which was reinvigorated and heavily funded after the USSR witnessed the nuclear power of the United States during their attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The Domestic Politics Model

This second model of nuclear proliferation focuses on the domestic actors who encourage or discourage governments from pursuing the bomb. It claims that nuclear weapons can be political tools used to advance the interest of particular parochial and bureaucratic groups and that domestic actors will often encourage or discourage their government from pursuing the bomb. Examples of influencing groups mentioned by the author are indeed the state's nuclear energy establishment, important units within the professional military, and politicians who operate in states in which individual parties or the mass public strongly favor the nuclear weapons' acquisition. The author further argues that when the previously mentioned groups are strong enough to form coalitions and control the government's decision-making process, nuclear weapons programs are likely to thrive. Moreover, in this theory, bureaucratic actors are seen as being the ones who create the conditions that favor weapons acquisition by encouraging extreme perceptions of foreign threats. Finally, the NPT is an element that could favor and help the few domestic actors who are against the development of the nuclear weapon by their government. This model is mostly liberal since it uses preferences as its main argument. Realists, on the other side, have recognized that domestic political actors have parochial interests but have argued that such interests have only a marginal influence on crucial national security issue. A good example of the Domestic Politics Model is India, which developed its nuclear weapons' program after heavy lobbying from the Atomic Energy Commission even though the Prime Minister was not in favor of it because of the high costs involved.

The Norms Model

The last model aiming to explain why states develop nuclear weapons is the Norms Model. Its main argument is that nuclear weapons' decisions are made on the basis that nuclear weapons serve important symbolic functions (nuclear symbolism), both shaping and reflecting a state's identity. This constructivist model explains that state behavior is not determined by national security and parochial interests but rather by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what is legitimate and appropriate in international relations and the way the nuclear weapon is perceived in different states. This theory further argues that decisions regarding the atomic weapon are deeply embedded in their social environment and the certain structures and behaviors it promotes. In another vein, nuclear weapons can serve extremely symbolic functions by reflecting the state's leader's perception of appropriate and modern behaviour and can be aimed at giving the state more prestige and international respect. An interesting application of this theory is the history of nuclear proliferation because a major discontinuity (a shift in nuclear norms) has emerged as the result of the NPT regime.

Iran Nuclear Negotiation

Waltz vs. Edelman et al.

Background

Kenneth Waltz

Founder of Neorealism

- States concerned w/ safety and security
- War occurs b/c of miscalculation and overaction



Eric Edelman

- Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under President George W. Bush
 - Conservative Military Policies



Waltz's Arguments and Edelman's Rebuttals

Waltz:

- Development of Iran Nuclear Weapon will stabilize the Middle East
 - Bipolarity > Unipolarity
- Iranian government is rational. Understands threat of retaliation.
 - Iran's concerned w/ security = Neorealism
- Allow Iran to develop Nuclear weapon. Iran and Israel should sign treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities.



Edelman:

- Will cause a nuclear arms race in the region
 - Multipolarity = less stable
- Iran is concerned only w/ gaining power in the region
 - aligns with Realism
- Iran is unpredictable. U.S. doesn't have missile defense program to protect itself and allies in case of emergency.

Edelman's Arguments and Waltz's Rebuttals

Edelman:

- Will lead to nuclear arms race
 - Short term: Israel v. Iran
 - Long term: Saudi Arabia and others
- If U.S. allows Iranian nuclear program, Iran could turn against US
 - Terrorism
 - Israel conflict
- U.S. could lose legitimacy as global mediator

Waltz:

- No nuclear proliferation in 70 years
 - Israel's nuclear weapons didn't cause proliferation
- Countries with nuclear programs feel more vulnerable → cautious
 - Neorealism
- N/A

Solutions

Waltz:

- 3 different outcomes:
 - Diplomacy + Sanctions → abandon program or feel more vulnerable
 - Stop short of building weapon but is capable of creating one quickly
 - Build nuclear weapon → more stability
- Solution:
 - Allow Iran to develop Nuclear weapon. Iran and Israel should sign treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities.

Edelman:

- 3 part solution:
 - Diplomacy and Sanctions
 - Clandestine Action
 - Threat of military force into alignment
- 2 possible strategies:
 - Containment of nuclear Iran or military intervention

What do you think is Iran's motivation to develop a nuclear weapon?

What could be the most stable outcome of the crisis for the region?

The dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The limits of containment Eric Edelman, Andrew Krepinevitch and Evan Braden Montgomery

It seems more likely that a nuclear armed Iran would become aggressive.

Iran, Israel and the bomb

- Greatest concern: Iranian-Israeli concern would emerge.
- Iran's nuclear weapons would remain a persistent source of instability in the Middle East
- As Israel is a very small country, only one nuclear bomb could destroy it. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Israel might abandon its posture of nuclear opacity, that is to say its policy of refusing to confirm or deny that it has nuclear weapons.

From Islamabad to Riyadh

- Analyses have highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)) have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs.
- Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals.
- Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia

N player competition

- If Saudi Arabia gets a nuclear arsenal, in the middle east, 3 powers could be nuclear powers: Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia: MULTIPOLAR WORLD (source of instability)
- In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, warhead miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses.

Incredible deterrents

- Tehran's leadership structure and decision making are opaque and has a hostile behavior (support for proxies such as Hezbollah)

- “One of the most important elements of a U.S containment strategy would be extended deterrence, that is, discouraging Iran from attacking states in the Middle east.”
- The United States does have significant ballistic missile defense capabilities, which could strengthen extended deterrence by countering Iran's most likely nuclear delivery systems.

Accepting the unacceptable

- If the US cannot prevent a conventionally armed Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, its patterns in the Middle East will almost certainly question its willingness to stand up to a nuclear armed Iran
- United States has traditionally adapted the size and the composition of its nuclear arsenal according to the Soviet Union's force. Now, however, it must be able to deter attacks against its territory by several countries: Russia, still, as well as China, North Korea, and perhaps soon Iran.

What to do

- The United States should continue to apply diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran, a durable resolution to this dispute may rest on the possibility that a significant portion of the Iranian public will conclude that the game is not worth the candle
- Buy additional time for diplomacy to work, for effective military options to be developed, and for steps to be taken that could reduce U.S. vulnerability to any Iranian retaliation.

“It seems more likely that Iran would become increasingly aggressive once it acquired a nuclear capability that the United States’ allies in the middle east would feel greatly threatened and so would increasingly accommodate Tehran, that the United States’ ability to promote and defend its interests in the region would be diminished and that further nuclear proliferation, with all the danger that entails, would occur.”

“In sum, any US effort to implement an extended deterrence regime in the Middle East in order to contain a nuclear Iran and stem proliferation in the region would face very serious challenges.”

Kenneth Waltz – Why Iran Should Get the Bomb

Main Argument: The US and Iran have portrayed Iran in a negative way and that if Iran acquired nuclear weapons they would use it in the same way as all other countries in the nuclear club, as deterrence and to enhance their security

- Despite the US and Israel's warning that nuclear Iran can only cause harm Waltz argues that it is in fact a good thing that could bring stability to the Middle East
- Iranian nuclear crisis could end in 3 different ways
 - Firstly, diplomacy as well as the sanctions placed on Iran could cause Iran to abandon nuclear option (unlikely because North Korea serves as an example of persisting with development of nuclear weapons despite countless sanctions)
 - Secondly, Iran stops testing but develops breakout capability meaning they would have sophisticated nuclear program without actually having the bomb, but could produce it in short notice (might not work out as intended)
 - Thirdly, potential for standoff is Iran develops bomb. Israel and the US say they won't stand for Iran's nuclear testing but every time a country has entered the nuclear club other countries have shifted their agendas
- Israel wants to remain nuclear power in the region and has historically used force to remain so (1981 bombing of Iraq and 2007 bombing of Syria both of which were to prevent those countries nuclear developments)
- Deep concern that Iranian regime is irrational, but regardless of threats Iran has issued towards Israel they have never acted on them indicating Iran's rational desire for preservation
- Waltz argues that Iran is trying to develop the bomb not to gain power but to increase security
- Belief that Iran could hand the bomb off to terrorist groups that they support like Hezbollah, but Waltz argues that countries can't fully predict what terrorist groups would do with the bomb so Iran would not give it to them at the risk of their own security
- Fear that other states would follow in the path of Iran if it acquired the nuclear bomb, but Waltz argues that nuclear weapons have been around for 70 years and Iran's acquiring would not suddenly mean wide spread proliferation in that region
- Waltz concludes that the US and its allies should not take such bold measures to prevent Iran from possessing the bomb and should take comfort that historically nuclear bombs have allowed for more peace than they've caused violence.

"Andrew Moravcsik (1997), "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization 51:4, pp. 513-553.

Summary:

Moravcsik lays out liberalism as a theory of international politics and discusses basic assumptions and how it differs from other theories.

For liberals, the configuration of state **preferences** matters most in world politics – not, as realists argue, the configuration of capabilities and not, as institutionalists argue, the configuration of information and institutions. He defines liberal theory's fundamental premise as follows: the **relationship** between **states** and the **domestic and transnational society** in which they are embedded **shapes state behavior** by **influencing the social purposes** underlying **state preferences**.

Liberal theory of IR rejects the utopian notion that an automatic harmony of interest exists among individuals and groups in society; scarcity and differentiation introduce an inevitable measure of **competition**. For liberal theory, since individuals are on the **average risk-averse**, they defend existing investments but remain more cautious about assuming cost and risk in pursuit of new gains.

Core Assumptions of Liberal IR Theory

1. The Primacy of Societal Actors: "The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence."
2. Representation and State preferences: "States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics."
-> State generally represents some groups more fully than others.
State is **not an actor** but a **representative** institution constantly subject to construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors. Individuals turn to the state to achieve goals that private behavior is unable to achieve efficiently.
-> Liberal theory focuses on the consequences for state behavior of shifts in fundamental preferences, not shifts in the strategic circumstances under which states pursue them

Assumptions 1 + 2 : states do not automatically maximize fixed, homogenous conceptions of security, sovereignty, or wealth. Instead States pursue particular interpretations and combinations of security, welfare, and sovereignty preferred by powerful domestic groups.

States represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics.

3. Interdependence and the international system: "The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior. "
For liberals, state behavior reflects varying patterns of state preferences. Each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other states.

Link between state preferences and state behavior is provided by the concept of policy interdependence, which is defined as a set of costs and benefits created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their preferences. The pattern of interdependent state preferences imposes binding constraints on state behaviour.

"What states want is the primary determinant of what they do" = liberalism (≠ realism and institutionalism: the state behavior has ironic consequences, for realist like Waltz "results achieved seldom correspond to the intentions of actors" no valid generalizations can logically be drawn variation in means, not ends, matters most)

Liberalism is accused to be only a domestic, a unit-level theory ("reductionism"), it's false because:

- State preferences reflect transnational societal interaction
- The strategies selected by a state and the systemic constraints to which it adjusts reflect not simply its own preferences but the configuration of preferences of all states linked by their policy interdependence

Liberalism can explain not only the "foreign policy" goals of individual states but the "systemic" outcomes of interstate interaction and liberalism offers a distinctive conception of political power in world politics (for realist its unique)

Liberals claim that the pattern of interdependence among state preferences is a primary determinant not just of individual foreign policies, but of systemic outcomes, is commonsensical. Nations are rarely prepared to expend their entire economic or defense capabilities, or to mortgage their entire domestic sovereignty, in pursuit of any single foreign policy goal

Liberal Theory as Systemic Theory

For realists, results achieved seldom correspond to the intentions of actors, hence, no valid generalizations can be drawn from an examination of intentions. In short, variation in means, not ends, matters most.

For liberal theory, what states want is the primary determinant of what they do. State preferences may reflect patterns of transnational societal interaction, they may vary in response to a changing transnational social context. Behavior of a single state reflects not simply its own preferences, but the configuration of preferences of all states.

Moravcsik argues that, contra Waltz, liberalism can explain not only the foreign policy goals of individual states but the systemic outcomes of interstate interactions. An example for this is the democratic peace literature.

Three variants of liberal theory:

1. Ideational liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of conflict and compatibility among collective social values or identities concerning the scope and nature of public goods provision.
2. Commercial liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of gains and losses to individuals and groups in society from transnational economic interchange.
3. Republican liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of varying forms of domestic representation and the resulting incentives for social groups to engage in rent seeking.

Variants of Liberal Theory

1. Ideational liberalism focuses on the compatibility of social preferences across fundamental collective goods like national unity, legitimate political institutions, and socioeconomic regulation.

- Liberal tradition: John Stuart Mill, Giuseppe Mazzini, Woodrow Wilson

Three essential elements of domestic public order often shaped by social identities are, political decision-making processes, and socioeconomic regulation

Three fundamentals type of social identity;

- Geographical borders

- Political decision making process (the commitment of individuals and groups to particular political institutions)

- Socioeconomic regulations, the nature of legitimate socioeconomic regulation and redistribution

2. Commercial liberalism explain the individual and collective behavior of states based on the patterns of markets incentives facing domestic and transnational economic actors (but commercial liberalism does not predict that economic incentives automatically generate universal free trade and peace)

3. Republican liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of varying forms of domestic representation and the resulting incentives for social groups to engage in rent seeking. Emphasizes the ways in which domestic institutions and practices aggregate underlying societal identities and economic interest, transforming them into state policy. The mode of domestic political representation determines whose social preferences are institutionally privileged

“Democratic peace”?

He then argues that liberal theory can be compared with and prevail over other theories. He discusses liberalism on four grounds: parsimony, coherence, empirical accuracy, and multicausal consistency.

Liberalism compared to realism and institutionalism:

- Liberal theory provides a plausible theoretical explanation for variation in the substantive content of foreign policy (not only for cooperation and conflict)

- Liberal theory offers a plausible explanation for historical change in the international system (international order isn't a static pattern) and is determined by national self-determination and social citizenship, the increasing complexity of economic integration, and liberal democratic governance

- Liberal theory offers a plausible explanation for the distinctiveness of modern international politics (linked to the emergence of a large and expanding bloc of pacific, interdependent and normatively satisfied states)

FRÉDÉRIQUE FOURNIER

Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics

BY ANDREW MORAVCSIK

Tl;Dr: The system is shaped bottom-up from the preferences of the different actors involved in it and influences the actions of the other actors within it.

Context: The piece was written in 1997, while Moravcsik was teaching at Harvard University's Department of Government. The author wrote this article because although Liberalism existed as a theory, it wasn't framed in a way rigorous enough to be called a science.

Key concepts: Liberalism, Preferences, Levels of Analysis, Cooperation, Change

Why it differs: Unlike realism, liberalism is able to explain change and cooperation. Since leaders are expressing their preferences to the individual level, if both leaders' preferences match, cooperation is possible. It is the first time that the world isn't seen a zero-sum game, meaning that both actors can benefit from an interaction.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

This is the laying out of liberalism as a theory. According to Moravcsik and the liberals, what's the most important are state preferences (unlike realists who argue that capabilities are the most important). The author looks at different levels of analysis to understand liberal theories of International Relations (such as the system, state, and individual levels). He then discusses three basic assumptions and how it differs from existing theories;

LIBERALISM KEY ASSUMPTIONS

1. Individuals and groups (basic units) prefer to seek maximization of competition and cooperation.
2. States as being not actors, but framework within individuals and how they attain preferences.
3. International system is an arena in which groups and individuals interact with one another.

! . → Interests may overlap or clash. It leads to conflict, or negotiations, or mixtures between conflict and peace.

CORE ASSUMPTIONS OF LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

1. The primacy of societal actors

- The fundamental actors in International Politics are individual and private groups. On the average, they are risk adverse (they defend the things they already have and are cautious about acquiring new things) and they organize their actions to promote their interests under constraints such as material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence.

2. Representations and State preferences

- States represent some branch of the domestic society on the basis of whom state officials (the government) define as state preferences and will act according to it.
- The state is only representing the domestic actors. Representative institutions and practices determine not merely which social coalitions are represented in foreign policy, but how they are represented.
- The representation is not perfect, it's most of the time an interpretation of security, welfare, and sovereignty preferred by powerful domestic groups.

3. Interdependence and the International System

- The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behaviour (i.e. patterns of state preferences). States are trying to achieve their preferences under the constraints associated with the preferences of other states.
- Unlike realists, conflict is not natural and actions are not always constraining others.
- Variations are assumed to be in the preferences while the capabilities are assumed to be fixed and/or endogenous to states.
- Policy interdependence is the costs and benefits associated with the pattern of interdependent state preferences

4. Liberal Theory as a Systemic Theory

- Results achieved don't correspond to the intention of the actors, therefore it is not possible to generalize the intentions of states.
- What states wants determines what they do.
- Unlike Waltz's theory, Moravcsik theory can explain the foreign policy goals of states and the systemic outcomes of interstates interactions.

Moravcsik and Legro – Is anybody still a realist?

This article questions the longevity of realism in international politics theory. Moravcsik and Legro (M&L) have in pointed out that the pure realism theory has known a shift in its basic values, which are that:

- 1) States are rational, unitary actors in an anarchic system
- 2) States have fixed and uniformly conflictual goals
- 3) States are primarily concerned with material capabilities

According to the authors, however, the so-called realist thinkers are shifting towards its competing paradigms: liberalist, institutionalist and epistemologist thoughts.

M&L then discuss different streams of realism (which is inherently paradoxical, realism being known for its “parsimonious elegance”)

They begin with minimalist realists such as Joseph Grieco. This scholar claims that the 1st realist value is enough to determine state behavior. However M&L claim that this 1st value is not enough since other paradigms also use rationality in an anarchic system as a starting point for their theories.

Then, Moravcsik and Legro argue that many realist thinkers include different variables when it comes to determine state preferences. However, realism considers the state as a black box, and its preferences are the same as any other. These neo-classical realist thinkers however, take into account domestic politics, state-society relations or culture as factors of preferences. In that case, they claim, realism shifts to liberalism. Middle-range realists face the same critique because of the way they emphasizes the importance of beliefs and perceptions of power (Stephen Walt for instance).

William H. Wohlforth argues in a similar vein that perceptions of power shape state behavior. Legro and Moravcsik critique the four factors that Wohlforth identifies as causes for the “timing of the sudden Soviet perception of decline in the late 1980s that, in his view, brought the Cold War to an end,” (39). Legro and Moravcsik cast the four factors, that is, the scientific-technical revolution, a shift in perceptions and ideas of the Soviets and Americans, and the symbolic impact of the revolutions in Eastern Europe, as various forms of non- realist approaches.

About institutionalism: M&L critique Joseph Grieco once again for characterizing the European Monetary Union (EMU) as an instrumental use of an institution by a coalition of weak states to transfer power. In other words, states apparently disadvantaged in the distribution of power were able to use an institution to transform the distribution of power. Therefore, the distribution of power becomes variable, against the realist theory.

After they made their Moravcsik and Legro urge for more clarity in IR theories so that research and analysis of state behaviors are more efficient. Far from saying that other paradigms are useless or false, Moravcsik and Legro just wanted to highlight the incoherencies among them. They eventually encourage the use of realist mechanisms in “circumstances in which states are motivated by strong and symmetrical underlying conflicts in preferences—overlapping territorial, economic, or ideological claims—or

situations where the cost of coercion is so low (at least to one party) that its cost-effective use is feasible," (49).

Moravcsik and Legro conclude by linking the importance of state preferences and beliefs as a variable to liberalist and epistemic explanations when the logic of strategic interactions between states belong more to realist or institutionalist theories. This article also showed the complementarities between paradigms.

“Two Level Game” Logic – Robert Putnam

- Putnam discusses the entanglement of domestic politics and international politics
 - advocates “general equilibrium” theories which account simultaneously for interaction of domestic and international theories
- politics of many international negotiations can be conceived as a two-level game:
 - Level I (International)—bargaining between negotiators, leading to tentative agreement
 - Level II (Domestic)—separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify agreement
 - requirement that any Level I agreement must in the end be ratified at Level II creates a crucial link between levels
- “win set” for given Level II constituency is all possible Level I agreements that could “win”,
 - Level II win sets are very important for understanding Level I agreements because larger win sets make Level I agreement more likely
- relative size of respective Level II win sets will affect distribution of joint gains from international bargain:
 - larger perceived win set of negotiator -> more he can be pushed around by other Level I negotiators
- Three factors affect win set size
 - the distribution of power, preferences and possible coalitions among Level II constituents
 - Level II political institutions
 - the strategies of the Level I negotiator
- Three other factors affect the relationship between the two levels—
 - uncertainty can be a bargaining device or a stumbling block:
 - uncertainty about the size of an opponent’s win set can increase the risk of involuntary defection but at the same time negotiators have an incentive to understate their own win sets and mislead their opponent
 - international pressures can reverberate within domestic politics tipping the domestic balance and thus influencing international negotiations
 - the role of the chief negotiator and his preferences can have a powerful impact

Some examples:

- >Greek Financial Crisis
- >China/US trade negotiations
- >Trans Pacific free trade

Some critiques

- >Negotiators
- >Interest
- >Realism
 - “zero sum games”

Some issues:

- > No outcome
- > Coercion
- > Pressure
- >Individual vs collective action

Summary- Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two- level games

By Robert D. Putnam

- Domestic Politics and international relations are entangled, one influencing the other
- E.g the Bonn negotiations in which a proposal was made by Japan, Germany and the USA to recover the locomotive from oil shock
- In these negotiations a package deal was made which was for all actors better than the status quo
- The Bonn summit produced a balanced agreement of unparalleled breadth and specificity in which all parts of the package were actually implemented
 - ➔ How was this possible?
- 1) Key governments adopted policies which were different from those which they would have adopted without this international negotiation
- 2) Power minorities in each government favoured policy on domestic ground

➔ the two- level game in international negotiations

- Politics of international negotiations can be conceived as a two level game:
 - 1) domestic level: domestic groups put pressure on government to adopt favoured policies (build coalitions)
 - 2) International level: national governments want to maximize ability to satisfy domestic pressure and minimize adverse consequences foreign developments
- (both levels must be taken into account)
- national political leaders appear in both games (moves that are rational for the political leader on one board might be impolitic for him at the other one)
- nevertheless both games interact
- therefore national political leader often seek to spot a move on one board that will trigger realignments on the other one `two- table metaphor`

➔ theory of ratification: importance of win- set

- In the case of a two- level game the negotiators representing two organisations meet to find an agreement but already know that this agreement needs to be ratified by their respective organisation
- The negotiator seeks to find an agreement that will be attractive to his constituents (because they will need to ratify the agreement in the end)
- There are 2 stages in finding an agreement:
 - 1) Level I : on this level the negotiators bargain in order to find a tentative agreement
 - 2) Level II: on this level a separate discussion within each group of constituents takes place in which they discuss whether or not the agreement can be ratified (vote upon)
- In order to find a satisfying agreement which can be ratified in the end, the win-sets of both levels need to overlap (in general the larger the win- sets the more they will overlap and the other way around)
- The win- set of Level II can be considered as all possible Level I agreements that would gain the majority among the constituents (meaning that a larger win- set of Level II makes agreements on Level I more likely)
- But nevertheless there is always the chance of failing ratification which can be distinguished into 2 defections:
 - 1) Voluntary defection: it refers to reneging by a rational egoist in the absence of enforceable contracts
 - 2) Involuntary defects: refers to the behaviour of an agent who is unable to deliver on a promise because of failed ratification, therefore only promise what you are able to deliver (`deliver ability`)

- In general the credibility of the negotiator at Level I is enhanced by a negotiator's ability to deliver at Level II (so if he can ensure ratification of agreement met at Level I)
- The smaller the win- set the greater the risk of involuntary defection
- (in general the costs of both defections is pretty high and even though actors in international cooperation have incentives to cheat the risk is minimized whenever they expect to meet again- anarchic `self- help`)
- In general in two- level games the size of the win- set is important because the relative size of the respective Level II win- sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains from the international bargaining
- the larger the perceived win- set of a negotiator, the more he can be pushed around by the other Level I negotiators
- Therefore a small domestic win- set can be a bargaining advantage (an agreement needs to be found which can be ratified on the domestic level)

➔ Determinants of the win- set

- What circumstances affect the win- set size?
- 3 sets of factors are especially important:
- 1) Level II preferences and coalitions
- 2) Level II institutions
- 3) Level I negotiators strategies

➔ 1) Size of win- set depends on the distribution of power, preferences and possible coalitions among Level II constituents

- In general it is to say that the lower the costs of a non- agreement (keeping sq) are the smaller is the win- set
- The size also depends on the relative size of the `isolationist` (who oppose international cooperation in general) and on the `internationalists` (who offer `all- purpose` support) being part of the constituents (the latter is more likely in smaller and dependent countries with open economies)
- The preferences of the constituents also determine the size of the win- set: in cases in which the constituents share homogeneous interests, non- agreement would be the only significant disagreement. In cases in which the interests of the constituents are more heterogeneous, Level I agreements are imposed unevenly on them and a non- agreement is more likely (if sq is better for the majority of them)
- Both cases of constituents preferences can impose problems upon the Level I negotiator:
 - 1) Problem of Level I negotiator if preferences of constituents are homogenous:
 - the more the negotiator can win at Level I the better his odds of winning ratification- therefore the negotiator is faced with the problem to manage the discrepancy between his constituents expectations and the negotiable outcome
 - 2) Problem of Level I negotiator if preferences of constituents are heterogeneous:
 - he also wants to maximize the chances that the negotiated agreement gets ratified but there are lines of cleavages in Level II constituents that will cross- cut Level I division so the negotiator needs to find allies at his opponent's domestic table
- In general a government that is internally more divided is more likely to strike a deal internationally than one that is firmly committed to a single policy (heterogeneousness in Level II may improve international negotiations)
- Another factor which can determine the size of the win- set is the participation rate in the ratification process (this rate varies across groups and issues, in general those

constituents whose interests are most affected will exert special influence on the ratification process)

- Whenever an issue has a high degree of politicisation, constituents are more likely to actively participate in the ratification process

→ **The size of the win- set depends on the Level II political institutions**

- domestic practices are able to affect the win- set for example strong discipline within the governing party increases the win- set by widening the range of agreements for which the Level II negotiator can expect to receive backing
- In the determination of the size of the win-set 'state strengths' and 'state autonomy' must also be taken into consideration:
- The greater the autonomy of the central decision- makers from their Level II constituents the larger the win- set and the greater the likelihood of achieving international agreements
- The stronger the state is in terms of autonomy from domestic pressure, the weaker its relevant bargaining position internationally (ceteris paribus)

→ **The size of the win- set depends on the strategies of the Level I negotiators**

- The Level I negotiator seeks to maximize the win- set of the other negotiators (easier to find agreement and the greater the win- set of the other the easier they can be pushed around)
- With regard to his own win- set the negotiator inhabits mixed feelings:
- the greater his own win- set the easier agreements can be met but the weaker is his own bargaining position (he also needs to 'soften up' at home because he needs domestic constituents in order to ratify the agreement)
- Also important is the role of side- payments which are used in order to attract marginal supporters (may come from unrelated domestic sources or received as part of the international negotiations)
- An experienced negotiator seeks to the cost- effectiveness (to him and his constituents) which is necessary in order to ensure ratification and to satisfy his own demands and threats. This is done by targeting his initiatives with an eye to his Level II incidence at home and abroad
- Furthermore, Level I negotiators have a strong interest in the popularity of his opposite number (If the popularity of one party increases, the win- set increases and there also is an increase in the success and the relative bargaining leverage of the other party) Therefore negotiators should be expected to reinforce one another's standing with their respective constituents
- Furthermore, partly for this reason and partly because of media attention, participation on the world stage normally gives a head of government a special advantage vis-à-vis his or her domestic position

→ **Uncertainty and bargaining tactics**

- Level I negotiators are often badly informed about Level II politics
- Uncertainty about a win- set can be both a bargaining device and a stumbling block in 2 level negotiations
- In Level I negotiations negotiators have the incentive to understand their own win- set
- Every negotiator is likely to know more about his Level II win- set his opponent does
- One tactic of negotiators is to exploit divisions within their own government (You should better make a deal with me because the alternative is even worse)

- Uncertainty about the opponents win- set can also cause involuntary defections; if the win- set of the opponents is not known it is hard to reach an agreement that falls within the lines and can be ratified by the Level II constituents of the opponents
- The tactic of an utility- maximizing negotiator would seek to convince his opposite number that the proposed deal is likely to be ratified but that a deal slightly more favourable to the opposite is unlikely to be ratified
- Solutions that expand the scope of joint gain and improve the odds of ratification are likely to require fairly accurate information about constituents preferences

→ Restructuring and reverberation

- Game- theory analysis requires that the structure of issues and payoffs be specified in advance
- In reality, much what happens in any bargaining situation involves attempts by the players to restructure the game and to alter one another's perception of the costs of no agreement and the benefits of proposed agreements
- Governments seek to expand one another's win-set (most common activities: wooing opinion leaders, establishing contact with opposition parties, offering foreign aid to a friendly but unstable government- they have exactly those functions)
- When it comes to reverberation, the social- choice theory views it as rather problematic. It implies a certain interconnection the utility functions of independent actors, across different levels of the game
- 2 rationales explaining reverberation:
 - 1) In a complex, unfriendly and interdependent world, offending foreigners may be costly in the long run (to get along, go along)
 - 2) takes into account cognitive factors and uncertainty; Given the pervasive uncertainty that surrounds many international issues, messages from abroad can change minds, move the undecided and hearten those in the domestic minority (Suasive reverberation is more likely among countries with close relations and is probably more frequent in economic than in politic- military negotiations)
- Reverberation implies that international pressure expands the domestic win- set and facilitates agreement
- But it can also be negative: foreign pressure may create a domestic backlash
- Cognitive balance theory suggests that international pressure is more likely to reverberate negatively if its source is generally viewed by domestic audiences as an adversary rather than an ally

→ **The role of the chief negotiator**

- the chief negotiator is the only formal link between Level I and Level II
- he has no independent policy views but acts as an honest broker or as an agent on behalf of his constituents. This is in theory true, but in reality the preferences of the chief negotiator may well diverge from those of his constituents
- 2 level negotiations are often costly and risky for the chief negotiator and they often interfere with his priorities
- The motives of a chief negotiator include:
 - 1) Enhancing his standing in the Level II game by increasing his political resources or by minimizing potential losses
 - 2) Shifting the balance of power at Level II in favour of domestic policies that he prefers for exogenous reasons
 - 3) To pursue his own conception of the national interest in the international context

- In the case of the 2- level- game the chief negotiator will normally give primacy to his domestic calculus
- He is also more likely to present an international agreement for ratification, the less of his own political capital he expects to have to invest to win approval, and the greater the likely political returns from a ratified agreement
- He also has a veto over possible agreements (even though if deal is in Level II win- set if he opposes it there is no agreement)
- A constraint on successful two- level negotiations derives from the leader's existing domestic coalition (everyone has a fixed investment in a pattern of policy a supporting coalition) – if the agreement threatens it or if ratification would require him to construct a different coalition, the chief negotiator will be reluctant to endorse I, even if it could be ratified (the greater the loss of supporters the greater the reluctance) (his constituents might even be more eager for an agreement than he is)
- In general if the negotiator's own domestic standing would be threatened if he were to reject an agreement that falls within his Level II win- set and if this is known to all parties, then the other side at Level I gains considerable leverage
- All in all the chief negotiator has great responsibilities over the negotiation outcome

→ Conclusion

- In analysing negotiations and its outcomes it is important to take the entanglements between both Levels into account (Level I and Level II)
- The 2- level analysis recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflicts about what the 'national interests' require as well as it recognizes that central decision- makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously (statement can be face strategic opportunities as well as strategic dilemmas)

Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett – Structural causes of democratic peace, 1946-1986

Democracies rarely fight each other –why?

There is something in the internal makeup of democratic states that prevents them from fighting one another despite the fact that they are not less conflict-prone than non-democracies.

Theoretical considerations

Normative and Structural model.

Normative model: Kant and Wilson.

Assumption 1: States externalise the norms and behaviours that are developed and that characterize the domestic political system → preferences.

Political conflicts are resolved in peaceful means on the domestic level → same on international level.

Assumption 2: The anarchic states of the world implies that conflict between democracies and non-democracies is usually dominated by non democracies.

States put their survival above all else. Some democratic states might actually drop their democratic norms and value if it is the only way to ensure security.

When two democracies enter a conflict, they both stick to their democratic norms and values and rarely fight → easier to reach an agreement.

Also, political leaders pay attention to public opinion in democracies and are therefore more likely to seek stability rather than conflict.

Structural model: Rummel, Small and Singer...

Assumption 1: Political leaders in democracies have to satisfy the people and get their approval before entering a conflict.

Assumption 2: Leaders can go around the first assumption only in case of emergency.

It's hard to convince the public that going to war is good ! → more tax, men killed...

In non-democracies, once the government has the support of the small influential minority they can do whatever they want.

Also it takes a long time for democracies to build up a sufficient military, by the time both democracies are done building up their army, diplomats would have time to find a solution.

Democratic norms take a long time to develop → if normative model is right, old democracies should be less likely to clash with one another than newer democracies.

There are different kinds of democracies (presidential, parliamentary...) and different "levels" of democracy.

Other potential causes:

1. "rich states do not fight one another because they have far more to lose than to gain by doing so" → trade, globalisation...
2. "rapidly growing states would harm themselves by engaging in conflict with another rapidly growing state" → cost of war
3. "Most democracies in the post WW2-era have been in some sort of direct or indirect alliance with one another"

Research design:

Normative-cultural and structural-institutional models suggest several testable hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: The more democratic the state is, the less likely it is to engage in a conflict with another democratic state.

Hypothesis 2: The more deep rooted (oldest?) the democracy is, the less likely a state will engage in conflict with another democratic state. (normative model)

Hypothesis 3: The more constraints there are on the executive power, the less likely the state will engage in a conflict with another democracy. (structural)

Après ils expliquent comment calculer le level of hostility, threats, niveau de démocratie, degré de contraintes institutionnelles et tout ça mais je pense qu'on s'en fout. Voir article pour les formules si vous voulez p. 629-630

Stuff that influences the likelihood of entering a conflict: dependant variables, independent variables, democratic norms, wealth, economic growth, alliance, contiguity, military capabilities ratio.

Conclusion:

Democratic peace phenomenon is the relative lack of conflict and complete absence of war between democracies. Both political constraint and democratic norms provide reasonably good explanation of why democracies rarely fight each other. Tests suggest that the normative model may be a better overall account of the democratic-peace phenomenon than the structural model.

Domestic political implications and structures significantly affect state behaviour.

Newly created democracies may still experience some significant amount of interstate conflict while their political systems are in the process of transition to democracy.

Process of globalization could lead to long term stability.

When many states are ruled autocratically, playing by these rules may be the only way for any state (even democratic ones) to survive in Hobbesian international anarchy.

Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946—1986

Democracies are in general about as conflict-and war-prone as nondemocracies, but democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent conflict.

Points:

- Democracy as well as other factors, accounts for the relative lack of conflict.
- **Normative model** suggests that democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes
 - Traced back to thinkers like Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson
 - Assumption 1: States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions (**liberalism**)
 - **Preferences**
 - Political conflicts in democracies are resolved through compromise rather than through elimination of opponents
 - This norm allows stability at the personal, communal and national level
 - In contrast, political competition in nondemocratic regimes is likely to be more zero-sum (win all or lose all—resolved through violence or coercion)
 - This norm creates mistrust and fear
 - Assumption 2: The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than by the former (**neo-realist**)
 - In an anarchic system states put their survival above any other value they seek to promote (**security**)
 - If states believe that their democratic norms would endanger their survival, they will act in accordance with the norms established by their **rival**
 - Democracies are more likely to shift norms when confronted by a nondemocratic rival
 - **When two democratic norms face each other there is no need to initially shift**
 - Disputes are more likely to be settled by third-party management, by agreement or stalemate + strategies of reciprocation
 - Stability = democratic vs. Instability = nondemocratic (or early democracy that may be facing opposition)
- **Structural model** asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other to make violent conflict unfeasible
 - Assumption 1: International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their policies. Such support must be

mobilized from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action

- International action in a democracy requires mobilization of both general public opinion and a variety of institutions (legislature, key interest groups, political bureaucracies)
 - This implies that very few goals could be presented to justify fighting wars (process of mobilization is cumbersome)
 - Nondemocracies don't have to worry about public opinion
 - Assumption 2: Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished only in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies
 - Because nondemocracies have little constraints, they impose emergency conditions on democracies enabling them to rally rapid support.
 - Conflict between nondemocracies tend to escalate because they have few **structural constraints**
 - **Comparing the Models**
 - **Structural model** views the constitutional and legal constraints on executive action as a key to understanding how governments act in their international politics
 - **Age of regime** shouldn't matter as long as structural constraints operate on the executive
 - **Difference in structures:** Presidential/parliamentary (less constrained) vs. Coalition (far more constrained)
 - **Normative model** looks primarily at the effects of norm of domestic political behavior on international politics
 - **Norms take time to develop** so newer states may clash more than older ones
 - State may be **legit** but have **no** real **structure** or state may have **democratic structure** but may **not** be **legit**
 - Using different data sets of international conflict and a multiplicity of indicators we find:
 - Democracy has a consistent and robust negative effect on the likelihood of conflict or escalation in a dyad
 - Both the normative and structural models are supported by the data
 - Support for the normative model is more robust and consistent
1. Does the degree of democratization of a dyad, in addition to the effort of other factors, reduce its likelihood to engage in conflict?
 - a. Rich states do not fight one another because they have far more to lose than to gain by doing so
 - i. Rich states are often engaged in heavy trading with one another + cost of war would be enormous

- ii. Most democracies in the post—World War II era were economically developed states, so their **economic structure** constrained them more than their **political one**
 - b. Rapidly growing states would harm themselves by engaging in conflict against other rapidly growing states (**economic structure**)
 - c. Most democracies in the post-World War II era have been in some sort of a direct or indirect alliance (**alliance bonds**)
- 2. What specific factors in the politics and norms of democratic societies prevent them from fighting one another?
- 3. Why is it that the same factors that prevent democracies from fighting one another fail to reduce the general rate of conflict involvement of democratic states?

Kant or Cant, The Myth of the Democratic Peace

Policymakers who have embraced democratic peace theory see a crucial link between America's security and the spread of democracy, which is viewed as the **antidote** that will prevent future wars.

There are two strands to the theory's causal logic. One attributes the absence of war between democracies to **institutional constraints**: the restraining effects of public opinion, or of the checks and balances embedded in a democratic state's domestic political structure. The other posits that it is **democratic norms** and culture—a shared commitment to the peaceful adjudication of political disputes—that accounts for the absence of war between democratic states

I conclude that **realism is superior** to democratic peace theory as a **predictor of international outcomes**. Indeed, democratic peace theory appears to have extremely little explanatory power in the cases studied (small amount of examples)

When democracies come into conflict with one another, they only rarely threaten to use force, because it is "illegitimate" to do so. Democratic peace theory explicitly holds that it is the very nature of democratic political systems that accounts for the fact that democracies do not fight or threaten other democracies.

Michael Doyle, building on Immanuel Kant, explains that democratic governments are reluctant to go to war because they must answer to their **citizens**. Citizens pay the price for war in **blood and treasure**; if the price of conflict is high, democratic governments may fall victim to **electoral retribution**. (Foreign policy decisions carrying the risk of war are debated **openly**)

The democratic norms explanation holds that "the *culture, perceptions, and practices* that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence **within countries** come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries. (Democratic states develop **positive perceptions** of other democracies—**based on mutual respect** + negotiation or the status quo are the

only possible outcomes in a dispute)

Democratic states benefit from **cooperative relations** with one another and they want to expand their positive interactions. In turn, this desire predisposes them to be responsive to the needs of other democratic states, and ultimately leads to creation of a **community of interests**.

Neo-realism: International politics is fundamentally competitive. In an anarchic system, a state's first goal is to survive. To attain security, states engage in both internal and external balancing for the purpose of deterring aggressors, and of defeating them should deterrence fail. In the international system, fear and distrust of other states is the normal state of affairs.

The former holds that changes within states can transform the nature of international politics.

Realism takes the view that even if states change internally, the structure of the international political system remains the same.

As systemic structure is the primary determinant of international political out-comes, structural constraints mean that similarly placed states will act similarly, regardless of their domestic political systems.

In a realist world, survival and security are always at risk, and democratic states will **respond no differently** to democratic rivals than to non-democratic ones.

Institutional constraints do not explain the democratic peace. If democratic public opinion really had the effect ascribed to it, democracies would be peaceful in their relations with all states, whether democratic or not. If citizens and policymakers of a democracy were especially sensitive to the human and material costs of war, that sensitivity should be evident whenever their state is on the verge of war, regardless of whether the adversary is democratic: the lives lost and money spent will be the same.

Nor is democratic public opinion, *per se*, an inhibitor of war. For example, in 1898 it was public opinion that impelled the reluctant McKinley administration into war with Spain; in 1914 war was enthusiastically embraced by public opinion in Britain and France.

To test the robustness of democratic peace theory's causal logic, the focus here is on "**near misses**," specific cases in which democratic states had both opportunity and reason to fight each other, but did not. (Opening up the "**black box**")

If democratic norms and culture explain the democratic peace, in a near-war crisis, certain indicators of the democratic peace theory should be in evidence:

- First, public opinion should be strongly pacific. Public opinion is important not because it is an institutional constraint, but because it is an indirect

measure of the mutual respect that democracies are said to have for each other.

- Second, policymaking elites should refrain from making military threats against other democracies and should refrain from making preparations to carry out threats.
 - Because the crux of the theory is that democracies externalize their internal norms of peaceful dispute resolution, then especially in a crisis, one should not see democracies threatening other democracies.
- Third, democracies should bend over backwards to accommodate each other in a crisis. Ultimata, unbending hard lines, and big-stick diplomacy are the stuff of *Realpolitik*, not the democratic peace

Key here is what Geoffrey Blainey calls the "fighting waterbirds' dilemma," involving concerns that others watching from the sidelines will take advantage of a state's involvement in war; that war will leave a state weakened and in an inferior relative power position *vis-his* possible future rivals; and that failure to propitiate the opposing state in a crisis will cause it to ally with one's other adversaries or rivals.

In each of these crises, at least one of the democratic states involved was prepared to go to war (or, in the case of France in **1923**, to use military force coercively) because it believed it had vital strategic or reputational interests at stake. In each of these crises, war was avoided only because one side elected to pull back from the brink. In each of the four crises, war was avoided not because of the "live and let live" spirit of peaceful dispute resolution at democratic peace theory's core, but because of realist factors. Adverse distributions of military capabilities explain why France did not fight over Fashoda, and why Germany resisted the French occupation of the Ruhr passively rather than forcibly.

Concerns that others would take advantage of the fight (the "waterbirds dilemma") explain why Britain backed down in the Venezuela crisis, and the Union submitted to Britain's ultimatum in the *Trent* affair. When one actually looks beyond the *result* of these four crises ("democracies do not fight democracies") and attempts to understand *why* these crises turned out as they did, it becomes clear that democratic peace theory's causal logic has only minimal explanatory power.

My Argument: Normative model is the best and realist approach fits best

Fashoda Crisis

The Royal Navy's power contrasted sharply with the numerical and qualitative deficiencies, and unpreparedness, of the French fleet. When Paris calculated the prevailing Anglo-French military balance, an embarrassing diplomatic climb-down emerged as a more attractive alternative than decisive defeat in a war. As Delcasse admitted, he and President of the Republic Faure were compelled to order Marchand's withdrawal by "the necessity of avoiding a naval war which we are absolutely incapable of carrying on, even with Russian help."¹⁰² In the end,

“Delcasse had no real alternative but to yield; except as an irrational gesture of defiance, war with England was not a possible choice.”⁰³ The Fashoda crisis’s outcome was, as Grenville says, “a demonstration of British power and French weakness.”

Once the crisis began, the press overwhelmingly supported the government’s decision to refuse negotiations with France, and during the crisis “the British popular press indulged in an orgy of scurrility.” There was plenty of warlike spirit in the country,” and British public opinion was “aggressively jingoistic” over Fashoda”. The unequivocal expression of British opinion” was solidly behind the Cabinet’s hard-line policy. This no doubt was true because the British public believed England’s prestige was at stake and consequently was “in a mood to respond vigorously” to the French challenge

During October, the Royal Navy made preparations for a war with France. On October 15, the Channel fleet was assembled. By October 26, the Royal Navy had drawn up detailed war plans. On October 28 the reserve squadron was activated and concentrated at Portland; soon the Channel fleet was deployed to Gibraltar and the Mediterranean fleet was moved to Malta. As these measures became known in Paris from intelligence reports and stories in the British press, they made a strong impression on French policymakers

The Ruhr crisis strongly disconfirms democratic peace theory. In World War I’s aftermath, both the public and the elites in France perceived Germany as a dangerous threat to France’s security and its great power status, even though Weimar Germany was a democracy

Democratic Peace Theory:

Overall the theory has too many holes and like neoclassical realism isn't distinct enough

Other factors along with the models that contribute to peace

- a. Rich states do not fight one another because they have far more to lose than to gain by doing so
 - i. Rich states are often engaged in heavy trading with one another + cost of war would be enormous
- b. Rapidly growing states would harm themselves by engaging in conflict against other rapidly growing states (**economic structure**)
- c. Most democracies in the post-World War II era have been in some sort of a direct or indirect alliance (**alliance bonds**)

Within the theory there are liberal and neorealist sentiments

Every democracy should act the same because they are all built more or less the with the same structure. (They are all dependent on **public opinion** and involvement)—this is similar to the **black box metaphor used by Neo-realists**

Public opinion = preferences (**liberalism**). Democratic governments are reluctant to go to war because they must answer to their **citizens**. Citizens pay the price for war in **blood and treasure**; if the price of conflict is high, democratic governments may fall victim to **electoral retribution (preferences have changed)**

Why Norms Model is better than the structural model

Structural constraints mean that similarly placed states will act similarly, regardless of their domestic political systems. (**Black box metaphor**)

If democratic public opinion really **were a determining factor to stopping democratic states from warring**, democracies would be peaceful in their relations with all states, **whether democratic or not**. If citizens and policymakers of a democracy were especially sensitive to the human and material costs of war, that sensitivity should be evident whenever their state is on the verge of war

Power of public opinion and “checks and balances” (not enough to judge war-proneness) aren't exclusive to democracies (Monarchy and the Church)

Reason why Norms model remains is because the culture, perception and practices are exclusive to democracies. (Mutual respect, compromise and peaceful resolution)—these variables, which are found in democratic states, are projected onto the international stage)

Ignores the effect of international norms (culture) on states and public

opinion—mention the Fashoda crisis

If democratic norms and culture explain the democratic peace, in a near-war crisis, certain indicators of the democratic peace theory should be in evidence:

- First, **public opinion** should be **strongly pacific**. Public opinion is important not because it is an institutional constraint, but because it is an **indirect measure of the mutual respect** that democracies are said to have for each other.
- Second, policymaking elites should refrain from making military threats against other democracies and should refrain from making preparations to carry out threats.
 - Because the crux of the theory is that **democracies externalize their internal norms of peaceful dispute resolution**, then especially in a crisis, one should not see democracies threatening other democracies.
- Third, democracies should **bend over backwards to accommodate each other in a crisis**. Ultimata, unbending hard lines, and big-stick diplomacy are the stuff of *Realpolitik*, not the democratic peace

Fashoda

- Once the crisis began, the press overwhelmingly supported the government's decision to refuse negotiations with France (**no mutual respect**)
- During October, the Royal Navy made preparations for a war with France. On October 15, the Channel fleet was assembled. By October 26, the Royal Navy had drawn up detailed war plans.
- When Paris calculated the prevailing Anglo-French military balance, an embarrassing diplomatic climb-down emerged as a more attractive alternative than decisive defeat in a war.

Christopher Layne (1994), "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19:2, pp. 5- 49

Brief context

Layne's writing is a realist critique of the Democratic peace theory. It can also be seen as a response to the Russett reading. Layne first summarizes the Democratic Peace Theory and Realism and contrast them. Then he shows 4 historical instances in which great powers almost came to blows but eventually avoided war. He states that realism explains these events. He reaches the conclusion that Realism is a better predictor of international outcomes.

Key Concepts

Democratic Peace Theory

Democratic states go to war with democracies less likely

1. Structural model

- the absence of war between democracies to institutional constraints
- restraining effects of public opinion (sensitive to costs of fighting)
- institutionalized political competition makes war less likely

2. Normative model

- democratic norms and culture accounts for the absence of war between democracies
- democratic states develop positive perceptions of other democracies
- based on form of learning

Realism

- International system is anarchic and competitive (self-help realm, no central authority)
- states' first goal is to survive
- internal and external balancing
- states will act no differently to democratic rivals than to non-democratic ones

Anglo American Crisis I: The Trent Affair, 1861

- British government backed by the public was ready to wage war with the union

- The union backed down because the war against the Confederacy was not going well, and France supported Britain (waterbirds' dilemma) not because there was a mutual respect between democracies.

Anglo-American crisis II: Venezuela, 1895-96

- For Washington, the controversy between London and Caracas was a great way to show America's primacy in Latin America (Monroe Doctrine)
- Both countries began planning militarily
- England suddenly reverse course because of the fears of losing Canada the Anglo-German relations and the threats of other main rivals (Russia, France)
- Public opinion did not affect policies on either side
- London backed down solely for strategic reasons

The Anglo-French struggle for control of the Nile: Fashoda, 1898

- England and France struggled for supremacy over Egypt and its vital artery, the Suez canal
- The British believed that vital strategic and reputational interests were on the line and they were ready to wage war
- France was compelled to accept a diplomatic defeat because of its military inferiority

Franco-German crisis: The Ruhr, 1923

- Symbolic geopolitical competition
- French troops supported by the public occupied the Ruhr in order to revise the Versailles treaty in France's favor
- Contrary to democratic peace theory, even though Germany was a democracy, French foreign policy did not reflect mutual respect towards Germany based on democratic norms

Conclusions

1. In each of these four cases realism provides more explanations of the outcomes
2. War was avoided only because one side pulled back not because of the "live and let live" spirit
3. Concerns that others might take advantage from the fight also influenced international policies (Waterbirds dilemma)
4. A state's political structure is highly influenced by external factors thus states with high security can afford to be democracies and states whose security is threatened are more likely to form authoritarian structures. =====> **In this sense democratic peace theory is looking through the wrong end of the telescope**

Notes on “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies” by Kenneth A. Oye

Oye asks the question: in an anarchic world, where no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests, why does cooperation happen in some cases and not in others? He uses a unified analytic framework that is based on game theory and microeconomics.

Cooperation = conscious policy coordination (pg 6)

Oye addresses both explanatory and prescriptive aspects of the question by examining

1. Circumstances that favor the emergence of cooperation under anarchy
2. Strategies states can adopt to foster the emergence of cooperation by altering the circumstances they confront.

Oye argues that three circumstantial dimensions serve both as explanations and targets of longer-term strategies to promote cooperation:

1. Payoffs affect prospects for cooperation; altering payoffs present strategies to improve prospects for cooperation
2. Prospect of continuing interaction affects the likelihood of cooperation; strategies arise from making players more liable in the present because they may interact in the future
3. Cooperation becomes more difficult as the number of actors increases; strategies for promoting cooperation based on number of players and strategies to reduce the number of actors necessary to realize common interests

Payoff Structure (pg 4)

Structure of payoffs in a given round of play: the benefits of mutual cooperation (two players working together) relative to mutual defection (both players deciding to refuse the game) and the benefits of unilateral defection (only one player refuses the game) relative to unrequited cooperation (only one player wants to cooperate)

Payoff structure serves as an intervening variable between cognitive, domestic, and international structural factors and international cooperation.

cognitive, domestic, international structure \leftrightarrow payoff structure \leftrightarrow international cooperation

Prisoners' Dilemma: authorities give two prisoners a choice. If neither prisoner squeals, both will get a light sentence. If one prisoner squeals and the other does not, the rat will go free and the sucker will get a heavy sentence. If both squeal, both will get a moderate sentence. In single-play Prisoners' Dilemmas, individually rational actions produce a collectively suboptimal outcome, because both will want to squeal.

Stag Hunt: group of hunters surround a stag. If all cooperate to trap the stag, all will eat ell. If one person chooses to defect to chase a rabbit, the stag will escape and the defector will eat lightly while the rest of the hunters do not eat at all. In single-play Stag Hung, the temptation to defect to protect against the defection of others is balanced by the strong universal preference for stage over rabbit.

Chicken: two drivers drive towards each other on a road. If one swerves and the other does not, then the first will suffer the stigma of being known as a chicken, while the other will enjoy being known as the hero. If neither swerves, both will suffer. If both serve, there won't be much damage to their reputation. In single-play Chicken, the temptations of unilateral defection are balanced by fear of mutual defection.

Changes in the magnitude of differences in the value placed on outcomes can influence the prospects for cooperation through two paths by:

1. transforming the game into another class of game
 - a. ex: Prisoners' Dilemma → less challenging Stag Hunts if the gains from mutual cooperation increase relative to the gains from exploitation
2. the magnitude of differences among payoffs within the game can change the likelihood of cooperation

Strategies to alter payoff structure:

1. procurement policy – a superpower favoring procurement of defensive or offensive weapons
2. publicizing an agreement diminishes payoffs associated with defection from the agreement
3. unilateral strategies (one state permitting the expansion of sectors and permitting liquidation of inefficient sectors)
4. bilateral strategies (strategies of issue linkage; ex: American negotiators in SALT I sought to instruct their Soviet counterparts on the logic of mutual assured destruction)
5. multilateral strategies (formation of international regimes)

The Shadow of the Future (pg 12)

Conditions of iterated (repetitive) games:

1. International politics is characterized by the expectation of future interaction
2. Payoff structures must not change substantially over time (each round of play should not alter the structure of the game in the future)
3. Size of discount rate applied to the future affects the iterativeness of games

Prisoners' Dilemma: if the prisoners expect to be placed in similar situations in the future, the prospects for cooperation improve.

Stag Hunt: players want a reputation for reliability, so if the hunters expect to hunt together again, the immediate gains from unilateral defection relative to unrequited cooperation must be balanced against the cost of diminished cooperation in the future. Therefore defection in the present decreases the likelihood of cooperation in the future, same as Prisoners' Dilemma.

Chicken: if the game is repeated indefinitely, then each driver may refrain from swerving in the present to coerce the other driver into swerving in the future. One driver's defection in the present may decrease the likelihood of the other driver's defection in the future.

Strategies of reciprocity and conditions of play:

Tit-for-Tat (conditional cooperation) can increase the likelihood of joint cooperation by shaping the future consequences of present cooperation or defection. In all three games, Prisoners' Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken, a promise to respond to present cooperation with future cooperation and a threat to respond to present defection with future defection can improve the prospects for cooperation.

Other strategies:

Explicit codification of norms (clarifying rules) can limit definitional ambiguity.

Provisions for surveillance can increase transparency.

Slice up a deal into a series of payments and deliveries to ensure cooperation.

Issue linkage strategies - establish a direct connection between present behavior in a single-play game and future benefits in an iterated game.

Number of Players (pg 18)

Prospects for cooperation diminish as number of players increases because:

1. As number of players increases, transactions and information costs rise
2. The likelihood of autonomous defection and of recognition and control problems increases
3. The feasibility of sanctioning defectors diminishes

Strategies for large numbers of players:

Regime creation

Creation of rules of thumb and mechanisms of collective enforcement and maintenance of regimes

Strategies to reduce the number of players in a game have the following effects:

1. diminish gains from cooperation while they increase likelihood and robustness of cooperation
2. impose substantial costs on third parties

The False Promise of International Institutions – John Mearsheimer

Introduction

- Institutionalism rests on the belief that institutions are a key means of promoting world peace
- Academic institutionalists consider institutions to be a powerful force for stability
- John Ruggie maintains, “There seems little doubt that multilateral norms and institutions have helped stabilize their international consequences.
- Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world
- They have no independent effect on state behavior

What are Institutions?

- A set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other
- They prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior

Realism

- International Relations is a constant state of war with the possibility of war always in the background
- International system is anarchic
- States inherently possess some offensive military capability
- States can never be certain about the intentions of other states
- States want to maintain their sovereignty

Cooperation in a Realist World

- States contemplating cooperation must consider how the profits or gains will be distributed among them
- States motivated by relative gains concern when considering cooperation
- Cooperation more difficult to achieve when states are attuned to relative gains logic rather than absolute gains logic

Institutions in a Realist World

- Most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power or even increase it
- Balance of power is independent variable that explains war

Variety of Institutional Theories

Liberal Institutionalism

- Focuses on the less ambitious goal of explaining cooperation in cases where state interests are not fundamentally opposed
- Each side has incentives both to cooperate and not to cooperate
- Theory focuses on economic and environmental issues
- Institutions contribute to international stability
- A theory that explains how institutions push states away from war

Causal Logic

- Cooperation is easier to achieve than realists recognize
- Principal obstacle to cooperation is the threat of cheating
- They accept that states operate in an anarchic environment and behave in self-interested manner
- Rules can work to counter the cheating problem

Flaws in the Causal Logic

- Liberal institutionalists assume that states are not concerned about relative gains, but focus exclusively on absolute gains
- A theory that accepts realism's core assumptions must confront the issue of relative gains if it hopes to develop a sound explanation for why states cooperate
- The theory has little utility when one accepts that states worry about relative gains
- Relative gains considerations pose a serious impediment to cooperation and must therefore be taken into account

Can Liberal Institutionalism be repaired?

- Powell maintains that relative gains considerations matter little, and that states act in accordance with liberal institutionalism when the threat of aggressive war is low
- Liberal institutionalism has little new to say about when states worry about relative gains
- Liberal institutionalism does not provide a sound basis for understanding international relations and promoting stability in the post Cold War world

Collective Security

- The problem of power is not a problem to be eliminated but a problem to be managed
- Difficult to find scholarly work that makes the case for collective security without simultaneously expressing grave doubts that collective security could ever be realized in practice (eg failure of League of Nations)

Causal Logic

- Collective Security assumes that states behave according to the dictates of realism
- Collective Security allows for changes in the status quo but those changes must come via negotiations
- “The evil-doer is supposed to find himself virtually isolated in confrontation with the massive forces of the international posse comitatus” Claude
- States must trust each other

Flaws in the Causal Logic

- Collective security does not provide a satisfactory explanation for how states overcome their fears and learn to trust one another
- Claude “collective security assumes the satisfaction of an extraordinary complex network of requirements”
- It is difficult to determine who is the troublemaker and who is the victim
- Theory assumes that all aggression is wrong but many occasions where conquest is warranted

Problems with the empirical record

- Collective security has never really worked when it mattered most (League of nations failed and United Nations was not involved during the Cold War)

Fallback Positions

- Peacekeeping and concerts might make the theory realizable
- However peacekeeping has no role to play in disputes between great powers
- Concerts are more likely to emerge in the wake of great power wars in which a potential hegemon has been defeated
- However they tend to only last a few years

Critical Theory

- Aim to transform the international system into a world society where states are guided by norms of trust and sharing
- Discourse largely shapes practice
- Aim is to “seek out the contradictions within the existing order for change to emerge”
- The theory says little about the desirability or feasibility of achieving that particular end

Causal Logic

- States behave according to the same norms or institutions that underpin collective security

- All states consider war as unacceptable practice
- Transform how states think about themselves and other states
- Top-down theory whereby elites play the key role in transforming language and discourse about international politics

Flaws in the Causal Logic

- It cannot serve as the basis for predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about the direction change takes
- They make arguments that directly contradict their own theory but which appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging

Problems with the empirical records

- There is little empirical evidence to support their claims and much to contradict them

Conclusion

- Institutionalism relates more to American values than Realism which explains its emergence and its significance
- Eliminates security competition amongst states and creates a more peaceful world
- However these theories do not accurately describe the world, hence policies based on them are bound to fail
- Institutions have mattered rather little in the past
- Misperceive reliance on institutional solutions is likely to lead to more failures in the future

Hypothesis on Misperception - Jervis

What is it about?

Jervis challenges the rational-choice view of international relations by arguing that misperception can undermine the real-world accuracy of game theoretic models.

According to Robert Jervis, for an actor to determine how he will act, he has to predict how other will act and how their actions will affect their values.

- Jervis argues that decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images. Basically perceiving what they want no matter what because their theories and images are set to let them only notice certain things.
- Jervis concludes that decision-makers should be aware of the ways in which the processes of perception lead to common errors; He believes that misperception can rule over the mind of an actor while ignoring accurate information.

Author's main arguments:

- Hypothesis 1: **"Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images."**
- Being aware of our bias will reduce the risks of misperception.

How are the arguments explained?

- Through different sets of hypotheses on perception and misperception
- They are all interlinked
- He also includes notions such as "Sources of concepts" and the "Evoked Set" that affect the psychological disposition of an actor and "Safeguards" to minimize errors

Hypothesis 2: There are **two ways to make mistakes**: One is to not change your views in the face of conflicting information, the other is to be too willing to do so. Both scholars and decision-makers are more likely to do the first (not to change their views).

Hypothesis 3: Actors can more easily assimilate into their established image of another actor information contradicting that image if the information is transmitted and considered **bit by bit rather than if it all comes at once**.

Safeguards to minimize errors:

Jervish provide with five Safeguards intended to avoid Misperception or minimize errors:

1. Decision-makers should be aware that they do not make "unbiased" interpretations of each new bit of incoming information, but rather are **inevitably heavily influenced by the theories they expect to be verified**;
2. Second, decision-makers should see if their attitudes contain **consistent or supporting beliefs**

that are not logically linked (example, most people who feel that it is important for the United States to win the war in Vietnam also feel that a meaningful victory is possible);

3. A third safeguard for decision-makers would be to make their assumptions, beliefs, and the predictions that follow from them as explicit as possible;

4. The decision-maker should try to prevent individuals and organizations from letting their main task, political future, and identity become tied to specific theories and images of other actors;

5. The decision-maker, in other words, **should have devil's advocates around** because he will want to ensure that **incoming information is examined from many different perspectives** with many different hypotheses in mind;

Jervis, here, is being auto-critical :

Of course all these safeguards involve **costs**. They would divert resources from other tasks and would increase internal dissension. Determining whether these costs would be worth the gains would depend on a detailed analysis of how the suggested safeguards might be implemented. **Even if they were adopted by a government, of course, they would not eliminate the chance of misperception.** However, the safeguards would make it more likely that national decision-makers would **make conscious choices about the way data were interpreted** rather than merely assuming that they can be seen in only one way and can mean only one thing.

Sources of Concepts:

An actor's perceptual thresholds are **influenced by what he has experienced and learned about**

? Placing information into categories

Three level at which concept can be present or absent:

1. The concept can be completely **missing** (ex. China's image of the Western world extremely inaccurate in the mid-nineteenth century);

- The concept is not yet included in the picture because of a lack of distance and experience

2. The actor can **know about a concept but not believe that it reflects an actual phenomenon**;

- the actor does not identify the relevance of the information in a specific context

3. The actor may **hold a concept, but not believe that another actor fills it at the present moment** (ex. the British and French statesmen of the 1930's held a concept of states with unlimited ambitions. They realized that Napoleons were possible, but they did not think Hitler belonged in that category);

Hypothesis 4: **Misperception is easiest to correct if an actor is miscategorized** (but the category exists in your head) (e.g. Britain was aware of the category of expansionist states, but it didn't think Hitler belonged in it); it is **hardest to correct if your mind completely lacks a certain**

category (e.g. China in the 19th century didn't know what to make of the West)

The Evoked Set

Hypothesis 5: If the sender (of a message) has something different on his mind (the "evoked set") than the receiver does, misunderstanding is likely.

- The evoked set describes the way people perceive data through a certain state of mind determined by what they were concerned with at the time that they received the information; In other words, **information is evaluated in the light of the small part of the person's memory (= the evoked set).**

Hypothesis 6: The more time I spend drawing up a plan, the more clear it is to me. So I will assume it is equally clear to you, making misperception on your part even more likely.

Hypothesis 7: An action may convey an unintended message if the action itself doesn't turn out as planned.

Hypotheses about Perception

Hypothesis 8: Decision-makers tend to see other states as more hostile than they are.

Hypothesis 9: We tend to assume that the behavior of others is more centralized and coordinated than it is (related to hyp. 7).

Hypothesis 10: Similarly, we tend to take the foreign ministry's position as representative of the government as a whole.

- During the Second World War, the Japanese often misinformed their own ambassadors to deceive their enemies.

Hypothesis 11: When states do something we like, we give ourselves too much credit for getting them to do so; when states do something we don't like, we attribute it mostly to internal (domestic) forces.

Hypothesis 12: When I don't try to conceal my intentions, I assume that you accurately perceive them.

Hypothesis 13 "Suggests that if it is hard for an actor to believe that the other can see him as a menace, it is often even harder for him to see that issues important to him are not important to others.

Hypothesis 14: We tend to forget that a single bit of evidence might support more than one view, including opposing views.

Samantha Poncabare

Samantha.poncabareail.mcgill.ca

Hypotheses on misperception, Robert Jervis

I. Previous treatments of perception in IR

2 sets of scholar tried to theorize perceptions before WWI, but it either was not accurate or was too general.

II. Theories – necessary and dangerous

- “Actors tend to perceive what they expect”
- A theory will have a greater impact on an actor’s perceptions if it the data is ambiguous and the theory meets the actor’s expectations.
- Actors more easily identify normal cards.
- Actors might identify an incongruous card as a normal one.
- It is legitimate to interpret and identify facts according to hypotheses and theories.
- Too little rigidity is as bad as too much.

Be cautious when applying cognitive distortion to IR, because:

- There are several interpretations
- The distinction between perception and judgement is obscure
 - Churchill and Chamberlain fitted each information on Nazi actions into their hypothesis on Nazi’s intentions.

III. Safeguards

Safeguards have to be suggested to decision-makers in order to minimize errors:

- Be aware that they do NOT make “unbiased” interpretations, they are inevitably influenced by the theories they expect to be verified.
- Decision-maker’s attitude has to contain consistent beliefs that are not logically linked. And be aware that actors with sudden common interest might over/under estimate the degree of common interest involved.
 - People who believe US had to win Vietnam war also believe victory was possible // People who believe defeat would not endanger US security and wouldn’t be costly also believe US could not win this war.
- Make assumptions, beliefs and predictions as explicit as possible to be able to evaluate it.
- Prevent individuals and organization from letting their main goal to become tied to specific theories and images.
- Decision-makers should always have devil’s advocates in mind; Roberta Wohlstetter’s argument that “a willingness to play with material from different angles and in the context of unpopular as well as popular hypothesis is an essential ingredient of a good detective, wether the end is the solution of a crime or an intelligence estimate.”
 - If in 1941 someone had point out the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese, government might have been less surprised.

These safeguards involve costs.

IV. Sources of concepts

- Actor's conceptual threshold are influenced by their past experience and knowledge.
- There are 3 main sources that shape decision-makers' concept of IR:
 - Actor's belief in his own domestic political system.
 - Concepts are supplied by the actor's previous experiences.
 - International history (historical traumas can heavily influence perception).
- There are 3 levels at which a concept can be present or absent:
 - Completely missing concept (no correspondence)
 - Acknowledge a concept, but not as an actual phenomenon (Communist elites deny democracies' description of themselves)
 - Hold a concept but not believe another actor fills it at the moment (FR and UK acknowledged Napoleons, but did not believe Hitler was one)

V. The evoked set

- The perception of data is influenced by (cognitive structure and theories and) by what an actor is concerned with at the time they receive the info.
- The "evoked set" is this small part of the person's memory that is presently active.
- Thus, background matters (a lot!)

VI. Further hypothesis from the perspective of the perceiver

- (8) Tendency for decision-makers to see other states as more hostile than they are.
- (9) Tendency for decision-makers to see the behaviour of others as more centralized, disciplined and coordinated than it is.
- (10) Tendency to take the foreign office's position for the stand of the other government as a whole.
- (11) Tendency to overestimate the degree to which others are acting in response to what they do when others behave in accordance with the actor's desire.
- (14) Tendency to overlook evidence that are consistent with their theories may also be consistent with other views.

Realism and the End of the Cold War

Modern realism was the dominant approach to the theory and practice of international politics in the United States after the collapse of great-power cooperation after World War II. When political scientists tried to take the liberalist approach, they were repeatedly defeated by undeniable indirect connection between events and realism in the US-Soviet rivalry.

When Wohlforth wrote this article in 1995, the Cold War had ended and so did the US-USSR rivalry. Wohlforth therefore asks himself if the rapid decline and comparatively peaceful collapse of the Soviet state, and with it the entire postwar international order, discredit the realist approach.

Wohlforth argues that most of realism's critiques are based on its most parsimonious form, Kenneth Waltz's structural realism, admitting that the latter deals poorly with change. It is not fair or convincing to compare it with richer and more context-specific theories such as liberalism, new institutionalism or constructivism. Realist theories can be made more determinate only if they are based on actual results rather than forecasts.

Outline of realist explanation

Wohlforth argues that the Cold War was a credible but ultimately failed Soviet challenge to U.S. hegemony and the relative stability it brought to international politics (structural realism). This then says that the USSR was never as powerful as the US, which is a big statement. So at first, the end of the Cold War was caused by the relative decline in Soviet power and the reassurance this gave to the West.

There are three keys to understanding the specificities of the Cold War's end and the Soviet Union's sudden but peaceful collapse that have not been addressed heretofore.

Decision-makers' assessments of power are what matters: Because, power is composed of a complex combination of material and non-material factors, it is very difficult for balance-of-power theories to make precise predictions about state behavior. All policies are future-oriented. All decisions are bets on the future. Obviously, if they conclude that decline is reversible, they will be less likely to opt for risky, forceful solutions to decline and more likely to choose retrenchment and reform.

Declining challengers are more likely than declining hegemon to try to retrench and reform rather than opt for preventive war: in the 1980s, the Soviet Union was not a declining hegemon, but a declining challenger because they never became powerful enough to contemplate taking over leadership. They never doubted who the real hegemon was (American-dominated system).

Sudden decline or civil strife on the losing side of a struggle is less destabilizing globally than such decline or strife on the winning side: it confirms what political actors knew to be the case just prior to the advent of the strife. If there is a decline in power on the winning side (USA), it gives an incentive to continue the struggle for the losing side (USSR).

Critique of realism

Wohlforth does agree that many of these criticisms push realism theories to improve or make more modest claims, especially these three following points. However, the critiques essentially attack the structural form of realism.

Egregious predictive failure

Scholars tended to associate change in the global system with war because historically there was no precedent of the opposite. Therefore, they did not think a lot about how it might end, only when. For structural realists, bipolarity was a world-historical first! It was hard to assess power, easier in hindsight.

Lack of correlation between independent and dependent variables

They argue that Gorbachev's reforms were a cause rather than a consequence of decline, and that he wanted to give up "socialism" and join the West. Wohlforth argues that this is simplistic and ignore perception of power. He further argues that they decreased socialism's and the USSR's status to favor a revitalization of the economy.

State behavior inconsistent with realist predictions, including the Soviet withdrawal from East-Central Europe

Gorbachev was surprised by the pace of change, but not the results. Soviet leadership tried fitfully to reduce the costs of the alliance, by sending troops home, while delicately urging reforms on its hard-line member governments. When the issue was finally presented as "spill blood or lose socialism," the amount of blood that would have had to be spilled was already great and the weaknesses of socialism had already been revealed.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the post-1989 system transformation does not constitute a critical case for realism. Realist theories are not weakened, but certainly not stronger, after the end of the Cold War. The explanation Wohlforth offers is an amalgam of classical realism and the hegemonic variant of neorealism coupled with a pragmatic empirical focus on decision-makers' capabilities assessments.

In the end, the West should keep an eye on Russia. Within a hundred years, Russia has declined in 1905 after its war with Japan, risen in 1914 during WWI, weakened in the 1930s and rose again in power after WWII, which set the Cold War in motion. The USSR has then slowly declined in the late 1980s until its breakdown. Even though Russia is down at the time, it may rise again.

Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of political powers — Alexander Wendt

Alexander Wendt is a German political scientist and most known for introducing and broadening the term constructivism.

Introduction

- In this article, Wendt is basing himself on 3 different schools of thought: neoliberalism, neorealism and constructivism. Constructivism defends how “practices constitute subjects” similarly to how institutions transform interests, from a liberal point of view.
 - > described as a process in which “identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioral one in which they are exogenous” so identities and interests are defined from within, all the while being based by intersubjective understandings, so a states conception of the self and other just as we mentioned in class yesterday
- He tries to prove whether or not state relations and state decisions are influenced by structure (anarchy and the distribution of power) or process (so interaction and learning). And so within the first couple of pages, Wendt directly rebukes the realist theory towards the dynamic and the structure of the international system.
 - specifically how Anarchies are systems of **self-help**: central authority and collective security are missing — and so this claim is directly supported by neoliberals and neorealists, which is what Wendt eventually goes against.

I) Anarchy and Power Politics

- Wendt opens up his discussion by stating that anarchy’s causal powers are flawed depending on which theoretical stance you belong to.
- And so according to him, Procedures and customs determine the character and therefore the depth of anarchy. For instance, in a non constructivist scenario, it is only when country A attacks country B that B will need to defend itself. However, an anarchy’s dynamic is what determines how it will react in the face of a threat — therefore it is not inherent but rather there is a social construction to it which neoliberal and neorealists have failed to prove — which brings forth a bigger question which is why and how was our international system constructed rather than implemented?

Anarchy and self-help

- Constructivism is based on how people act towards certain actors in terms of meanings and more specifically how that meaning affects you. Wendt uses the example of how states act differently towards enemies than they do toward friends.
 - There’s the example of the US and USSR’s relationship in a cold war and post-cold war environment. Initially the two superpowers are rivals but this changes at the end of the CW — their relationship has changed due to the fact that their meaning to one another has equally changed.
- Wendt goes on to say that interests are based on identities: each state has multiple identities and these can easily change depending on your institutional role.
 - So basically they are not going to always have the same interests for any situation which makes complete sense because you can not be expected to react the same way for any given problem.

- So in the end you have to construct the meaning of a situation and derive your interests from there.
- To continue with that, an institution is a set of identities and interests and how they are formed.
 - self-help in this case is an institution
 - constructivists are very concerned with the preservation or security of the self in a defensive world.
 - Wendt establishes three security systems: a competitive, individualistic and cooperative one. The first one describes a situation in which collective action is not seen as possible as you are constantly looking out for yourself in fear of being stabbed in the back by your enemy. An individualistic security system is much more laid back because it describes a situation where states are indifferent to the relationship between their own and other's security.
 - A cooperative one strongly differs from the previous two as it's when everyone's security should be seen as your responsibility especially since it's not linked at all to the notion of self-help.
 - So in the end, security of the self is not something you should be comparing with others but rather something you should only be responsible for yourself, which reinforces the power politics approach that Wendt decided to take which is when you basically protect your own interests above everyone else's through economic, military or political force.

Anarchy and the social construction of power politics

- Wendt points out a second characteristic of constructivism → which is how meanings are also derived from interactions so for instance an interaction between states that are meeting for the first time.
 - an interaction is a result of what actors do and how decisions are made on the basis of probability, instead of relying on the worst case scenario possibility, which is what realists would typically do.
 - the example of aliens contacting Earth and whether or not it should directly be seen as an alarming gesture. It is how we decide to interpret a gesture in terms of national security: this is known as a process of “signaling, interpreting and responding creating a social act”.
- So in the end, there is no anarchy until states actually decide to interact with one another.

Predator states and anarchy as permissive cause

- In this section, Wendt Poses an interesting question as to why is it that the mirror theory of identity formation does not explain why states only have self-regarding and not collective identities. So basically why is it that our identities only reflect ourselves, our interests, our self-security rather than our state's as whole?
 - this is when the predator argument is introduced and why some states tend to become aggressive. As one state is aggressive, this forces others to engage in competitive power politics as you need to be able to fight fire with fire when necessary. This complements the following sentence which is that “one predator will best a hundred pacifists because anarchy provides no guarantees”
 - goes to contradict the fact that all states are power-seeking but rather only one is power-seeking and that the others follow that one state since anarchy is also based on exploitation of others.
 - So you will always be left to defend yourself in the face of the predator, but establishing a collective defense will highly depend on past interactions between the certain states.

II) Institutional transformations of power politics

Critical strategic theory and collective security

- Wendt now introduces the term roles and how he establishes the fact that they are not played by following a certain diplomatic script or what not but rather they are taken — so the fact that they're taken means that actors are engaged in critical self-reflection, therefore always being open to change. But that doesn't mean that actors are constantly changing and adapting their identities, that's not possible because then the social order would completely be up in the air, but rather you simply add it to your experiences and future expectations.
- So in the end it's not possible to live in a world where we don't change roles because since we are always presented towards new social situations it would be impossible for us to know how to react every single time. However, its important to note that if you don't define the role of an identity, it makes it harder to define certain situations and interests.

“Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics – Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink”

- Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink discuss “Constructivism” as being an approach to social analysis that views humans’ interaction as creating a set of “**intersubjective beliefs**” or shared beliefs that construct the interests of purposive actors
- In the essay, they compare aspects of Constructivism with Comparativism and mention how although Comparativists have long been interested in questions of culture, ideas, and identity, few comparative authors identify themselves as constructivists
- **Core Features of Constructivism:**
- Analyzes human consciousness and its role in international life
- It asserts the following:
- Human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational facts, not simply material ones (**this separates them from Neorealists who see International Politics in material terms and Liberalists who look at the role of economic power**)
- The most important ideational factors are intersubjective (meaning shared and discussed among groups of people) and thus, ideas cannot be reduced to single persons
- These shared ideas become **social constructions** and thus, construct the interests and ideas of purposive actors. Therefore, money, sovereignty, and rights only exist because people believe it does
- Constructivists accordingly seek to find the correlation between changes in social facts and how these changes influence politics
- Constructivism as a theory by itself is different than Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism because it is a social theory that makes claims about the nature of social life and social interaction but does not make any specific predictions about political outcomes like in social science research
- Also different from materialist and utilitarian theories because identities and interests are a big part of it

- Constructivists believe that by understanding how sovereignty, human rights, laws of war, bureaucracies are constituted socially, we can hypothesize their effects in world politics
- All constructivists agree that state identity shapes state preferences and actions but they have no agreed upon definition for identity since it is not a “catch-all” term
- Identities could be ways in which we identify states such as the Islamic state but at any time, certain types of identities have more or less international legitimacy and role identities only exist in relation to other identities
- Speech can “persuade” people into changing their minds about what goals are valuable and about the roles they play or should play in social life
- **Divisions in Constructivism:**
- Postmodern Constructivism: Analytical and ethical knowledge claims cannot be made objectively since research involves interpretation which is subjective
- Modern constructivists accept that the world is always interpreted but that doesn’t mean that all interpretations or explanations are equal
- Constructivism doesn’t try to compete with other “isms”, it focuses on the issues instead
- Norms matter for Constructivists. Different states react differently to the same norms and also internalize them differently due to regime types, civil wars, and the presence of domestic human rights organizations
- **Additions to Constructivism:**
- Critical constructivism adds that these “social constructions” *reflect* relations of power and that many categories we treat as natural are products of past social construction processes
- Norm Entrepreneurs: People who dislike existing norms so they group together to create new social constructions

- **Comparativists**
- involves comparisons among countries and through time within single countries, emphasizing key patterns of similarity and difference to study conflicts and institutions between countries
- Rarely use the term “constructivist” and when they do they usually mean something different
- Looks to explain puzzles or questions rather than test a particular theory
- Also don’t feel the need to identify with a particular “ism”
- Comparativists want to build a “mid-level” theory to separate itself from the macro theorizing in International Relations
- **Additions to Comparativism**
- Political Culture: Bringing culture up in politics is a common staple of comparative politics
- Social Movement Theory: A debate over whether social movement actors were mainly driven by a need to express their own ideas or more strategic concerns of where and when they could win
- Identity and Ethnicity: The constructed and imagined nature of ethnic identity
- **Critiques:**
- **Critique 1**
- One of Constructivist’s theory’s main focuses is on universal norms and how they affect political behavior depending on where one is in the world. Constructivists generally define norms as a set of universally standard appropriate practices and behaviors which political actors can interpret however they choose. However, there is a few problems and false assumptions that come with using norms to study behavior
 - 1- You cannot assume that everybody in a society has the same set of values or at least agrees on what is appropriate and what is not. Different identities will have a different set of norms and thus, we can not make “norms” a universal entity (for example euthanasia or capital punishment)

2- By looking at norms to study international relations, we generalize the world too much and assume that everyone follows the same norms

- **Critique 2**

- On the other hand, we have another group that looks only at local variations in norm effects and this is problematic because it does lose sight of the global norms we do have. For example, we can generally assert that “murder” is universally regarded as being wrong

- **Critique 3**

- Constructivists generally tend to do their research at the “state” level meaning that to generate conclusions on things like reasons of conflict, and bureaucracy between countries, they look at the domestic systems of specific states, and view all states as being equal. According to Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz, they might see this approach as being reductionist or overly simplified since Waltz for example sees international conflict as being due to the lack of a “world government” and would argue that if all countries are viewed equally without the role of a world government, states will fight since the state is anarchic by nature

- **Critique 4**

- Liberalists may also disagree with constructivists since constructivists believe that the identity of the state and the social structure between and inside nations decides how international anarchy is approached and don't really uphold economic power between states while Liberalists would argue that economic power is a huge source of conflict between states

- **Critique 5**

- Sikkink and Finnemore relate material topics such as money and sovereignty to social constructions and argue that these things only exist because societies have made them into social constructions. However, I would also argue that this is a reductionist claim since although money started as a social construction in order to “barter” or “trade” it has now become such a big, universal and real part of society that no “Norm Entrepreneur” would be able to stop money as being part of a society
- According to Constructivist theory, material topics such as sovereignty and money, only exist because people have “constructed” it to exist. Do you agree with this statement, why or why not?

Presentation Readings

What is the point of this article?

What are the main arguments?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the theory?

How can we apply this to international relations today?

Mon. Nov. 9, 2015

“Collective Identity Formation and the International State”

Alexander Wendt

- Collective identity among states can emerge endogenously at the systemic level
 - Opposes neorealist-neoliberal view, which suggests that the challenge is getting exogenously given egoists to cooperate
- Systemic-level interactions can shape identity, increases possibility for cooperation
- Formation of “international state”
- **Collective action problem:**
 - Situation where there is conflict between individual and group interests
 - Mancur Olson’s definition: “takes self-interested actors as constant and exogenously given and focuses on the selective incentives that might induce them to cooperate”
 - Rationalists: explain behaviour in terms of changing constraints
 - Neoliberals: explain behaviour in terms of tastes (exogenous)
 - Jeffrey Legro: the rationalist “two-step”
 - 1. Interests are formed exogenously
 - 2. Interests impact behaviour
 - Systemic interaction does not transform state interests → this is up for debate, may ignore some strategies for cooperation
- Wendt: reframes collective action argument in terms of states with interests **endogenous** to interaction
- Draws on two literatures:
 - Integration theory – formation of community at int’l level
 - Constructivist approach – states are constructed by historically contingent interactions
- State-centric approach
- Dependent variable = forms of identity and interest
- **Identity and Collective Action:**
 - Constructivism – 3 core claims:
 - “States are the principal units of analysis for international political theory”
 - “The key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material” → opposes realism

- “State identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics” → opposes realist systemic theories
 - Corporate identity – focuses on self-organizing, intrinsic qualities (body and experience of consciousness)
 - Generates four basic interests: physical security, ontological security, recognition as an actor, development
 - Social identity – sets of meanings that actors attribute to themselves in the eyes of other actors
 - Can have many
 - Individual/group identities
 - Identities can be cooperative or conflictual
- **Collective Identity and Action:**
 - “Ability to overcome collective action problems depends in part on whether actors’ social identities generate self-interests or collective interests”
 - Positive/negative identification with another
 - Neorealists: emphasis on “relative gains”, negative identification
 - Neoliberalists: emphasis on “absolute gains”, neutral identification
 - Alliances vs. collective security arrangements:
 - Alliances: temporary, states are self-interested, come together for a specific reason (response to a threat)
 - Collective security systems: collective identity, willingness to act alike against nonspecific threats
 - Identities and interests are dependent variables endogenous to interaction
- **Explaining Self-Interest in World Politics:**
 - States often define their interests in egoistic terms
 - **Domestic Determinants:**
 - Interests stem from corporate nature
 - States are predisposed to be self-interested
 - Depend on their own society for survival – societal interests come first
 - Nature of state-society relations – some states depend more on int’l society, some depend more on domestic factors
 - Nationalism – societal collective identity based on cultural, linguistic, or ethnic ties → this can vary
 - **Systemic Determinants:**
 - Anarchic system makes it so states that are not self-interested will be selected out
 - Institutionalists emphasize the norms and shared understandings in an int’l society – principle of sovereignty helps states to survive in anarchy

- **Summary:**
 - “Egoistic interests are based on representations of the relationship between the self and other”
 - These representations are always in process
 - Many factors (systemic and domestic) dispose states towards egoism – does not always lead to collective identity
- **Collective Identity Formation Among States:**
 - Three types of mechanisms that promote collective state identities: structural contexts, systemic processes, and strategic practice
 - **Structural contexts:**
 - Structure of int’l systems determines collective identity formation
 - Shared understandings, expectations, and social knowledge
 - Intersubjective structures determine how much room there is to develop collective identity – depends on degree of conflict
 - In situations of high conflict states will likely defend egoistic identities
 - Intersubjective structures give meaning to material capabilities (by influencing actions)
 - **Systemic processes:**
 - Structures are shaped by practice
 - Systemic processes = “dynamics in the external context of state action”
 - These relate to identity, not just behaviour
 - **Rising interdependence:**
 - Increase in “dynamic density” of interactions (ex: trade and capital flows)
 - Emerge of a “common other” (threat)
 - These increase thickness of systemic structures, and collective identities as a result (key factor = **dependency**)
 - As interdependence rises, so will the potential for endogenous transformations of identity
 - **Convergence of domestic values:**
 - Cultural/political values
 - This can happen as a result of rising interdependence
 - May happen as one society learns from another
 - Reduces heterogeneity – possibility of positive identification
 - Possibility for states to respond to this processes by increasing egoistic identity, in a fight to stay authentic/independent
 - **Strategic practice:**
 - Agents and structures are influenced by what agents do
 - Two forms of interaction: behavioural and rhetorical
 - **Behavioural:**

- Axelrod's two-person prisoner's dilemma demonstrates how strategies of reciprocity can generate cooperation
 - Yet this model assumes that actors are egoistic – interaction only affects expectations about others' behaviour, not identities
 - Must place this model in the context of changing identities through interaction
 - Repeated acts of cooperation will have two effects on identity:
 - “Reflected appraisals” – actors form identities by learning to see themselves as others do
 - Actors sustain presentations of self – states will internalize a new identity
 - **Rhetorical:**
 - Rhetorical practices: dialogue, discussion, persuasion, symbolic action...etc.
 - These practices in collective action attempt to create solidarity
 - About redefining identity
 - **Rival Hypotheses:**
 - Nothing inevitable about collective identity – faces opposing forces
 - Hypothesis rivals rationalist hypothesis
 - States acquire collective interests through processes at the systemic level
- **The International State:**
 - Treats states as having identities, interests, rationality, etc.
 - Concept of state authority – legitimacy and coercion
 - States must develop an identity (economic, political, etc.)
 - Institutionalizes collective action
 - Collective identities bind states to an international community, ex: collective security system
 - Institutional framework for capitalist production internationalizes states, demand for international rules and regulations
 - International state formation is a process – still In early stages
 - It is issue specific
 - Creates tensions between national and transnational interests
 - Internationalization of political authority has two broad implications for IR:
 - Structural transformation of states system from anarchy to authority, mutual recognition of sovereignty

- Calls into question the premises of contemporary democratic governance → must consider democracy at the international level, and make collective identities democratically accountable
- **Conclusion:**
 - Rejection of realist and rationalist conceptions of structural theory
 - Realism:
 - Reduces system structure to distribution of material power
 - Rationalism:
 - Identities are exogenous and constant
 - State should be considered when explaining structural change
 - International politics is about the transformation of identities (by dynamics at both the domestic and systemic levels)

“A Realist Reply”

John J. Mearsheimer

- Response to criticisms of his article “The False Promise of International Institutions”
- **The Core Issue:**
 - Central question raised in “False Promise”: “can international institutions prevent war by changing state behaviour?”
 - Do institutions have the power to sway states away from balance-of-power logic?
 - Realists – No.
 - States will always behave as power maximizers
 - Institutions reflect balance of power
 - Institutionalists – Yes.
 - Institutions have influence on state behaviour by convincing states to accept outcomes that may weaken their relative power position
 - Role of alliances in institutional theory:
 - “Inner-directed” institutions – designed to facilitate cooperation and solve conflicts among member states (collective security system)
 - “Outer-directed” institutions – objective is to deter, coerce, or defeat an outside state or group of states (alliance) → Institutionalists focus less on these types of institutions
 - When Institutionalists (Ruggie, Keohane, Martin) attempt to use alliance type institutions who have promoted peace as examples, they are defying traditional institutionalism that has continuously been rooted in “inner-directed” institutions, and are instead making realist claims
- **John Ruggie: A Ship Passing in the Night**
 - Does not provide strong defense of institutionalism – does not address the core issue
 - Arguments are consistent with realism

- EX: asserts that the US was more successful in the Cold War with institutions like NATO by their side
 - Mearsheimer agrees, but this does not argue that institutions have the power to change state behaviour independently
 - It is a realist claim – institutions helped to improve the state’s relative power position
- **Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin: Realists by Any Other Name...**
 - Liberal institutionalism – clear alternative to realism
 - Institutions can help states to overcome collective action dilemmas
 - Most recent variant of this theory is realism by another name
 - Mearsheimer criticizes claim “institutions matter” – vague, doesn’t answer question of how they influence state behaviour
 - States invest resources in institutions because they further their interests – realism agrees with this
 - All arguments about the benefits of institutions could be done without them
 - Authors argue that institutions cause peace – evidence is weak
 - Liberal institutionalists are converting to realism, whether they admit it or not
- **Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan: Mixing Oil and Water**
 - Mearsheimer argued in “False Promise” that there are flaws in the logic of collective security
 - Collective security systems and concerts (agreements) are distinct
 - Kupchans defend a new version of collective security which involves balance-of-power logic (a.k.a. realism) → yet these two theories are contradictory and cannot be mixed
 - States that are primarily concerned with power will not be primarily concerned with maintaining peace
- **Alexander Wendt: Missing the Critical Issues**
 - Offers a bold challenge to realism, but does not properly address the criticisms against critical theory that Mearsheimer raises in “False Promise”
 - Wendt describes both critical theory and realism as “structural” theories – yet there is confusion over the meaning of the word structure
 - Realists consider the *material* structure of the int’l system – power capabilities and their distribution
 - Critical theorists consider the *social* structure of the int’l system – emphasis on shared discourse, norms, values and how they shape the world
 - Two critiques of critical theory that Mearsheimer raises in “False Promise”, that Wendt does not respond to:

- The theory is concerned with changing state behaviour, but does not provide a reason behind these changes (why are some discourses more prevalent than others)
 - Wendt does not attempt to explain why realism has been the dominant discourse in IR for well over a thousand years – does not explain why it is now the time for new discourses
 - There is no way to predict the future
 - There is little empirical support for the theory
- **Conclusion:**
 - Debate over whether institutions cause peace has significant real-world consequences
 - Should states rely on institutions to protect them?
 - So far, evidence says no

A Realist Reply -John J. Mearsheimer

Core Issue between Critics and Measheimer

- Critics of “The False Promise of International Institutions”
- Question of article: can international institutions prevent war by changing state behaviour?
 - Realist answer: NO.
 - institutions reflect state calculations of self-interest based on concerns of relative power
 - institutions can be useful to maintain or increase some state’s power
 - ex.: NATO was helpful to balance against the Soviet Union but did not force anyone to balance
 - Institutional answer: YES.
 - institutions can promote peace by convincing states to reject power-maximizing behaviour and accept outcomes that can weaken their relative power position
 - DEBATE: whether institutions can have an independent effect on state behaviour or whether they are tools employed by powers for their own purposes
 - institutionalists focus on “inner-directed” institutions: designed to manage and resolve conflict and facilitate cooperation among the member states
 - ex.: collective security system
 - little attention paid to outer-directed institutions (alliance): target is an outside state which the alliance aims to deter, coerce, or defeat in war
 - institutions cause peace by deterrence (realist behaviour)
 - they ignore NATO and incorporate inner-directed institutions such as European Community (EC) and the International Energy Agency

- Ruggie, Keohane & Martin: NATO was used to deter Soviet threat... but deference has nothing to do with institutionalist theory

John Ruggie: A Ship Passing in the Night

- not a strong defense because does not touch on the issues of institutionalist theory
- 4 arguments follow realism:
 - during early Cold War realists gave bad advice such as uniting NATO and Europe... true but says nothing about institutions affect state behaviour
 - “postwar American pursued its interests and sought to manage the changing international balance of power but U.S. policy makers also had” certain desire such as the establishment of NATO... says nothing about institutions affecting state behaviour, as well as the true fact that states can use institutions to further their interests
 - Eisenhower administration’s support of European unification deviated sharply from realism... this isn’t true, because Eisenhower felt that a united Western Europe would achieve European containment against the Soviet Union better than a divided Western Europe, which is consistent with realism
 - views of Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, or Dulles toward the institutional dimensions of security policy had less to do with mushy thinking than with geopolitical realities: REALISM: US policymakers used NATO to improve their relative power

Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin: Realists by Any Other Name...

- original institutionalist theory: institutions can independently ease cooperation among states by helping states overcome certain collective action
- Grieco published an article in International Organization theory’s causal logic
- Keohane & Martin: contrasts liberal institutionalism and realism to show that realism is flawed

- response reveals that liberal institutionalism in a large form has been swallowed up by realism
- 3 dimensions:
 - “institutions matter” but Mearsheimer is said not to care about them: first claim is way to vague to even have a meaning, but M believes that they sometimes matter, which explains why states invest modest money, but that is besides the point
 - criticism of realism, as institutions affect state behavior in ways that contradict realism, but go on to explain institutions through realist arguments:
 - “liberal institutionalists, who see institutions as rooted in the realities of power and interest, do not argue that NATO could have maintained stability under any imaginable conditions [but that they] make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities” (42)
 - “institutionalist theory... after all, posits that international institutions are created in response to state interests , and that their character is structured by the prevailing distribution of capabilities” (47)
 - only mention of effect of institutions: “the difference between realism and liberal institutionalism does to lie in whether institutions are independent or dependent variables” (48)
 - arguments which appear to contradict realism do not:
 - “institutions can facilitate cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflict” actually fits with realism because relative gains does not require states to violate the power-of-balance logic
 - all the tasks assigned to institutions do not require them: states can bargain with each other and use side payments without them... they are said to increase issue linkage to promote cooperation, but issue linkage was born before institutions
 - evidence that institutions can cause peace: studies of oil pollution at sea and European Court are not representative of war and peace

- John Duffield's work on NATO shows that it wasn't created for non-realistic reasons, etc., Keohane states this is because liberal institutionalism is a new theory

Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan: Mixing Oil and Water

- standard theory of collective security: stark alternative and direct challenge to realism: states behave according to different logics in each theory, thus the predictions of each for life in the international system vary greatly as well
- argue that Mearsheimer presents a very narrow definition of collective security, but he in fact analyses the standard theory
- they propose new version of collective security: incorporates power-of-balance theory, but realism and collective security cannot be mixed in any case, they are mutually exclusive, as they are different explanative views of state behaviour
- claim that collective theory can take many forms such as ideal collective security and concerts, but they do not describe the nameless institutional forms nor do they distinguish them from concerts, thus they defend NIFs and concerts rather than theory
- claim that collective security system will fail long before a state is attacked: not necessarily true

Alexander Wendt: Missing the Critical Issue

- critical theory offers bold challenge to realism, but he doesn't answer the criticisms levelled against critical theory
- describes it and shows how it differs from realism as he thinks Mearsheimer misinterpreted critical theory. This isn't true
- maintains M was wrong to treat critical theory as a single theory, but he does so to analyse the literature, and doesn't caricature the theory
- states that realism isn't structural enough, but confuses structure notion
 - realists believe state behaviour is shaped by material structure
- did not respond to main critics in Mearsheimer's article

- Written in 1989 - Before the end of the Cold War - Was it an anticipation of what will happen after the end of the Cold War?
- American writer - did that influenced his opinion?

Summary :

Francis Fukuyama's essay represents a different aspect of the civilization exclusivity question. "The End of History?" concerns the rise and fall of major ideologies such as absolutism, fascism and communism, and suggests that human history should be viewed in terms of a battle of ideologies which has reached its end in the universalization of Western liberal democracy ("What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War ... but the end of history as such: that is, the endpoint of mankind's ideological development and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government"). He argues that although its realization is still in process in the material world, the idea of Western liberalism has triumphed, as evidenced by the worldwide growth of Western consumerist culture and the gradual movement towards democratic or liberal reforms in countries that previously embraced alternate ideologies.

Key concepts :

- Idealist stance
- underlines Hegel's notion that history would end in an "absolute moment" where the triumphant form of government assumed its place as victor. (« mankind progressed through a series of primitive stages of consciousness on his path to the present and that these stages corresponded to concrete forms of social organization, such as tribal, slave-owning, theocratic, and finally democratic-egalitarian societies, has become inseparable from the modern understanding of man. »)
- Contradictions that drive history first comes from human consciousness.
- state of consciousness permits growth of liberalism which seems to stabilize the world.
- 2 major challenges to liberalism = fascism and communism.
- Nationalism & other forms of racial and ethnic consciousness = other contradiction to liberalism.
- « The present world seems to confirm that the fundamental principles of socio-political organization have not advanced terribly far since 1806 » - rival ideologies that wants to go over liberalism.

How this concept differ from the others that we say in the course ?

- About a possible post-cold war order.
- Optimist view about the future of IR.
- Shows why liberalism should triumph over other ideologies.

The Clash of Civilizations? Samuel P. Huntington

Conflict of Civilizations

- “It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in the new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic... the dominating source of conflict will cultural”
- Nation state will remain principal actors of international system
- Principal conflicts will be between nations and groups of different civilizations
 - Terrorist groups
 - Activist groups

Civilization

- A cultural entity composed of:
 - Villages
 - Regions
 - Ethnic groups
 - Nationalities
 - Religious groups
- Example
 - Culture of a village in southern Italy may differ from that of a village in northern Italy, though what links them as well as differs them from a village in Germany is the common Italian culture (language, history, borders)
- Civilization is the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have.
 - This distinguishes people from other species
 - Defined by:
 - Language
 - History
 - Religion
 - Customs
 - Institutions
 - Subjective self-identification of people
- Civilizations can be composed of many people or few people; many state or a single state.
- Civilizations are open to change
 - Civilizations rise and fall; divide and merge; disappear.

Civilization Identity

- World will be shaped by interaction of 7-8 great civilizations
 - Western
 - Confucian
 - Japanese
 - Islamic
 - Hindu
 - Slavic-Orthodox
 - Latin American
 - African
- Why will the world be shaped by interaction between these civilizations?
 1. Differences among the cultures and views
 - More fundamental than differing political ideologies and regimes
 - Differences don't necessarily mean conflict and conflict doesn't necessarily mean violence, though over the years differences are responsible for most prolonged and violent conflicts
 2. Globalization — World is becoming a smaller place
 - Increase in interaction between peoples of differing civilizations
 - Increase in awareness of differences.
 - Example
 - Americans react more far more negatively to Japanese investment as opposed to larger investments by Canadians or Europeans
 3. Economic modernization and social change is separating people from longstanding local identities and weakening the nation state as the source of identity.
 4. Growth of civilization - consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the west
 - A West at the peak of its power is confronting non-Wests that have an increasing desire to shape the world in non-Western ways.
 - Elites of the non-West used to be individuals not from the West, but who were educated by the West at universities and in western society
 5. Cultural conflicts are easily compromised and resolved as opposed to political and economic ones.
 - In ideological conflicts the question is "What side are you on?", while in cultural conflicts the question is "Who are you?"
 - "The wrong answer to the cultural question can mean a bullet in the head"
 - Religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people
 - It is difficult to be half—Christina and half—Muslim, while common to be half—French, half—American and a citizen of Italy.
 6. Economic regionalism is increasing
 - Regional economic blocs are increasing
 - European Union

- North American (trade between US, Canada and Mexican cultures).
- Common culture facilitates state interaction and expansion
- Common religion facilitates state interaction and expansion
- Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues
 - Human rights
 - Immigration
 - Trade and commerce
 - Environment
- Clash of civilizations occurs at two levels
 - Micro level = “adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other”
 - Macro level = “states form differing civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively to promote their particular political and religious values.”

Fault Lines Between Civilizations

- Replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the cold war, becoming the sites of bloodshed and crisis.
- The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe.
- The interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a *clash of civilizations*
 - Example:
 - Increasingly open racism, political reactions and violence in Italy, France and Germany against Arab and Turkish migrants.
- Northern border of Islam conflict has erupted between Orthodox and Muslim peoples
 - Serb and Albanian peoples
 - Bulgarian and the Turkish minority
 - Violence between Ossetians and Ingush
 - Slaughter of each other by Armenians and Azeris
 - Tense relations between Russian and Muslims of Central Asia
- Clash between Muslim and Hindu in Central Asia
 - Rivalry between Pakistan and India
 - China and Buddhist people of Tibet
 - China and its Turkic-Muslim minority
 - China and the USA
 - New Cold War (Deng Xiaoping)



- Clash of civilizations also exists in economic terms
 - USA and China
 - USA and Europe
 - West and Japan

Civilization Rallying: The Kind-Country Syndrome

- “Groups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from another civilization naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civilization”
- This syndrome is progressively replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the basis for cooperation and coalitions.
- Conflicts and violence also occur between states and groups of the same civilization
- However, they are less likely to be as intensive and expansive as those between states or groups from differing civilizations.
- Local conflicts most likely to escalate into major wars will be those, as in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between the civilizations.

The West Versus the Rest

- The West is at its peak in power and has no super power opponent.
 - Military conflict among Western states is unlikely
 - Western military power is unrivaled
 - Japan is the only economic challenge of the West
 - Dominates international relations and with Japan international economic institutions
 - Domination of the U.N. Security Council and its decisions, only sometimes abstained by China
- “The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values.”
- Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations.
- Western ideas of:
 - individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of the church and state
are contrary to concepts in
 - Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or orthodox cultures
 - “Universal civilization” is a western idea.

- Central axis of world politics in the future will be
 - The “West and the Rest”
 - Responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values
- Responses by non-Western often entail:
 1. Isolation policy (Burma, North Korea)
 2. Bandwagoning - attempt to join the West, accepting its values and institutions
 3. Balance the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions
 - “Modernize, but don’t Westernize”

Torn Countries

- Civilizations with diverse peoples will begin to divide
- Torn countries — states with multiple differing characteristics from their civilization
 - Example
 - Turkey — Part of the EU, though it considers itself a Muslim state, while the rest of the EU is predominantly Christian
 - Russia — Is Russia part of the West or a leader of the Slavs?
 - Should Russia stay with the West or form a closer relationship with China and the Muslim states?

Countering the West

- Increasing weaponry
 - Chemical
 - Nuclear
 - Biological
- Western states (including Russia) are anti-proliferation, non-Western states are pro-proliferation
 - Western states employ sanctions, treaties and threats in order to achieve global anti-proliferation
 - Non-Western states reserve their right to develop any arm they perceive as necessary in order to enhance state security
- Chinese development
 - Economic
 - Military
 - Causing Arms race in the East Asia

Overall Purpose of Article

- To describe that differences between civilizations are real and important
- Conflict between civilizations will overcome ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict
- International relations, a game normally played by the West, are becoming progressively de-Westernized
 - Non-Western states will become actors rather than objects in international relations
- Conflicts between groups in differing civilizations will become more frequent, overcoming the magnitudes related to conflicts between groups in the same civilization
 - Magnitudes meaning more sustained and more violent
- Conflicts between groups in differing civilizations are the most probable to lead to global wars
- World politics will revolve around relations between “the West and the Rest”
- Elites in non-Western countries will try to join the west, though they will face major obstacles in doing so

“For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist

- The West needs to recognize other civilization’s aims and work with them rather than against them.
- For example, the West shouldn’t try to implement democracy in the East, but instead allow those states to develop

Notes: David Kang (2010), East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (excerpts in Art & Jervis, International Politics)

Wako: Smugglers and Pirates

Ming and Qing — in the mid-fourteenth century and the early seventeenth century- bans on Chinese maritime trade while there was huge demand on Chinese goods

—> resulted **illegal trade in the form of smuggling and piracy**

“pirates” were the merchants who smuggled and they were called Wako, meaning “invaders from Japan”

- Wako were not actually Japanese but rather armed Chinese merchants
- dealing with the wako was one of the main factors that caused diplomatic coordination among Japan, China and Korea
- Stephen Turnbull calls the wako-“half merchant–half pirate,” because “in the absence of legitimate trade, piracy and smuggling rushed to fill the vacuum.”

Origins of Wako

- Wako was originally armed military families from the Kyushu who attacked towns in Korea and China, take slaves and interrupt trade
- In response, Chinese emperor Hong Wu Hongwu (1368–1398) warned the Japan and Korea attacked the island of Tsushima in 1389 in an attempt to wipe out the wako stronghold

As the central governments of East Asia became more powerful and exerted greater control over their territories and borders, the wako eventually died out. Wako caused East Asian countries to **expend** enormous resources to control them, prompted governments to **communicate and collaborate** at times.

Trade Policies of Qing Dynasty

Qing trade policies: initially **severe restrictions** on trade were followed by a **gradual loosening**

- Qing retained many Ming institutions in governing their foreign relations and the **tribute system remained** which modification until 1911
- Qing had been crucial actors in Northeast Asian trade

In 1644, Qing gained power in China. Qing allowed trade in copper initially but not on silver.

Qing feared the coexistence of Ming loyalist on Taiwan and powerful armed merchants —> Qing increased maritime restrictions.

- From 1661 to 1684, private trade was outlawed
 - Many civilians living on the coast were ordered to move inland
- Still, there were private trade in the form of smuggling.

In 1680s, consolidated domestic control and control of coasts, Kangxi emperor was convinced that private trade would benefit Chinese economy and state budgets. —> **lifted the ban** on private trade while the tribute system was retained

Trade quickly resumed, both in forms of tribute and private.

Both Qing and Ming Dynasty interacted with outer world on regular basis formally and privately.

The overarching institutions that governed trade were those of the **tribute system**—states needed to establish diplomatic relations before they were allowed to trade.

At the same time, large amount smuggling and illegal trade was conducted. Smugglers justified their illegal actions but it does not negate that it was the tribute system that governed relations

Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State

Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim (W&F)

Intro:

Wendt is a German political scientist born in the second half of the 20th century who was one of the core constructivist scholars in International Relations.

Friedheim is an American political scientist who also contributed to the development of the constructivist theory.

This reading investigates the role of hierarchy and sovereignty in the post-cold war era, especially in the study of informal empires. The authors give a constructivist point of view emphasizing on social relations giving material disparities causal significance.

I- Main concepts discussed in the reading

Sovereignty: "possession of exclusive authority or right over some domain. In the case of state, it can be authority over a *territory*"

Since exclusivity refers to others, it is a social quality

Hierarchy: one actor (dominant state) exercises authority over another actor (subordinate state). Seen as a 'contract' in which the dominant actor provides "social order" in exchange for a subordinate's "consent".

Those 2 features are central to the study of informal empires in both readings.

Informal empire: (W&F) "structure of transnational authority that combine an egalitarian principle of *de jure* (juridical) sovereignty with a hierarchical principle of *de facto* (in practise) control"

II- Summary & Analysis

Summary: In this work, the authors explain the dynamics in terms of hierarchy and sovereignty between the dominant state and the subordinate in the case of a formal empire. For this they use the contemporary example of E ger and the USSR. Throughout this essay they essentially seek to show that it is the underlying social relations that give material disparities causal significance. Hence they take a CONSTRUCTIVIST point of view.

1) Informal empires

They illustrate the value added by a constructivist approach to informal empire.

Basically they argue that by highlighting the role of *inter-subjectivity & socially shared knowledge* in power relations, a constructivist approach makes it possible to see the *legitimate* aspect of those relations.

They point out a pre-condition for informal empire to exist: “distribution of military power must be sufficiently unequal that a more powerful state has the *material capacity* to intervene and provide security to a weaker one.”

Yet, authors go further than that by claiming that inequality is NOT sufficient enough. In fact what really matters is what actors do with their power according to their ideas that underlie their interest.

2) Hierarchy

They explain how the hierarchical aspect of informal empires is manifested institutionally in numerous ways:

- 1) Relatively stable inter subj understandings embodied in treaties, norms and shared ideology
 - 2) Inter organizational linkages
 - 3) Consultation btw leaders of member states
- ➔ Mutually constituted IDs

Instead of seeing Hierarchy under anarchy (=materialist), constructivism sees it in the *system* by focusing on what motivate actors to subordinate. ➔ Interests = security for sub and domination for other

3) Sovereignty

They focus afterwards on sovereignty. According to W&F the hierarchy of informal empire is distinguished by the juridical sovereignty of its elements.

They argue that it is a relational and contingent ID of states which is produced and reproduced every day by practises of mutual recognition.

Thus, when looking at those 2 descriptions of Hierarchy and Sovereignty, we understand that it is the structures of authority that shape identities and interests.

Finally they report one key challenge in formal empire, which is the problem of *legitimacy*

It is constructed through institutions, intersubjectivity and socially shared knowledge and explains the stability of informal empires.

L&W posit that sovereignty helps legitimate *de facto inequality* in inter politics because it recognizes property rights, and is in this sense equalitarian, but it does so w/o stipulating that these have to be equal.

4) Legitimacy

PB = “reconciling assertion of de facto control over sub state security with their recognition and the right to reject this control”. That is to say asserting control in a legitimate way. For example if a dominant state maintain control only by force of arms, it would be a formal empire and accordingly be illegitimate → collapse in a contemporary context

Nonetheless they point out a solution based on inter-subjectivity: manufacture (construct) consent. This can be done by producing and reproducing authority = matter of doing what the dominant actor tells you because he tells you to do it = legitimate

Thus it consists in the production and reproduction of interstate legitimacy which consequently involves (re)production of certain states’ IDs.

5 mechanisms:

- 1) Overt coercion
- 2) Provision by dominant of security to its clients in exchange for influence over their policies
- 3) Hegemonic ideology to justify and provide coherence to system’s structure
- 4) Institution of sovereignty = giving sub sense that if they acquire external obligations, their ID as distinct actors is secure
- 5) Role of outside powers

5) East Germany and the USSR: informal empire

The hierarchy relation was based on the constructivist explanation of legitimacy ensuring de facto control coupled with de jure sovereignty. This relation evolved according to intersubjectivity and the social mechanisms. Ultimately, East Germany fell not due to the material disparities, but to a lack of legitimacy, which has a social and not material dimension.

Conclusion

Wendt & Friedheim demonstrate how informal empires consist in norms and rules which compel subordinate state's actions by virtue of the dominant state legitimacy. This hierarchical relation is built of IDs, interests as well as institutions which transcend de facto anarchy even if state remain formally sovereign.

First, a constructivist approach, by highlighting the role that inter-subjectivity and socially shared knowledge play, makes it possible to conceive the existence of legitimacy in power relations between states.

Second, by focusing on structures of socially shared knowledge and how it constitutes IDs and interest of both states, constructivism makes it also possible to see the forms of power and contestation involved in the construction of actors in an informal empire

Summary of Linklater's "Realism, Marxism and Critical International Theory"

Main argument:

- Linklater's main argument is that "traditional arguments against Marxism obscured the extent to which historical materialism could respond with an equally powerful critique of realism and make a distinctive contribution to the construction of a perspective which went significantly beyond it."
- He considers Giddens book *The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* and Kubalkova's text *Marxism and International Relations*
- Through these works, concludes that there has been a "pronounced tendency within recent sociology and the theory of international relations to deny, implicitly or explicitly, that either Marxism or realism can generate a complete account of world politics. For this literature, the realization of such an account entails the selection of a different theoretical strategy: one that is committed to absorbing the strengths of realism and Marxism within a new perspective which involves quite simply the simultaneous transcendence."
 - SO, he concludes that neither realism nor Marxism are enough to explain state behaviour, you have to take the strengths of each and combine the two
- He discusses the "deeper issue whether there ought to be a major transformation of contemporary social and political theory so that it integrates the concern of classical sociology and international relations theory within a more comprehensive perspective".

Summary of each section:

Describing Modernity

- He first discusses the mistaken focus of sociologists on the role of capitalism and industrialization in the international system, instead of also recognizing influence of the division between competing sovereign states.
- On the other hand, he argues that classical works of international relations failed to recognize the impact of industrial society on the state system.
- He then concludes that an adequate theory would require the combination of the two.

Beyond Realism and Marxism

- Here, Linklater highlights the Marxist mistake of predicting an authentically universal class. Marxism fails to consider the divide between social states, while only being able to explain the divide between capitalist states.
- He then concludes by stating that, again, a balance between realism and Marxism is a good way of looking at the international system. That way, one does not have to “surrender faith in the ... goals of freedom and universality”

Opening up the theory of international relations

- Linklater’s argument in this section is well summarized in his sentence “opening the theory of international relations to the influence of Marxism can be defended as a means to a more sophisticated explanation or as a method of grounding it upon new normative foundations.”

Enlarging Marxist Theory

- Here, Linklater goes over many of the weaknesses of the Marxist perspective and questions the extent to which one can allow change within the Marxist framework while still calling it Marxism.

International Relations and Human Emancipation

- Here Linklater discusses the possibility that realism might only be valid to the extent that the world is “unfree”. He believes the introduction of Marxism adds an important dimension.

Conclusion:

- Linklater concludes that the realist critique of Marxism might have “impeded the ascent to a perspective superior to both”.

Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method by Robert Cox

Gramsci and hegemony

- Gramsci geared his thought consistently to the practical purpose of political action

origins of the concept of hegemony

- 2 main strands leading to the Gramscian idea of hegemony:
 - 1. came from debates within the Third International concerning the strategy of the Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of a Soviet socialist state
 - 2. came from the writings of Machiavelli

first strand:

- there was an idea already in the Third International that workers exercised hegemony over the allied classes (such as other workers and peasants) and dictatorship over enemy classes
- Gramsci however began applying it to the bourgeoisie which made it possible for him to distinguish cases in which the bourgeoisie had attained hegemonic position of leadership over other classes from those in which it had not
 - in capitalist northern Europe, bourgeois hegemony was most complete. there was an agreement in which the subordinate class worked for the bourgeoisie and in return the bourgeoisie provided leadership
 - because their hegemony was rooted in civil society, the bourgeoisie didn't need to run the state as long as the rulers of the state recognized this structure as the basic limits of their political action
- this new perception of hegemony led Gramsci to enlarge his definition of the state to include the foundations of the political structure in civil society
- the hegemony of a dominant class bridged the conventional categories of state and civil society

second strand:

- the 2nd strand helps to broaden even further the potential scope of application of the concept

- Gramsci was curious about what Machiavelli had written about the problem of founding a new state
- Gramsci was concerned with finding the leadership and supportive basis for an alternative to fascism

war of movement and war of position

- when Gramsci was thinking through the 2 concepts of hegemony, he realized circumstances in Western Europe were very different from those in Russia
- the basic difference was in the relative strengths of state and civil society
- Russia:
 - administrative and coercive apparatus was formidable but vulnerable
 - civil society was undeveloped
 - small working class led by a avant-garde could overwhelm the state in a "war of movement" with no resistance from the rest of civil society
 - the leading party could found a new state through applying coercion and consent
- Western Europe:
 - civil society (under bourgeois hegemony) was fully developed
 - a "war of movement" could enable revolutionaries to seize control of the government, but because of the resiliency of civil society, it would fail
- in order to make a war of movement successful in the hegemonic states of Western Europe, one would need to slowly build up the strength of the social foundations through:
 - creating alternative institutions and intellectual resources within the existing society
 - build bridges between workers and other subordinate classes

passive revolution

- there were 2 kinds of societies and not all Western European societies were bourgeois hegemonies

- one kind had gone through a social revolution (ex: England and France)
- the other had the “new order created abroad” thrust upon them and the new industrial bourgeoisie was not able to achieve hegemony → passive revolution (ex: Italy)
- the concept of passive revolution is a counterpart to the concept of hegemony in that it describes the condition of a non-hegemonic society

historic bloc (blocco storico)

- state and society together constituted a solid structure and revolution implied the was development within it of another structure strong enough to replace the first
 - Gramsci thought this could only come about when the first had exhausted its full potential
 - this is what Gramsci called a historic bloc
- a historic bloc cant exist without a hegemonic social class because a dominant class maintains cohesion and identity through propagation of a common culture
- intellectuals play a huge role because they develop and sustain the mental images, technologies, and organizations
- in the movement towards hegemony, there are 3 levels of consciousness
 - economico-corporative: aware of the specific interests of a particular group
 - solidarity or class: extends to a whole social class but remains at a purely economic level
 - hegemonic: brings the interests of the leading class into harmony with those of subordinate classes and incorporates these interest onto an ideology expressed in universal terms
- the movement towards hegemony is a ‘passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures’

hegemony and international relations

- basic changes in international power relations or world order can be traced to fundamental changes in social relations

- for Gramsci, the state remained the basic entity in IR and the place where social conflicts take place
- the states that are powerful are the states which have undergone a profound social and economic revolution

hegemony and world order

- 4 time periods to distinguish hegemony and non-hegemony:
 - 1845-75: Britain was a economic hegemon that had the capacity to enforce obedience in all its peripheral countries
 - 1875-1945: other countries challenged Britain and the balance of power was destabilized, leading to 2 world wars
 - 1945-65: US was now a hegemon, similar to 19th c. Britain
 - late 60s – early 70s: US no longer a hegemon
- hegemony at the international level is not merely an order among states, but an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production
- world hegemony is a social structure, economic structure, and a political structure and it must be all 3

the mechanisms of hegemony: international organizations

- one mechanism through which the universal norms of a world hegemony are expressed is the international organization
- 5 features of international organization that express its hegemonic role
 - 1. they embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders
 - ex: monetary and trade relations that promote economic expansion
 - 2. they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order
 - 3. they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order
 - ex: help define policy guidelines for states and legitimate certain institutions at the national level
 - 4. they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries
 - 5. they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas

- ex: absorbs potentially counter-hegemonic ideas and make these ideas consistent with hegemonic doctrine

prospects for counter-hegemony

- world orders are grounded in social relations
- a significant change in world order is likely to be traceable to fundamental changes in social relations
- in Gramsci's thinking, this would come about with the emergence of a new historic bloc
- must shift the problem of changing world order back from international institutions to national societies
 - only a war of position can bring structural changes
- in short, the task of changing world order begins with the long, laborious effort to build new historic blocs within national boundaries

Feminist IR Perspective

Cohn

- How can they think this way?
 - The extraordinary abstraction and removal from what I knew as reality that characterized the professional discourse
 - Participant observer: one of 10/48 women on committee of nuclear strategy
 - Observes men as “them”
- 1. Listening
 - Sanitized abstraction
 - Ex: Clean bombs, countervalue attacks, collateral damage
 - All about competition for manhood, and thus there is tremendous danger. But at the same time, the image diminishes the contest and its outcomes
 - Sexual imagery may not be individual but cultural distinguishes between two
 - Ex: penetration, description of Nagasaki bomb
 - Origins less important than function sex language serves in decreasing macabre of defense talks distinguishes between two
 - Ex: patting homoerotic because of thrill from taming danger but harmlessness
 - Patriarchal imagery
 - “Losing her virginity” = country’s initiation into the nuclear world
 - Younger countries seen not as equals but “sons”
 - Domestic images
 - Distances and decreases accountability
 - Ex: PAL, BAMBI, Christmas tree farm
 - Men’s desire to appropriate from women the power of giving life
 - Destruction becomes rebirth
 - Ex: male scientist is parent, successful nuclear bomb is male progeny
 - Appropriate ultimate religious power
 - Priesthood = self-proclaimed virtue, god-like, creates dogma vs. hard science
- 2. Learning to speak the language
 - Took pleasure in using the words
 - Acronyms roll off the tongue
 - Initiated into exclusive club providing allures and power of white male privilege
 - Feel in control of the situation and weapons
 - Removes you from the reality of nuclear war
 - Process of learning and decoding removes from reality
 - Technostrategic speak structurally removes user from reality
- 3. Dialogue
 - Language does not allow certain questions to be asked or certain values to be expressed
 - Patronize those that do not use allotted language
 - Sanitized language with no “peace”, emotions, or human realities
 - In technostrategic discourse, the reference point is not white men, it is not human beings at all; it is the weapons themselves
 - Language doesn’t permit ideas of human death and societies
 - Questions concerning humans are seen as unprofessional and easily dismissed
 - Language isolates technostrategy from social, psychological, moral etc. thoughts

4. Solutions

- We believe the language itself offers the criteria and strategies for nuclear deployment, but they are just the ideological curtain for actual reasons
- Still learn language in order to appear professional and not just ideological
- Feminists have deconstructive task of delegitimizing militarized masculinity and reconstructive task of creating alternative visions of rationality and voices

Comments

- Standpoint feminism
- Combines feminism and anti-militarism
- Combines international relations with psychology and linguistics → inevitable
- Weaknesses
 - Combining feminism and anti-militarism is quite cliché → often combine perspectives → in this case, calls for more marginalisation / disregard
 - Tried to stretch some meanings (ex: priesthood = belief in godlike abilities) → calls for more marginalisation / disregard
- Strengths
 - One of the first feminist writers, archaic but effective
 - True: there is the idea of power as competition, not as acting in concert (seen as more feminine)

Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint

Author: Robert O. Keohane

Divides Feminist IR theory into three components:

1. Feminist Standpoint Theory
2. Feminist Empiricism
3. Feminist Postmodernism

Main Argument:

- The conception of a feminist standpoint provides a particularly promising starting-point for the development of feminist international relations theory.
- Purpose: To explain how the three main perspectives of feminist IR theory can positively contribute to present IR theories.

Feminist Standpoint

- Key Contribution: Improve understanding of existing IR practice by examining how core concepts of IR are affected by the gendered structure of international society.
- Feminist theory will look at whether or not male constructions of key concepts in IR theory have affected how we think about world politics.
- Argues feminist analysis needs to re-analyse key concepts such as power, sovereignty, and reciprocity.
- The definition of these core concepts in IR theory will change because these definitions are linked to male construction.

Feminist Empiricism

- Sociological approach
 - Investigates how gender affects modern interstate system
 - Recognizes women have been victims of patriarchal states
 - Two aspects of international relations have had harmful effects on women's lives are:
 1. The institutionalization of warfare
 2. Its reinforcement of state sovereignty
- Keohane's Critique – To be a proper theory it needs to do more than just state women have been marginalized.

Postmodernism

- Different approach from standpoint feminism and feminist empiricism.
- Keohane argues that this is a dead end and "disastrous for feminist IR theory to pursue this path"

Conclusion

- Keohane believes some parts of feminist theory can make meaningful contributions to IR theory by putting an emphasis on connectedness because previous theories (male dominated) have been created through separateness.

Robert Keohane: IR Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint
Uses Christine Sylvester's and Sandra Harding's distinction of feminism into 3 different views:

1. Feminist Empiricism
2. Feminist Standpoint
3. Feminist Postmodernism

The first, feminist empiricism observes that states and state theories have been fundamentally gendered structures of domination and interactions. These feminists suggest looking at international relations with this gendered structure, these social attitudes and structures in mind.

Feminist standpoint argues that women's experience at the margins of political life have given them perspectives on social issues that provide valid insights into world politics. This is a different view from the mainstream that can give us information about reality that the mainstream methods cannot.

Lastly, Feminist Postmodernism, which according to Keohane is hard to grasp. It is a resistance to the conception of the 'one true story' of reality created by the white male perspective. Postmodernists believe that those who study within the human sciences are ensnared by the same structures that affect the society they study. The belief is that knowledge is not found, but constructed.

Keohane speaks of the feminist standpoint in terms of redefining power, sovereignty and reciprocity. Instead of concentrating on power as control, this standpoint points out the importance of looking at power's order-creating function: quoting Hannah Arendt "not just to be able to act but to act in concert". It also redefines sovereignty from the masculine view of control, to again, the power of the people to act in concert as sovereigns. Lastly it redefines reciprocity. Instead of looking at it as something that takes place as 'tit-for-tat', we may look at it as empathy for people towards one another. Keohane points out that these feminist thinkers are opposed to dichotomies and in support of networks such as family ties.

Feminist empiricism, Keohane declares, sees women as victims of the patriarchal state. Keohane believes that instead of concentrating on the universal repression of women this view suggests, that it is more important to look at variations of its incidence around the world. He thinks this should examine the extent that the current system depends on the under rewarded labour and repression of women and that it may also be a good idea to look at which states and conditions are most conducive to this kind of repression. He believes that these feminists are just pointing out that women in general are disadvantaged, and that this is useless because this is already well known. This view means to combine objectives and observations of feminism with the research methods of empiricism.

Keohane does not grasp postmodernism, which is explained with a quote from Mary E. Hawksworth: "Truth must be abandoned because it is hegemonic and therefore destructive." He believes that thinking this way is a problem, because there are no standards against which we can evaluate claims. Keohane believes that objectivity helps us evaluate claims scientifically, without this objectivity that is not possible.

Keohane believes that feminist standpoint is the most promising of the three feminist perspectives. Feminist standpoint is the most compatible with neoliberalism because it looks at the masculine cultural values and institutions in place in society affecting our behaviour. Neoliberals also emphasize on power as the ability to act in concert, diffuse and specific reciprocity, and the role of networks, all of which were mentioned by Keohane when describing the feminist standpoint. Keohane believes that Neoliberal and Feminist Standpoint scholars could work together and create their own discourse, while dismissing Feminist Empiricism and Feminist Postmodernism.

Good Girls, Little Girls, and Bad Girls: Male Paranoia in Robert Keohane's Critique of Feminist International Relations by Cynthia Weber

Argument: Keohane, by reason of male paranoia, eliminates the 'risks' of feminist IR theory through:

- Fetishization
- Temporalization
- Spatialization

In doing so, Keohane uses discipline and author(ity) to marginalize feminist theory.

Looking Through vs Looking At Feminist Lenses

- Feminists look at IR through the lense of Feminist IR Theory
- Keohane looks at Feminist IR Theory as a useful tool of mainstream IR Theory
- 'How to Look' is at least as important as 'What is Seen', according to Keohane
- Establishes Keohane as the textual subject
- Problem: Presents Feminist IR Theory as legitimate ONLY when presented by 'mainstream' IR theorists -- in this case, Keohane -- and not as valid in its own right

What Keohane Fails to Address

- Mainstream IR theories are "more similar than different in the issues they evade"
- Rather than using Feminist IR to transform his worldview, he makes it his object of analysis

- Cause: male fragility (“male paranoia”)

The Mutilated Feminist Body

- By mutilating Feminist IR Theory, Keohane reduces the threat it poses to mainstream IR
- Evaluates each piece for its ability to complement IR instead of as an integral part thereof
- Three parts:
 - Good Girls -- Feminist Standpoint -- can supplement mainstream IR
 - Little Girls -- Feminist Empiricism -- will be able to supplement mainstream IR
 - Bad Girls -- Feminist post-modernism -- has no use in mainstream IR
- Fetishizes, Temporalizes, and Spatializes Feminist IR Theory to minimize the threat

Good Girls

- Keohane scopically fetishizes Feminist Standpoint -- uses the theory to support his views but:
- Refuses to view IR **through** the lense of Feminist Standpoint
- Scopic Fetishization: viewing something as not a whole, undistorted object in and of itself
- Keohane only discusses parts of Feminist Standpoint which support his own view as a neoliberal institutionalist

Little Girls

- Keohane temporalizes Feminist Empiricism
- “Little Sister” of Feminist Standpoint
- Keohane is quick to criticize this viewpoint
- Suggests Feminist Empiricism allies with Feminist Standpoint (“Big Sister”)
- Condemned as incomplete through temporalization and scopic fetishization

(as with Empiricism)

Bad Girls

- Keohane's clearest display of male paranoia
- Spatialization of Feminist Post-Modernism
- Keohane argues that removal hereof is the only way to eliminate "bias" including:
 - "Nihilism"
 - "Relativist Resignation" (that reinforces the status quo)
- "Disastrous" to pursue
- Unable to fetishize because establish borders around it (unable to identify as useful)
- Result: spatial disciplinary strategy: banishment
- Hence: places Fem. Post-Modernism outside of boundaries

Conclusion: "Return of the Mutilated Body"

- Keohane mutilates Feminist IR Theory
 - By using only parts that support his theory, he fetishizes Fem. Standpoint and Fem. Empiricism but is unable to identify (and hence to fetishize) Fem. Post-Modernism
 - Temporalizes Fem. Empiricism and spatializes Fem. Post-Modernism
 - Reason: male paranoia/male fear
 - Abuses his authorial authority to establish borders within and around Feminist IR Theory, thereby mutilating it.

Explaining Third World Alignment

Steven R David

- Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University
- Specializes in international politics and security issues.
- Theories of alignment, defining American interests and third world politics.

What are Third World Countries? A developing non aligned country. Examples: India, Angola and Kenya

- Steven R. David does not believe the IR theories can be applied to third World Countries.
- He believes that the theory of “omnibalancing” meets the needs of third world countries.

Omnibalancing: it incorporated the need of leaders to appease secondary adversaries, as well as to balance against both internal and external threats in order to survive in power.

- This theory agrees with the key assumptions of balance of power-that threats will be resisted.
- He states that Third World leaders need to resist all threats, internal and external in order to survive.
- Third world leaders always align and re align, not for ideological reasons, but because they need support outside forces, in order to resist the threats they face.
 - Examples of this in the article are Egypt, Sadat switched from alignment with the USSR to the United States.
 - Another Example is Derg which switched from the US to the Soviet Union.

Three distinct repairs of balance of power theory are offered:

- 1) Rather than just balance against threats or power, leaders of states will appease. They will align with a second enemies to fight their primary enemy. "Enemy of my Enemy is my friend". We do not entirely believe this because of the examples given: Soviet Union and US
 - 2) They appease other states in order to counter the more immediate and dangerous domestic threat. [example is Apartheid South Africa and the USA].
 - 3) Dominant goal is to stay in power and to protect themselves instead of the state. [Example Bashar al Assad, Syria, Mummer Ghadaffi Libya, Comporé Burkina Faso.]
- Omnibalancing believes that leaders are weak and illegitimate.
 - Many of these states have democratic constitutions where they are supposed to have elections, but they either never occur or the state fakes them.
 - Omnibalancing accepts the realist view that the world is characterized by international anarchy, that interests are bound to conflict, and that the use of force is always an option for heads of states.
 - Many of these leaders will use force against their own people in order for them to stay into power.

Omnibalancing accepts the realist argument that there are clear hierarchies of issues, with survival being the most important

- Many leaders will do anything to stay in power, rig elections, change the constitution and even use force against the opposition.
- A situation in which internal threats are far more likely to challenge a Third World leader's hold on power than are threats from other states
 - Arab Spring, Burkina Faso.
 - Since 1945 wars within the states have outnumbered wars between states.

Where there is omnibalancing

- Many third world states had been colonies out of which foreign powers created states where none had existed.

- Many of these countries are artificially constructed.
- A situation in which there is ethnically and cultural divide where groups own allegiance to and act on behalf of interests other than the national interests.

Power came from force, like many countries.

- Loss of Power=Loss of life, third world leaders are far more aggressively.
 - They use a lot more force because they no if they don't they will be killed.
 - Gaddafi of Libya is a great example for this.
-
- Third world leaders and insurgents commonly seek outside support to advance their interests.
 - If you look at the Congo wars, there was a ton of foreign involvement in these conflicts even though they didn't hold a huge sway on the global order.
-
- Military weakness of most third world states enhances their willingness to back or help suppress internal threats against neighbours.
 - Uganda and Rwanda are always actively involved in DRC for their own safety.
 - Both have autocratic leaders.
-
- In the balance of power theory, there is a distinction between the international anarchic system and the order of domestic politics.
 - The problem in this distinction is that the central government in third world countries does not possess the power to resolve conflicts inside their countries. There is no strong consensus or integrated society to prevent a conflict.
 - Balance of power theory focuses on the states as the principle level of analysis, that is, for most of its adherents, the state, and not the individual ruler, is the main actor of international politics.

Third World does not completely disagree with neorealism, but it calls into question how neorealism emphasis on countering threats from other states as the prime determinant of alignment

- Leaders usually have to deal with internal threats.

Waltz recognizes that violence and the use of force to deal with it occurs as often within states as between states. He argues on the legitimate use of force to deal with violence, citizens therefore need to worry about protecting themselves.

Waltz observations are largely irrelevant in terms of the alignment decisions of the third world leaders.

One thing he emphasizes about third world countries is that the borders were artificially added, in which the ethnic and cultural groups weren't taken into consideration while creating these borders, which caused many issues in those countries today.

Why Balance of Power Theory is flawed in the application to Third World Countries

- It overlooks the most likely source of challenges to the leadership of third world states.
- Example: 1971 Pakistani Leadership believed it had to counter a secessionist threat from the East Bengalis in order to remain in power. They had to confront India, which supported the rebels. Pakistan lost because of India and the internal conflict they had with the East Bengalis.

Case Study: Sadat

- He aligned with the US following the 1973 October war.
- After Nassar's death in 1970, Egypt enhanced relations with Soviet Union.
- Treaty of Friendship was signed and Moscow sent Cairo a lot of financial assistance as well as military assistance.
- Soviets helped Sadat gain a political victory against the war with Israel in 1973.
- He turned to US because they supported Israel, their enemy.
- Only omnibalancing explains Sadat's decision to switch sides.
- He went to war with Israel in 1973 because of the growing pressure inside his country to regain the occupied lands Israel was holding.
- He aligned with US out of recognition that that was the best means of balancing against his principal, domestic threats.

Significance of the Third World

- Third world is becoming stronger, fast growing economies.
- More investment, interest in these regions.
- IR theory will need to begin to cover this region.
- South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria are becoming growing influential powers in the world.

William Brown (2006) "Africa and International Relations: A Comment on IR Theory, Anarchy, and Statehood" Review of International Studies 32, pp.119-143

This essay's main thesis argues that because IR theories have been created in the Western World they truly do not apply to the IR issues that occur in Africa. He looks at a critique that was written by Neuman and Dunn, who say that for Africa's wars and political issues to be understood, we must create new IR theories that encapsulate it. However, Brown is clearly against this because he argues that the more theories you create to differentiate the African Continent to the Western world, the more alienation is created.

His theory is that the IR theories we have today should be broadened to encapsulate Africa's issues.

His essay is divided into three main bodies that defend the above thesis:

1. Neo Realism
2. The state
3. Anarchy (needs to be changed to understand African anarchy)

He says Neo realism is the most applicable theory in this case and created new theories would be a direct threat to new realism, which he argues is the best to understand the African issues, just needs to be broader.

Some things he says need to be changed and added to our Western views are:

- Get rid of state centralization
- Create non state political features

He says that critiques (Neuman) do not see the importance of the state in creating their theories. For example in Uganda, the state and its relations with the outside politics are very unclear and have only created more issues. If looking at the heart of the issue and the crux of the matter, the state of the state (aha) cannot be ignored.

Ultimately he concludes that looking at the state of African politics, it would only worsen the situation if people were to add more separation between African and Western IR.

For a good essay, you could easily connect him with Marx, and his views on how rights and religion sharply contract and separate people and their views.

Tristan Rodriguez

Clash of the titans reading

Deals with a debate between Brzezinski and Mearsheimer, and their attempts at explaining the possible outcomes of the US and China: if they will either inevitably go into conflict, or if there won't be such a thing and in that case China will surpass the US.

What Brzezinski argues:

1st paragraph: nationalism as an important force, "its focus remains on economic development and winning acceptance as a great power":

2008 olympic games

2010 world expo shanghai

PCC's rational and cautious approach at dealing with foreign policy issues (realist standpoint)

His final line "stability today does not ensure peace tomorrow" echoes the previous readings from last week regarding the feminist standpoint of IR.

3rd paragraph: regional hedgemons wouldn't want to go to war on account of their possession of nuclear weapons, whose sheer destructive power is enough to deter the 2 powers from using them:

5th paragraph: "Frankly, I doubt that China could push the United States out of Asia. But even if it could, I don't think it would want to live with the consequences: a powerful, nationalistic, and nuclear-armed Japan," due to the latter's growing military program. The only time an invasion of Taiwan would be possible is when the US is out of the picture.

What Mearsheimer argues:

2nd paragraph: Better to be Godzilla than Bambi:

A conflict between the US and China is inevitable

The US will attempt to contain the growth of China's power and influence across the world.

"the mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their own region while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region"

The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it: the strive of power isn't enough, the great powers also want to be the hedgmoms of the system.

ensure that no state in Asia can threaten its regional hedgemomy in Asia, much like the US in the Western Hemisphere.

4th paragraph: why China has risen economically so much is because it hasn't picked a fight with the US. In 2030, he states that China will have the military capacity to take on the US's and he ponders on whether then will it attack or not? We can't be sure if that will happen or not, so many factors could influence the eventual outcome, but he thinks China will push the US out of Asia to be the official hegemon of the region.

6th paragraph: "it's not a pretty picture" China should build its economic strength so that it's in a position to dictate the terms of the international state system which the US will then have to abide to, which he compares to making trouble in the US's backyard where its focus will remain.

Zbigniew Brzezinski and John Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy Jan/Feb (2005), pp. 46-50.

1. Very brief context of the author / reading

Brzezinski “Make Money, Not War”:

- Is a realist
- Was former U.S. president Lyndon Johnson’s National Security advisor
- During his term as National Security advisor, the Security Arms Limitation Treaty was signed (SALT II) and US-China relations became less tense

- In his part of “Clash of the Titans”, titled “Make Money, Not War”, Brzezinski argues that China is fascinated by its own economic growth so much so that it has no intent to attack anyone unless an attack towards them is imminent.
- He alludes to China’s hosting of the Olympics in 2008 and the World Expo in 2010, which will greatly contribute to their ever-growing economy.
- He claims that a “confrontational foreign policy” can negatively affect China’s growing economy
- Argues that as China’s economy is growing, US power will inevitably diminish and so will Japan’s relatively newfound economic and social influence
- The only flaw China has going against them is a weak military in comparison to that of the US (at best, they are in a position to declare minimum deterrence)
- China would become virtually economically paralyzed if the US were to ever act upon a threat from them (maritime trade and oil flow would completely stop)
- The Chinese take issue with Taiwanese independence and how it could cause some sort of war if military action is not taken against them
- Brzezinski makes the final claim that the Chinese have finally discovered that the only way to reach hegemonic status is if they gradually and intelligently spread their influence without compromising the already firmly-established US influence

Mearsheimer “Better to be Godzilla than Bambi”:

- Is a neorealist
- Belief in offensive and defense realism

- Directly opposes Brzezinski by saying that China’s rise will not be an easy or peaceful one, and that it will potentially cause a war/security competition with the US
- He alludes to his international theory (“main actors are states that operate in anarchy” “all great powers have some offensive military capability” “no state can know the future intentions of other states with certainty”[AKA security dilemma→ conflict spiral])
- Both the US and China’s goal is to reach hegemonic status (not likely global, but at least regional)
- With this being said, China will try to make sure no one in its region will try to overpower the power China already has over the Asian continent; China will also carefully try to push the US out of China
- But the US is determined to keep its status as THE only regional hegemon and it will do everything in its power to make sure China does not gain regional hegemonic status in Asia

Brzezinski responds in “Nukes Change Everything”:

- The title itself is self-explanatory – Brzezinski explains that the reason why societies don't erase themselves is because of the presence of nukes (whose sole purpose is to exterminate societies); the dynamics of power politics have been altered by this and this was especially evident in the US-Soviet conflict

Mearsheimer responds again in “Showing the United States the Door”:

- Emphasizes that we must privilege political theory over political reality because political reality is far too subjective and can change at any given time
- Counterargues Brzezinski's point that China has no desire to fight because of economic prosperity – says that in times of economic prosperity, Germany declared WWII and Japan, too, started conflict during times of great economic growth
- Branching off on what Mearsheimer said about putting emphasis on political theory, he insists that China will be able to trump the US' military power in a few decades' time
- **BASICALLY:** Mearsheimer argues that China will not only be able to defeat the US as regional hegemon, but will also be able to deal with Taiwan

Brzezinski responds again in “America's Staying Power” :

- Counterargument of Mearsheimer's opinion that China could push US influence outside of Asia
- Admits that Taiwan is a strategic danger, but insists that the US will still be able to enter the picture in trying to defeat this 'strategic danger'

Mearsheimer responds again in “It's Not a Pretty Picture”:

- Insists it's not a good idea for China to try to deal with Taiwan now; they should try to focus on continuing to grow their economy and then grow their military power, hopefully outgrowing the US
- Perpetuates the realist theory of an anarchical state and the security dilemma by 'not painting a pretty picture'= China should focus on dominating Asia, while encouraging Brazil, Argentina, or Mexico to become great powers and 'start trouble in the backyard' of the US b/c right now the US has all the power to be causing the trouble in people's backyards

2. Key concepts and quotes from the reading

- “More broadly, China is determined to sustain its economic growth” (Brzezinski 47)
- “Even beyond the realm of strategic warfare, a country must have the capacity to attain its political objectives before it will engage in limited war.” (Brzezinski 47)
- “...stability today does not ensure peace tomorrow.” (Brzezinski 47)
- “China cannot rise peacefully” (Mearsheimer 47)
- **Containment (Mearsheimer):** China's neighbors will side with the US in order to contain China
- “How great powers behave is not predetermined” (Brzezinski 49)
- “The United States will not be out of the picture for a long, long time.” (Brzezinski 49)
- “I wish I could tell a more optimistic story about the future, but international politics is a nasty and dangerous business. No amount of good will ameliorate the intense security competition that will set in as an aspiring hegemon appears in Asia.” (Mearsheimer 50)

3. Brief description of how the concepts differ from others in the course:

Most obvious concept realism in general differs from is liberalism (or idealism). While realism generally concerns itself with a security struggle and neorealists concern themselves with power struggles, liberalism emphasizes the importance of mutual cooperation between states. It also chooses to involve NGOs and international organizations in order to shape state preferences.

Ikenberry, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West : Can the Liberal System Survive ?*

According to the historian Niall Ferguson : the 20th century has witnessed « the descent of the West » and the « reorientation of the world » towards the East.

For realists, China will use its influence to redo the rules and institutions created by the United States and will then be seen as a security threat = tension, distrust and conflict.

For Ikenberry, this can be avoided because China will be facing a whole international system, not just one state, where a lot of states possess the nuclear weapon, so the order is « hard to overturn and say to join ».

=> the US must give China more incentives to join the Western order and less to oppose it.

Transitional anxieties

China is a serious threat for the US because it challenges it both economically and militarily, while the Soviet Union for example was only a military rival.

World politics are shaped by the interests of powerful states who create institutions and rules. Rising states want more authority matching their rise of power, while declining state only worry about security and abandon their claim for authority.

—> rising states can be dangerous, can lead to conflict (Euro conflict triggered because Germany was gaining more power and states like France, UK and Russia tried to stop it)

There are different types of power transitions :

- States get a lot of power and still accommodate in the existing order
- States have risen up and wanted to change the order
- Power transitions can require a complete or huge change in rules and institutions of existing order
- Others only require minor reforms

Some factors determine which way it'll go : the nature of the rising state's regime and the dissatisfaction with the old order, character of the international order itself.

Open order

Postwar Western order is unique because the US-led order is more liberal than imperial (making it more accessible, legitimate and durable).

US built rules and institutions to keep peace (like Bretton Woods, the Atlantic security pact...)

—> even at the end of Cold War, system gave the soviet leaders incentives to join (shared leadership, reassurances and points of access).

3 critical features to its success and longevity :

- Built around rules and norms of nondiscrimination and market openness : rising states expand power, lots of potential benefits
- Coalition-based character of its leadership : past orders were dominated by only one state, now it is a coalition of powers arrayed around the US, there is a process of give-and-take over economy, politics and security.
- Dense, encompassing and broadly endorsed system of rules and institutions : more open and rule-based, sovereignty and rule of law not just norms anymore.

Ikenberry, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West : Can the Liberal System Survive ?*

=> Incentives China has to join this order are reinforced by the change of nature of the international economy = new interdependence through technology, globalization. US is dependent on China and the rest of the world, the economic relations are different.

Accommodating the rise

—> these features give the Western order the ability to accommodate rising powers so they can have power and authority within the system. It is already facilitating China's integration, the country is increasingly working within the Western order and uses its institutions a lot.

—> Already permanent member of the UN security council so has the authority and the advantages of « great-power exceptionalism »

Also China's economic interests fit in the international economical system and is aware that in order to be successful has to be part of this system. The country needs access to the capitalist order and also wants protections that the rules and institutions can provide (ex : WTO provides tools to protect against discrimination and protectionism)

International economic institutions also offer opportunities for new powers to rise up through their hierarchies (FMI and World Bank translate economic charges into institutional voice —> pressures to admit China into economical governance institutions)

Power shift and peaceful change

Some people in the Bush administration were hostile to multilateral, rule-based system the US had shaped and led —> stupid and dangerous behaviour because China will inevitably be powerful, US has power to decide what kind of system will be in place when it happens.

US has to do a number of things to prepare for rise of states :

- Must reinvest in the Western order, reinforcing engagement, integration and restraint, has to benefit a full range of states
- Must reestablish itself as supporter of the global system of governance : will facilitate problem solving and if use power for rules and institutions then it will make this power more legitimate and countries will want to follow it more
- Needs to reaffirm values of the deal it made with its allies = US will provide security while in return allies will operate within the US-led Western order
- Renew support for wide-ranging multilateral institutions : for WTO, could build on it, concluded current Doha Round + make other multilateral agreements (like with global warming and nuclear proliferation)
- Integrate developing countries in key global institutions to give them new life.

=> All of this is to make sure the current order does not fragment into « mini lateral » pacts, China could take advantage of these = competition between US and Chinese spheres.

The triumph of the liberal order

China may be able to overturn the US alone, but never the whole Western order.

—> US reign will pass, so have to wonder what they want the order to look like when they won't be as powerful = neo-Rawlsian question of our era (Rawls said institutions should be made under a « veil of ignorance » so architects build them without wondering where they are in the system, regardless of rich or poor).

The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?

By: G. John Ikenberry

Main Arguments:

Superpowers rise and fall: two things can happen

- 1) The new hegemon breaks down the old order and this results in tension, distrust and conflict
- 2) There is a shift of superpower but the order remains and this results in a smooth transition of power

In the case of China:

- **China will become the hegemon**
- **However, the Western order will remain**

Characteristics of the Western order:

- 1) There are rules and norms of non discrimination and a market openness; states can live and strive within the order
- 2) There is a coalition of powers (lead by the US); they keep the order in place
- 3) There are broadly endorsed rules and institutions; this ensures cooperation and shared authority

The Western order is more liberal than imperial

It has the capacity to accommodate rising powers

Evidence that China is rising within the order: working within the system with IMF

What the US must do to ensure that the order remains:

- 1) Re-establish itself as the foremost superpower of global system of governance
- 2) Support wide ranging multilateral institutions (do not let the order fragment to bilateral)
- 3) Reintegrate developing countries into global institutions

Main weaknesses (of article):

- Assumes that China will be the next hegemon
- Assumes that it will be a unipolar world if China rises (why not a bipolar world?)
- Does not explain in what way the US is declining
- Does not explain what will happen when/if China becomes hegemon (will it keep the western order or slowly change institutions to avoid other to strive?)

1. Neoconservatism and the Bush Doctrine

1) American hegemony and their grand strategy of primacy

- > the US is the only superpower and seeks to preserve its hegemonic position
- > US leadership of the int system is necessary for an orderly and peaceful world = hegemony beneficial for the US but also the rest of the world
- > strategy of primacy creates a "bandwagoning logic"

2) Commitment to the preemptive use of military force

- > physical deterrence and defense against threats
- > belief that traditional deterrence/containment is no longer credible with "rogue states" or terrorists (cf martyrdom, statelessness...)

3) Unilateralism

- > difficulty to get consensus on preemptive use of force = unilateral powers (US) have possibility of acting unitarily = faith in US military to fulfill national and international interests

4) Promotion of democracy

- > Neoconservatism = idealist strand (wilsonian ideals) and a power strand (emphasis on military power)
- > belief that US economic/political interests are advanced by the spread of liberal values and democracy
- > foreign policy should actively work towards the spread of democracy (even with use of force in the case of Iraq)

=> elements of neoconservative theory that provide a rationale for invading Iraq

2. Realist response : why the US should avoid war with Iraq

=> Realists perceive the invasion of Iraq as a source of problems = unnecessary and counterproductive

=> Realists critique the Bush doctrine and the arguments made by neoconservatives for going to war with Iraq :

1) Moralistic foreign policy which seeks to spread democracy and moral values

- > oppose conception of national interest imbued with universal values
- => national interest must be derived from specific interests = protection of "physical, political and cultural identity"

2) Democratic peace thesis = democracy as most powerful ideology

- => systemic pressures force all states democracies or not to act in a similar manner
- => power of nationalism = danger of invading a multiethnic state
- => question US capabilities for bringing democracy in Iraq

3) Bandwagoning logic

=> balance of power = states are more likely to oppose and resist rather than align with the threatening predominant state

=> rogue states more likely to redouble efforts than capitulate = danger of nuclear

4) Grand strategy of primacy

=> unrealistic and counterproductive

=> militaristic, aggressive, unilateral policies encourage balancing and decline favorable opinion of the US

4) Preemptive war

=> unnecessary = possibility to contain Iraq indefinitely

=> critical of the idea that Hussein's foreign policy was aggressive/expansionistic

=> Illusory justification that war was necessary because Iraq possessed WMD and could hand them off to terrorist groups

=> Iraq could be both deterred and contained making preemptive war unnecessary

=> US national interest was not at stake

3. Why Realism failed and Conservatism won the debate

Different conceptions of interest and national interest

—> neoconservatives = national interest linked to concern with conditions of domestic political life, cannot be separated from values and social virtues

—> realists = reduce interests to material self-interest, egoistic conception

—> NC believe the interests of states cannot be reduced to their material power or position within an order = capabilities

—> R encourages a division between morality and foreign policy which makes it unable to provide a clear vision of national interest that can be explained to citizens

—> NC evokes a moral foreign policy which reinforces values at the domestic level and helps get popular support for pursuing national interest at the international = people can identify with it

—> NC conception of national interest which transcends domestic and foreign policy views issues of security as linked to those of culture = link between debate over Iraq and controversy over values "culture wars" => powerful rationale for Iraq war against realists

—> NC by making links between national interest and public interest presents itself as representing the American public and its values which have been marginalized by elites

=> Neoconservatism draws upon a positive Wilsonian tradition of liberalism combining it with the constant fear that America's liberal order is at risk = ability to link both gives it rhetorical and political power

CONCLUSION :

=> can realist theory really be applied ? can it convey its ideas to the public and those in power ?

=> necessity for a normative aspect to realism = presence of values

The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists
-Brian C. Schmidt & Michael C. Williams
Published in 2008

Aim: to contribute to our understanding of both the debate over the war in Iraq and its influence of US foreign policy by examining the relationship between neo-conservatism and realism.

Summary:

The article begins to talk about how the US did not have an exit strategy nor did Bush's administrations reasoning for the war were proven false

Neo-conservatism veered the US to invade Iraq after 9/11

Realists argued that invading Iraq would be in the US's national interests

The article **begins** by establishing the connection between the tenets of neoconservatism and the arguments for war against Iraq. The focus is on how the Bush Doctrine was the primary neoconservative justification for the war in Iraq.

Michael Doyle (liberalist) describes realist as "theorists of the "state of war"" who adopt 3 core assumptions

- 1) international politics takes place in a condition of anarchy
- 2) the main actors are independent sovereign states that recognize no high power
- 3) "the lack of legitimate international source of controlling authority means no restraint is sufficiently strong or general either to eliminate completely or to manage reliably conflicts of interest, prestige or value

In the case of Iraq, realists did not believe that the situation in 2003 warranted the use of force, this comes after the Hussein government was overthrown. Neoconservatives, on the other hand, were greatly displeased with the outcome of the Persian Gulf War and began a lobbying campaign for the United States to use armed force to remove Hussein from power.

"Realist theory is often depicted as presenting a deeply pessimistic account of international politics in which all actors are compelled to seek power in order to ensure their own survival and security. Because there is always the chance that any particular state may resort to force, realists maintain that war is an ever-present possibility in an anarchical environment."

NEOCONSERVATISM AND THE IRAQ WAR

"the Bush doctrine is, essentially, a synonym for neoconservative foreign policy" this is highly regarded in the political spectrum

The Neoconservative Bush Doctrine can be broken down into 4 points :

It **begins** by stating that "the United States is now the sole super power in the world and seeks to preserve its hegemonic position for the indefinite future"

Neoconservatives believe that balance-of-power politics is unnecessary and a limitation to achieving American National Interests. However, they do believe that a return to a multipolar

balance of power would also be a direct threat to America and its national interest international order.

The **second** element of the Bush Doctrine is “the commitment, when the circumstances warrant, to the preemptive use of military force.”

The **third** element that makes up the Bush Doctrine is “a commitment to the maintenance of a unipolar international system and to the doctrine of preemption is unilateralist to the core.”

This was shown in Americas defiance of the international system and the UN opinion of not invading Iraq.

This element was further supported by neoconservatives confidence in the America military power. They believed that the United States unquestionably possessed the most powerful military in the world. They believed that the US should use this power to reorder the international system to suit Americas own believed interest.

The **final** element of the Bush Doctrine, and one that is deeply embedded in the history of American foreign policy, is democracy promotion.

Democracy promotion is at the core of neo-conservatism- it is that democracy instill peace as democratic countries will no go to war with one another. → in the Middle East it seemed that there was a complete absence of democracy and thus this was the first step to solving the terror threat.

Neoconservatives fully embody this belief and strongly support the notion that American foreign policy should actively, and at times forcefully, work to spread democracy.

→Democracy promotion is like the pre work for the democratic peace theory

Indeed, Iraq was intended to be merely the first step in the eventual regional democratization of the entire Middle East. After years of supporting authoritarian, monarchical governments and Millitant groups the Bush administration abruptly determined that democracy was the remedy to all of the ills, especially the rise of terrorism, plaguing the Middle East.

One of the justifications for invading Iraq rested on the claim that by removing the dictator Saddam Hussein, democracy would bloom in Iraq

Collectively, these four elements of the Bush Doctrine provided a powerful rationale for invading Iraq.

Overall the Bush doctrine privileged military power over diplomacy when instilling democracy, as military power allows a country to act unilaterally without the need for allies.

They believed that once Saddam Hussein was overthrown and democracy was instilled, many of the other issues in the Middle East, such as the Israel Palestine conflict, would imminently be resolved.

They then **turn** the arguments that realists put forth in their attempt to steer America away from the road to war. The realists, however, proved to be unsuccessful in their attempt to prevent war

REALISM AND THE IRAQ WAR

Hans J. Morgenthau, realists have been fierce critics of the tendency of the United States to engage in moralistic foreign policy crusades to remake the world in its own image

In contrast to neoconservatism's claim that democracy is the most powerful ideology in the world, realists have stressed the power of nationalism.

Realists strongly disagreed with the neoconservatives' assertion that, following the invasion of Iraq, other countries would seek either to align themselves with the United States or reform their domestic political system to suit America's liking.

Not surprisingly for these realists, the most likely means of attaining the ability to deter the United States from attacking would be the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Realists figured out that one thing that dictators such as Saddam Hussein wanted to keep, was their power and life.

As Walt (A neorealist and professor at Harvard) observes, "the war in Iraq reinforced global concerns about the unchecked nature of U.S. power." By using "force against Iraq—in defiance of the Security Council and widespread global opposition," Walt argues that more and more states began to view the problem of U.S. primacy in the following manner: "how can other states be comfortable and secure when U.S. decisions affect all of their interests, and when the United States is strong enough to act pretty much as it wishes?"

Realists concluded that Iraq could be both deterred and contained; thus making preventive war unnecessary

NEOCONSERVATIVES VERSUS REALISTS

Big Realists debate; whether the invasion of Iraq was in the national interest of the US, the neoconservatives took this weak point and turned it against their realist opponents.

In neo-conservatism, 'interest' has a specific meaning, they believe that 'interest' in politics cannot be understood separately from the values in relation to which they are constituted.

In this way, realism is not simply wrong about foreign policy: it actually contributes to the erosion of the political order of the United States that it claims to defend.

First, neoconservatives argue that the endless debates and indeterminacy within realism over what the national interest is reflect more than just the difficulties of judgment, which neoconservatives readily acknowledge.

Second, a realist policy guided by traditional "Realpolitik"(diplomacy based on consideration of power) alone is ironically, yet unrealistic. Unable to connect adequately to the values and identity of the American people, a realist foreign policy will fail to generate either the commitment or the resources necessary to ensure its success.

Finally, instead of providing security for American society, a realist foreign policy actually contributes to its decay. Lacking a clear vision of the national interest that can be explained to citizens and connected to their values, realist foreign policy is of necessity often duplicitous

Wilsonian → used to describe a certain type of ideological perspective. This ideology comes from President Woodrow Wilson's 14 points that lead to world peace if implemented.

Strong, socially vibrant conceptions of both the public interest and the national interest are essential if a political community is to combat the corrosive acids of modernity.

→ **Connection between the domestic and international**

and in the **final** section they address the central question of the article; why did realism fail in the debate over Iraq?

One of neo-conservatism's most powerful aspects is its ability to include both international and domestic, representing the battle between values and culture as the core of politics and security.

Realists failed because they couldn't justify or see how American national interests were achieved to go to war in Iraq

Neoconservatives are able to connect the politics of virtue with the American national interest and the security challenges it has faced has provided a base on which alliances and progress have been made.

“Although a high proportion of neoconservatives are intellectuals—and are often part of what would be considered an academic elite by any standards—they are able to represent themselves as outsiders shunned and victimized by liberal (and realist) intellectuals in precisely the same way that real people are, and for the same reasons” → explains that neoconservatives are REAL people with opinions and thoughts

SPEAKING THE TRUTH

can realism make its analytic positions politically powerful; that is, can it speak its truth in a way powerful enough to get people—and even power—to listen?

Criticism:

The article was explicit in its point of view towards realism and how realism had many pitfalls including balance of power, and what national interest meant to them. However, the article does not effectively deconstruct neo-conservatism to see what its pitfalls may be. It seems that neo-conservatism is this perfect theory.

This article has many different references and quotes including Hans Morgenthau, Irving Kristol (dubbed the godfather of neo-conservatism).

The article mainly focuses on the reasons why America/ Bush was right or wrong for the invasion of Iraq, but not how effective they were after they invaded it. The article was written in 2008, which was 7 years into the war.

QUESTION: do you agree with Schmitt and Williams that the reasons for the US invasion of Iraq were better seen through neoconservative (focus on foreign policy, the spread of democracy and the use of the American military) eyes than realists?

https://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/morgenthau_2522.jsp

Feminist Perspectives on 9/11

J. Ann Tickner

Overview: This article examines international relations from a feminist standpoint. The author elucidates how men have appropriated the running of affairs concerning national defense, security and foreign policy. By critically analyzing gender relations in both the Middle East and in the Western world, she advances new ways of thinking that could re-structure "gender images", wherein women would no longer be subordinate to men.

The article is divided into 6 parts

1. Gender images
 2. Defining Gender
 3. Gendering war and peace
 4. Gendering 9/11
 5. What can we learn from 9/11
 6. Conclusion
-

1. Gender images

- Gender image are the roles we attribute to men or women: i.e "men should work and women should stay at home"
- But also how we perceive the man/woman relation: "men are equal to women; men are superior to women; women are superior to men..."
- This creates expectations and an assigned identification
- Kurth and Fukuyuma, two IR theorists the author quotes, **fear** the "feminization" of the west is weakening the US. Women should not occupy foreign policy/ military positions because women are not fit to stand up to "unexpected dangers" (non-democracies) → this is an example of gender image
- These fears are widespread in the US. Reinforced in times of war. → proliferation of idea that we "need men to protect our nation."
- This is reinforced by media: Post 9/11, sudden disappearance of women from TV + newspapers

2. Defining Gender

- Dictionary definition: "social classification of 'feminine' and 'masculine'"
- Author expands on definition → "socially and culturally constructed relational characteristics"
- In other words, gender is a set of social characteristics that we prescribe to men or women, which affects the way men and women relate to each other.
- For ex: "a man is strong", "a woman is graceful"

- Gendered social relations and relations of power: gender distinctions can serve to increase power of the dominant group because certain characteristics are considered to be superior to others.”
- Which serves to legitimate certain actions
- This distinction between men/women roles is reinforced during war

3. Gendering War & Peace

- War has mostly been carried out by men
- Due to cultural socialization: boys brought up thinking that being a warrior is a symbol of “manhood”
- As well, patriotism is associated with combat (the idea of having the will to die for your country). So if women are underrepresented in war, it makes it harder to run for political office in the US because discredited as being less patriotic.
- Women are stereotypically associated with peace: anti-war movements, pacifists, etc
- So men seen as more realistic and women more idealistic.
 - this is disempowering for women
 - as long as we make this association, “militarized masculinity” will exist
 - gender hierarchy will persist

4. Gendering 9/11

- Many boys in Middle East brought up in madrassas: schools that teach extremist Islam, young men trained to despise western values
- Author clashes occidentalists. In the article, occidentalists = middle eastern scholars who study the western world: view western values like materialism, liberalism, capitalism, feminism as source of evil. Believe that women with education must be brought under control, because they are what bring the world to decadence.
- Author then elaborates on perception of women post 9/11 in America
- Following the attack, US gave world impression of having two options: “with us or against us”
- America grows increasingly intolerant of alternative points of view
- Tickner underscores that women and feminists get blamed in times of political, economic and social uncertainty. The public opinion was based on “objectivity” of privileged men.
- Meanwhile in Afghanistan, women have been fighting a war against women oppression which began long before 9/11
- Women had many rights prior to Taliban uprising. As of Soviet intervention, women lost their rights. As Taliban came to power in 1996, they promised to create pure Islamic state → destruction of womens’ rights: parallel with American women who are further excluded in times of war.
- Tickner emphasizes the need to view women as victims in order to go beyond gender stereotypes that have been fostered by post 9/11 societal uncertainty (need to blame someone)

5. What can we learn from 9/11?

- Biology is not destiny, even during wars.
 - **Criticizes** Fukuyama's claim that there is an inherent biological reason for male dominance
 - **Goldstein:** Cultural factors are more important than biology – in this sense hegemonic masculinity is created through culture
 - **Robert Connell** (constructivist) – suggests a reshaping of gender – severing ties between things like courage and violence
 - **Stein:** women can do everything men can do with regard to war, therefore male superiority is constructed too.
 - **Stem:** Ending male monopoly on “legitimate force” breaks bond between gender identity and the use of state force.

- Women bear the burdens of religion and culture.
 - **Religions** are inherently patriarchal, and inherently subordinate women.
 - **Lack** of female education as a result of Occidentalism keeps religious discourse in the hands of dominant patriarchal authority.
 - **The tension** between Occidentalism and Orientalism from a feminist viewpoint comes from the United States's centralization of gender issues in their depictions of Islam.
 - **Both Occidentalism** and Orientalism suggest the existence of a homogenous Muslim world, which ultimately undermines the struggles of women within.
 - **This is exemplified** in the attitudes of Muslim women, who largely believe that the shrinking of the secular sphere has negative consequences for women in its narrowing of their rights.
 - **Occidentalism views** pro-women's rights as the internalization of Western identity.
 - **In this sense,** the rights of women can't be achieved without the painful notions of cultural betrayal.

- We Need Gender-Sensitive Conceptions of Development, Security and Peace.
 - **Starts** by outlining a historical correlation between female involvement in the political sphere and the success of those systems.

- **National** standards have all been observed as rising given a greater role of women and their influence
- **Whitaker** specifically cites the enhanced political stability of systems with greater female political involvement.
- **Tickner** suggests a re-thinking of these IR terms – suggests moving towards more gender-sensitive conceptions.
- **Peace**, for example, as a concept, reflects a male account of peace with regard to the state.
- **Tickner** suggests an account of peace which includes the lack of oppression and internal ideological harmony.
- **Other** feminist viewpoints similarly suggest an account of peace which consists in the halting of the internalization of hatred towards the ‘other’
- Women’s Gains from War May not Last.
 - **Wars** have historically acted as a catalyst for women’s political progression and economic benefit.
 - **This benefit** however, typically disappears after the conflict (for example, the domesticity of motherhood reinforced after conflict)
 - **Patriarchal** culture unlikely to accept political risks in a post-war scenario.
 - **“There** is less risk in portraying women as victims than in supporting their empowerment”
 - **An increase** to the female involvement in Afghan politics in 2002 was promising, though gradually receded through intimidation and coercion.
 - **Without** strong vigilance from the international community, Afghan women are unlikely to end up much better off than they were under the Taliban.

6. Conclusion

Her argument as a ‘feminist’ aims at a society where gender differences are less polarized and gender structures are less hierarchical.

An examination of the post-9/11 world from a feminist point of view is useful in this sense.

Her examination of how gender-issues play a role in the international system and suggests that differences with regard to the issue of feminism and female are of political significance in the sense that they establish hostility between states, but also work to teach us something about the given system. From this she derives four general lessons

1. - Biology is not destiny, even during wars.
2. Women bear the burdens of religion and culture.
3. We Need Gender-Sensitive Conceptions of Development, Security and Peace.
4. Women’s Gains from War May not Last.

Notes: Tickner

JC Cordell

1. Gendered Images
 - a. West accused of becoming feminized
 - b. Clash of civilizations
 - i. Some believe it to be internal; decline of Enlightenment, rise of post-industrialism, move of women into workforce
 - ii. Multiculturalism
 - c. Rise of hyper masculinity in America post-9/11
 - d. Women fell out of public eye
 - e. America perceived as both feminized and a (masculine) threat
 - f. "War both reinforces gender stereotypes and shakes up gender expectations"
2. Defining Gender
 - a. "A set of variable, but socially and culturally constructed relational characteristics"
 - b. Certain traits associated with femininity (passivity, weakness, dependence, emotion, privacy)
 - c. Certain traits associated with masculinity (power, autonomy, rationality, activity, publicity)
 - d. Masculinity is the cultural ideal
 - e. Gender reinforces "otherness"
 - i. Outsiders associated with femininity
 - f. Gender is about each identity and the relations between them
3. Gendering War and Peace
 - a. Fighting is almost exclusively a male activity
 - i. No biological evidence as to why
 - ii. Men are socialized into warriorhood
 - b. Patriotism often associated with fighting in war
 - c. Protecting the "helpless" (women and children) often a motivator for men to fight
 - d. War is associated with masculinity, peace with femininity
 - i. Peace is considered idealistic and unrealistic
4. Gendering 9/11
 - a. Occidentalism = system of teaching
 - i. Villainizes capitalism, liberalism, materialism, rationalism, feminism
 - ii. Filled with gender symbolism and misogyny
 - iii. Hatred of western luxury and decadence
 - b. "Others" villainized in times of tragedy, incl. women and feminists
 - c. Women in Afghanistan helped fight despite the Taliban taking away many of their rights
5. What can we learn from 9/11?
 - a. Maleness \neq war
 - b. Masculinity has changed slightly, but the binary and gender stereotypes are more rigid than they've been
 - c. Masculinity changes during war
 - d. Women bear the burdens of religion and culture

- i. Women are strongly affected by ideological conflicts
 - ii. Women's liberation is often blamed for social issues
 - e. Women's political and economic participation indicates a rise in development
 - f. Although women often make strides during war (women entering the workforce during WWII) they also often lose those strides after war (revitalization of the cult of domesticity after WWII)
- 6. Conclusion
 - a. The prevalence of gendered imagery in the war on terror indicates an inherent genderedness of the war
 - b. Al Qaeda finds Western women and gender relations to be particularly abhorrent
 - c. Uncertainty → fear of social change → fear of feminism
 - d. Feminists advocate for "a society where gender differences are less polarized and gender structures are less hierarchical"

Article argues that strategic interaction is best for approaching asymmetrical conflicts

Explaining Asymmetric Conflict Outcomes

-over 200 years about 30% of asymmetrical conflicts result in the weaker states winning, and the frequency is increasing with more time

Andrew Mack's interest asymmetry thesis

Strong power's survival not at stake, thus has lower interest in winning, thus more politically vulnerable to demands of the public and elites to withdraw

Weak power's survival is at stake, has more interest in winning, so more resolute and less vulnerable politically to other influences

Problem with above thesis

Power is not a great indicator of how interested a state is in a conflict

The thesis does not explain why some conflicts are longer than others

If thesis is right, there should be no variation over time in the distribution of outcomes

Strategic interaction thesis: a theory of Asymmetric conflict

Strategy: plan for using armed forces to achieve military and political objectives

Grand strategy: total resources directed to military, political, economic, and other objectives

Tactic: art of fighting battles using arms

Attack strategies (preferred by strong actors)

- Direct attack (use of military, destroy adversary's capacity to resist)
- Barbarism (use violation of the laws of war, like chemical and biological agents, or rape and torture to destroy adversary will and capacity to fight)

Defence strategies (weak actors)

- Direct defense (use of armed forces to stop adversary's attempt to capture or destroy values, like territory or resources)
- Guerrilla warfare strategy (a portion of society trained to impose impact without direct confrontation. needs physical sanctuary or passable borders of sympathetic states)

-strong actors initiates attack in asymmetric conflict

-ideal strategy are war winning and not war terminating

Logic of strategic interaction

- predict adversary strategy will improve chances of winning
- Toft argues there are 2 strategic approaches: direct and indirect
- direct approach targets capacity to fight
- indirect approach targets will to fight
- same approach interactions (direct vs. direct and indirect vs. indirect) favours strong actors
- opposite approach interaction (direct vs. indirect and indirect vs. direct) favours weaker actors.

- Strong actors have inflated expectations of a overwhelming and swift victory
- political and military elites needs to escalate force to avoid looking incompetent
- results in domestic pressure to end conflict

Strategic interaction: explaining the trend

- the trend of weaker actors winning with more frequency with time explained by socialization, and Toft argues that it's regional
- blitzkrieg imitated by USA, USSR, and European allies etc.
- guerrilla warfare of Mao imitated by Vietminh, Algerian rebels, Malayan communists etc.
- blitzkrieg direct, guerrilla warfare indirect this opposite approach favours weaker states

Hypothesis 1: When strong actors attack using a direct strategy and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, strong actors should win quickly and decisively.

Hypothesis 2: When strong actors attack with a direct strategy and weak actors defend using an indirect strategy, all other things being equal, weak actors should win.

Hypothesis 3: When strong actors attack using an indirect strategy and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, strong actors should lose.

Hypothesis 4: When strong actors employ barbarism to attack weak actors defending with a GWS, all other things being equal, strong actors should win.

Hypothesis 5: Strong actors are more likely to win same-approach interactions and lose opposite-approach interactions.

A First Test: Strategic Interaction and Asymmetric War Outcomes, 1800-1998

- correlation establish that strong actors won 76% of same approach interactions, weak actors won 63% of opposite approach interactions
- same approach interactions tend to be quick, opposite approach interactions are usually drawn out
- opposite approach interactions and strong actor failure have increased with time, explaining the higher frequency of weaker actors winning with time

U.S. Intervention in the Vietnam War

US military intervention 1965-73 U.S. military intervention involved four distinct strategic interactions:

- barbarism (Rolling Thunder) against a direct defense: bombing campaign, used to deter support for North Vietnam
- a direct attack against a direct defense (the main-force units war), US army successful, North Vietnam shifted to GWS
- direct attacks against a GWS (the guerrilla war in the South I), more favourable to NV
- barbarism against GWS (the guerrilla war in the South II). US implemented Hamlet and Phoenix programs, successful, had political costs

Politics

- US withdrew from Vietnam since US administration assumed defeat of NV forces would make NV concede to Us demands
- and military defeat of NV took too long

Conclusion

- material power is useful and quantifiable, and strategic interaction thesis highlights when this power matters more or less
- weak actors: successful defense depends on indirect strategy
- strong actors: weak actors using indirect defense will be difficult to beat, but would resort to barbarism

“The New Rome Meets the New Barbarians: How America Should Wield Its Power”

Written by Joseph Nye, dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government (2002)

Reprinted from *The Economist*

Summarized by Garima Karia

1. Key concepts and quotes from the reading

Introduction

- Is the US powerful enough to act unilaterally/however they like?
 - “Afghanistan campaign’s apparent success shows that unilateralism works just fine”
 - Nye argues **no**
- Is the US on the decline?
 - “Only a decade ago, the conventional wisdom lamented an America in decline.” → some thought the US would fall
 - Nye predicted “the continuing rise of American power.” He also argues, however, that “the new conventional wisdom that America is invincible is equally dangerous if it leads to a foreign policy that combines unilateralism, arrogance and parochialism.”

Three Kinds of Power

- 3 “chessboards”
 - Top: military power (unipolar)
 - Middle: economic power (multipolar)
 - US is not a hegemon here
 - Bottom: the realm of transnational relations
 - Includes actors as diverse as “bankers, terrorists, hackers” who all wield so much individual power (with the development of technology, Internet, etc.) → there is no polarity or hegemony because of this new freedom
 - Nye: “When you are in a 3D game, you will lose if you focus only on the top board and fail to notice the other boards and the vertical connections between them.” → To remain on top, the US must focus on all boards

A Shrinking and Merging World

- The only way a coalition of nations could check US power is if the US becomes overbearingly coercive
- Power is no longer solely based on military capabilities. Power= “getting others to want what you want” = “has to do with agenda-setting, economic incentives, cultural attraction and ideology”
- **The Information Revolution**
 - “The contemporary information revolution and the globalization that goes with it are transforming and shrinking the world”
 - The information revolution is creating virtual communities and networks that cut across national borders

- Game-changer → transnational corporations and non-state actors of all kinds will play larger roles
 - Soft power gains importance
 - Distance is shrinking; events that occur “far away” geographically are hit home
- Post Cold War: return to isolationism?
 - “Some, like the columnist Charles Krauthammer, urge a new unilateralism, whereby the US refuses to play the role of ‘docile international citizen’ and unashamedly pursues its own ends...But military power alone cannot produce the outcomes Americans want on many of the issues that matter to their safety and prosperity.”
- Defeating terrorism
 - Long process → “will take years of patient, unspectacular civilian co-operation with other countries”
 - Not just a military operation
 - “Rather than proving the unilateralists’ point, the partial nature of success in Afghanistan illustrates the continuing need for cooperation”

The Perils of Going Alone

- Information revolution and globalization dominate the world; Americans cannot “achieve all their international goals by acting alone.”
 - Financial stability
 - Climate change
 - Porous borders → drugs, terrorism, disease
- The US needs international support/ “mobilize international coalitions to address shared threats and challenges”

The Barbarian Threat

- Isolationism is never a good idea; it wouldn’t have prevented 9/11 because of the power of the American economy (even if they had a weaker foreign policy)
- The importance of American pop culture → soft power > government
 - Some American concepts portrayed in pop culture are “profoundly subversive of patriarchal societies” but are/will not be a threat unless the US itself becomes radical
 - “Those hard nuggets of opposition are unlikely to catalyze broad hatred unless the US abandons its values and pursues arrogant/overbearing policies that let the extremists appeal to the majority in the middle.”
- “Unilateralism risks an arrogance that alienates American’s friends”
- **“By embedding its policies in a multilateral framework, the US can make its disproportionate power more legitimate and acceptable to others. No large power can afford to be purely multilateralist, but that should be the starting point for policy. And when that great power defines its national interests broadly to include global interests, some degree of unilateralism is more likely to be acceptable. Such an approach will be crucial to the longevity of American power.”**

- American challenge= not other States themselves, but how to collaborate with them to fight non-state actors.

How will the US stay on top? (aka TL;DR)

- “American economy and society will remain robust and not decay”
- “US will maintain military strength and not become over-militarized”
- “Americans will not become unilateral and arrogant in their strength that they squander the nation’s considerable fund of soft power”
- “There will not be some catastrophic series of events that profoundly transforms American attitudes in an isolationist direction.”
- “Americans will define their national interest in a broad and far-sighted way that incorporates global interests”
- “The information revolution, technological change and globalization will not replace the nation-state, but will continue to complicate the actors and issues in world politics. The paradox of American power in the 21st C is that the largest power since Rome cannot achieve its objectives unilaterally” in this day and age.

2. Brief description of how the concepts differ from others in the course.

- Nye argues that the US will stay “at the top,” but under a new set of criteria (as elaborate upon in “Key Concepts”)
- An alternate perspective: **The Realist Take**
 - BOP/Balancing of the USA is bound to happen.
 - “Throughout history, coalitions of countries have arisen to balance dominant powers, and the search for traditional shifts in balance of power and new state challengers is well under way.”
 - Realists propose China as the new “enemy”/envisage a Russia-China-India coalition/propose European federation that will “challenge the US for primacy”
 - It’s a long(-term) shot
 - Nye critiques the Realist perspective: “This forecast depends on a high degree of [European] political unity, and a low state of transatlantic relations... their quest for new cold-war-style challengers is largely barking up the wrong tree. They are ignoring deeper changes in the distribution and nature of power in the contemporary world.”

Notes on: The New Rome Meets the New Barbarians: How America Should Wield Its Power

Author: Joseph Nye

March 23, 2002

Reprinted from The Economist

- **Context of Article:** Joseph Nye is dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. This article was written 7 months following the 9/11 attacks in the USA and the ensuing considerable shift in American military foreign policy. By this point, President George W. Bush had deployed a military campaign to Afghanistan and the idea that the United States was the largest superpower was an ongoing dialectic among political scientists and commoners alike. This article tries to explain the complex power structure that America holds, with consideration to the authors that say that America's power is in decline, as well as others that hold that America will continue to rise in power.
 - Nye explains his analysis with several points;
 - **1. America's leading position in the information revolution will empower them in the future, but will empower non-governmental bodies as well;** at the time of writing, America's 20th of the global population took over half of the internet. Nye hypothesized (wrongly) that in a decade or two, Chinese will overwhelm the internet and take over in terms of power. He did hypothesize, however, that power would disperse through the proxy of the internet (and away from governments), allowing for rapid **globalization**.
 - **2. Power is more difficult to wield unilaterally;** in order to empower nations against climate change and terrorism, cooperation within the form of **international coalitions** must be created. Nye argues that multilateralism will rise in importance, and Americans agree that the USA should not conduct overseas military operations without the support of other countries.
 - **Nye's conclusion:** "If the assumptions hold, America will remain number one. But number one "ain't gonna be what it used to be." The information revolution, technological change and globalization will not replace the nation-state but will continue to complicate the actors and issues in world politics. The paradox of American power in the 21st century is that the largest power since Rome cannot achieve its objectives unilaterally in a global information age."
- **Key Concepts:**
 - **"Realist" international-relations theory:**
 - With application to this context, Nye explains that many theorists have expressed their concern with regards to America's staying-power; during this period, many saw China (and perhaps even a coalition between Russia-India-China) as a threat and as a balancing power.
 - **"Three kinds of power":**

- Nye compares the USA and the rest of the world in terms of power, and states that “At first glance, the disparity between American power and that of the rest of the world looks overwhelming.” However, he then unpacks this statement by showing that while America dominates in military power, other nations are powerful economically and with regards to transnational relations.
- **1. Military power:** USA is the only country with the capability to reach globally with their nuclear *and* their conventional forces.
- **2. Economic power:** Multi-polar, with the USA, Europe, and Japan representing two-thirds of the world product, and China’s dramatic growth likely making it a fourth big player.
- **3. Transnational relations power:** Ranges from international banking/trading to terrorist transferral of weapons, to hackers disrupting Internet operations. Nye asserts that there is no uni-polarity, multi-polarity, nor hegemony in this power structure; it is rather widely dispersed.
- **Multilateral, Unilateral, Multi-polar:**
 - Nye explains the shift in importance from USA’s unilateral force to a modern, multi-lateral force that pulls in cooperation from other nations. This is important because as he argues that with the information revolution comes the idea of more dispersed power, making it difficult for America to enact its policies unilaterally. He argues that America can maintain its position as the most powerful superpower well into the 21st century, but it should not prevent back to an isolationist policy in order to maintain this.

Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict

-Barnett & Adger

SUMMARY

-In this paper where they pave the way for further research tracks, Barnett & Adger look at how actual and perceived climate impacts may cause changes in social systems and thus increase the likelihood of violent conflict.

The investigation contained in this paper is threefold:

- > The vulnerability of local places and social groups to climate change
- > The link between livelihoods and violent conflict
- > The role of the state in development and peacemaking

Paper separated in 4 sections:

(i) Explains that climate change may undermine human security by reducing access to, and the quality of, natural resources that are important to sustain livelihoods.

(ii) Suggests that the kinds of human insecurity that climate change may affect can in turn increase the risk of violent conflict.

(iii) Argues that climate change may undermine the capacity of states to act in ways that promote human security and peace.

(iv - the sum) They suggest ideas for further research, and reassert that through direct effects on livelihoods and indirect effects on state functions, climate change may in certain circumstances increase the risk of violent conflict.

(i) Climate change and human security

- Widespread scientific consensus on the imminence and unprecedented effects of climate change (IPCC)

-Climatic variations have triggered large-scale social disruptions in the past

(e.g. the El Nino events and famines that killed tens of millions in the late 19th century
→ famine triggered by drought, but caused by the way political and economic colonization deprived people of their entitlements to natural resources.)

The vulnerability of people to climate change depends on the extent to which they are dependent on **climate sensitive forms of natural capital**

Other **social factors** also play a role by determining people's entitlement to resources (poverty, the degree of support provided by the state/discrimination, access to economic opportunities, effectiveness of decision-making processes, and social cohesion)

Human security is Multidimensional

Determinants of human security as temporally and spatially complex:

→ **anterior** processes such as colonization and war shape present insecurities

→ **ongoing** processes such as climate change and trade liberalization shape future insecurities

External factors also impactful

-Environmental changes: upstream users of water, multinational mining companies, etc.

-Social determinants: warfare, corruption, trade dependency, etc.

(ii) Human insecurity and violent conflict

See Table 1 at the end of this paper for the detailed relationship between determinants of human insecurity, violent conflict and climate change

Summary of the relationship between determinants of human insecurity, violent conflict and climate change:

Vulnerable livelihoods → resource-dependent populations will be more affected; impacts may be on the long-term (e.g. declining productivity of lands) or on the short-term (floods)

Poverty → Climate change may undermine access to natural capital

→ May indirectly increase poverty through its effect on the resource sectors (i.e. knock-on/chain effects of the decline of certain sectors)

Weak states → impacts of climate change increase costs associated to providing services and infrastructures and thereby may decrease gov'n't revenues

*so it may decrease overall state capabilities

Migration → Large-scale movements of people may increase the risk of conflict in host communities

(Thus, climate change do not by itself cause violent conflict; it is rather the parameters it affects that can generate violent conflict, for instance by widening inequalities, weakening the state, etc.)

Uncertainty about the future as a main driver toward internal armed conflict

-Actual insecurity, but also **perception** of future insecurity increase the risk of violent conflict.

(e.g. key elements that increase the risks of violent conflict are declining access to land, or declining returns from human use of land –since they all cause livelihood contraction)

-Thus, provision of aid, AND/OR some certainty that aid will arrive, diminish the likelihood that people will use violence in order to fulfill their needs.

-Lack of opportunities for individuals and groups to act to improve their lives increase the likelihood they'll join armed groups.

-It is relative rather than absolute poverty that seems to trigger conflict (since some people prosper while others suffer)

Some (e.g. Collier, 2000) therefore argue that wars “are the product of a set of rational decisions that lead to (a violent) reordering of economic and political systems and social relations.”

However Barnett & Adger underline that there are in fact a multitude of reasons why people can commit violence once they join an armed group (prospects of social mobility, social recognition, power, excitement, frustration/vengeance, etc.)

‘internal’ security dilemma

-within countries groups may respond to perceptions of threat from others, leading to similar build up of threat perception and capability thereby increasing the risk of conflict

→ **The role of leaders in fueling or mitigating these perceived threats plays a crucial role**

“ Human security depends on a system where each rational individual calculates that it is more profitable not to rebel. ” – Gough (2002)

SO

-Human insecurity increases the risk of violent conflict

-Climate change affects livelihood security, thus negatively impacts on human security, and thereby increase the risk of violent conflict

(iii) The State and Human Security

-Human security is indissociably linked to states operation

National level: -The state plays a major role by providing opportunities for people, providing welfare, etc.

- it may also promote rights to personal security, social services...

- it can exercise its sovereign rights to mediate its trade exchanges with other states so as to not undermine certain groups’ livelihood

(So the state is a critical institution for livelihood)

International level:

-regional and global forces are both often implicated in internal conflicts

(e.g. arms trading, presence of private military forces, foreign investors, third party intervention)

Therefore→ many states may be involved in the causes and solutions to violent conflict

‘Strong’ State vs. Weak or ‘Contracted’ State

Strong state

→Control the legitimate use of force

→ more able to manage environmental degradation and change

→accountability and transparency reduce corruption and maintain faith in market processes

→ people less anxious about the future

→effective conflict resolution mechanisms

→ income support, food aid, etc.

⇒ DEMOCRACY also plays a crucial role (mechanism)

-protection of human rights and freedoms -protection of D. processes, etc.

Gives people power to affect change and thus reduce potential for violent conflict

Weak or ‘Contracted’ state

→groups that fall beyond the protection of the state (geographic or social distance)
(marginalized people within the society)

→unequal returns and/or inadequate supervision of resource extraction activities
(unfair returns / environmental impacts to landowners)

→when states contract (for example as a result of Structural Adjustment and Good Governance Programmes pushed by the US, IMF, WB) freedoms and opportunities may also contract

Are all factors that increase the likelihood for violent conflict to emerge

Large migrations can also lead to violent conflict, and may be a direct consequence of climate change

However, it is the political and institutional responses to new migrants, rather than the existence of migrants *per se* that has significant effect on the likelihood of violent conflict

CONCLUSION

→ Understanding how climate change may increase the risk of violent conflict also requires understanding the way it may weaken the capacity of states to provide opportunities for people, and manage globalization.

Even though research suggest that climate change may have direct and indirect negative effects on the risk factors, “there is still much uncertainty about the ways in which climate change may increase human insecurity and the risk of violent conflict.”

Therefore, Barnett & Adger wisely suggest that we should avoid speculating about climate change “in the language of security”, and further propose a potential research programme.

Table 1

The relationship between determinants of human insecurity, violent conflict and climate change

Factors affecting violent conflict	Processes which climate change could affect/exacerbate
Vulnerable livelihoods	Climate change is likely to cause widespread impacts on water availability, coastal regions, agriculture, extreme events and diseases. The impacts on livelihoods will be more significant in sectors of the population with high resource-dependency, and in more environmentally and socially marginalised areas. Some of these climate driven outcomes are long term and chronic (such as declining productivity of agricultural land), while others are episodic (such as floods). These impacts on livelihoods will be widespread both in developing and developed countries.
Poverty (relative/chronic/transitory)	Poverty (and particularly relative deprivation) is affected by the spatial differentiation of climate impacts and the sensitivity of places to them. Climate change may directly increase absolute, relative, and transient poverty by undermining access to natural capital. It may indirectly increase poverty through its effects on resource sectors and the ability of governments to provide social safety nets. Stresses from climate change will differentially affect those made vulnerable by political-economic processes such as liberalisation of markets for agricultural commodities.
Weak states	The impacts of climate change are likely to increase the costs of providing public infrastructure such as water resources, and services such as education, and may decrease government revenues. So climate change may decrease the ability of states to create opportunities and provide important freedoms for citizens as well as decrease the capacity of government agencies to adapt and respond to climate change itself.
Migration	Migration may be one response of people whose livelihoods are undermined by climate change. However, climate is unlikely to be the sole, or even the most important ‘push’ factor in migration decisions. Yet large-scale movements of people may increase the risk of conflict in host communities.

Climate Change, human security and violent conflict- Barnett and Adger

Introduction:

-speculation that climate change may increase risk of violent conflict

-bodies of research:

-vulnerability of local places and social groups to climate change on the livelihoods and violent conflict and the role of the state in development and peacemaking

→relationships between climate change, human security and violent conflict

→climate change undermines human security in the present day and in the future by reducing access to and the quality of natural resources that are important to sustain livelihoods

-two ways conflict might be stimulated by climate change:

1. conflict comes about through changes in political economy of energy resources due to action to reduce emissions from fossil fuels

2. conflict stimulated by changes in social systems driven by actual or perceived climate impacts

Climate change and human security

- Climate change: driver to environmental changes such as coastal erosion, declining precipitation and soil moisture, increased storm intensity and species migration.
→poses risks to human security
- most analyses of famines now identify poverty, inequality, market failures, and policy failures as the deeper causes of what seem to be “natural” disasters
- vulnerability of people to climate change depends on:
 - the extent to which they are dependent on natural resources and ecosystem services
 - the extent to which the resources and services they rely on are sensitive to climate change
 - their capacity to adapt to changes in these resources and services
- other social factors that undermine human security in addition to environmental change:
 - Poverty
 - the degree of support (or discrimination) communities receive from the state
 - people access to economic opportunities
 - the effectiveness of decision making processes
 - the extent of social cohesion w/in and surrounding vulnerable groups
→these factors determine people and communities’ entitlements to economic and social capital that in turn determine their capacity to adapt to climate change
- warfare, corruption, trade dependency, macroeconomic policies, and a host of other larger scale processes associated with globalization shape the social and economic entitlements that are necessary to reduce and individual’s vulnerability to environmental changes
- the extent to which system-wide impacts transpire will be determined by the degree to which any given national economy is dependent on climate sensitive natural resources and the robustness and resilience of social institutions to manage change

Human insecurity and violent conflict

Factors affecting violent conflict	Processes which climate change could affect
1. vulnerable livelihoods	1. climate change is likely to cause widespread impacts on water availability, coastal regions, agriculture, extreme events and diseases
2. Poverty	2. Climate change may directly increase absolute, relative, and transient poverty by undermining access to natural capital.
3. Weak States	3. impacts of climate change → increase costs of providing public infrastructure (water resources, services like education) and decrease govt revenues/ decrease ability of states to create opportunities and provide important freedoms for citizens and decrease capacity of govt agencies to adapt and respond to change
4. Migration	4. large-scale movements of people may increase the risk of conflict in host communities

- Climate change will not undermine human security or increase the risk of violent conflict in isolation from other important social factors.
- Uncertainty about the future: critical factor, not just potential or actual insecurity that increases the risk of violent conflict but also the perception of future insecurity.
- Declining access to land is seen as a key process that causes livelihood contraction and hence increases the risk that people will join armed groups
- War itself is a significant cause of livelihood contraction: violence tends to escalate in part because it generates new causes of grievance and increased impoverishment
 - Wars are not irrational, but rather are the product of a seat of rational decisions that lead to a violent reordering of economic and political systems and social relations
 - Joining armed gangs can serve a host of psycho-social needs
 - Deliver sense of power and status
 - The prospects of social mobility, excitement and belonging and social recognition
 - Motivated by a genuine sense of grievance, frustration and desire for revenge, by identification with a common cause and by a need for protection from violence and denial of economic freedoms.

The state and human security

- States are critical to:
 - Providing opportunities for people
 - Creating and providing a stable environment so that livelihoods can be pursued with confidence
 - Providing measures to protect people when livelihoods contract

- Creating conditions whereby people can act in ways to pursue the lives they value
 - Provide protective guarantees to assist people when livelihood contract
 - Provide economic freedoms that are important for people to seek employment
 - Provide political freedoms
 - Provide social opportunities such as education and health care
- when all these functions are extensive and effective states are legitimate, people have opportunities to develop and have less anxiety about the future, conflict resolution mechanisms tend to be effective, and economies tend to grow and poverty levels tend to fall
- State functions that are of important to mitigate against the generation of violent conflicts:
 - Provision of health care and education
 - Protection of human rights
 - Establishment and maintenance of a strong and independent judiciary
 - Accountable and transparent police services and armed forces
 - Protection of democratic processes
 - Groups that fall outside of/ beyond the protection of the state (for reasons of geographic or social distance) are more likely to experience violent conflict
 - Where states actively deny entitlements or deliberately repress and abuse people, violence becomes a likely tool of resistance
 - Other factors that increase risk of violent conflict:
 - Availability of weapons
 - A history of violent conflict
 - Resource dependence
 - A youth bulge among working population
 - Large migrations have at times lead to violent conflict and large migrations may be a consequence of climate change

→ people rarely migrate for environmental reasons alone, so understanding the way climate change may induce more migration also requires understanding the way it will interact with other factors

Towards an improved understanding

- 3 key areas of research on climate insecurity
 - to assess the vulnerability of people's livelihood to climate change
 - revealing that the most potentially devastating impacts of climate change arise from a combination of multiple stresses acting in concert
 - of which climate stresses are but one, and which also include ecosystem degradation, failed governance systems, and economic decline
 - factors include the sensitivity of resources such as freshwater, soils, reefs and fisheries, the degree to which households and communities rely on these resources to meet their needs and values, and the capacity of social systems to adapt to changes in the temporal distribution and abundance of these resources so that households' and communities' needs and values can continue to be satisfied

- adaptive capacity depends on, inter alia, the ability to access commodity markets and labor markets and the prices paid on these markets, the ability of communities to pool resources to collectively respond to change, access to information, population health, and the existence and effectiveness of national and international policies and measures to sustain resources and livelihoods in vulnerable places.
- Examine the consequences of livelihood insecurity
 - Key risk factors include the opportunities to gain income elsewhere, a past history of violence, ineffective justice systems, the availability of weapons, ineffective or non-existent public and private welfare systems, and poor access to opportunity-enhancing services such as education and health care.
 - Kinds of places where climate induced changes in livelihoods is a risk factor for violent conflict include: where state is weak, access to education and health care and income is poor, and much of population is dependent on primary resources
 - Role of institutions for successful adaptation to climate change
 - Institution: ritualized practices that maintain social cohesion and collective and peaceful responses to changes

Factors that matter regarding institutions: its legitimacy, its responsiveness to constituents, its core values and its commitment to them, its ability to learn and experiment, the amount of resources available to it, its independence from short term political pressures, the quality of its management and the transparency of its decision making.

- Examine the challenges climate change pose to states
 - increased rural-urban migration (land tenure institutions and urban planning agencies)
 - increased morbidity (health service providers)
 - increased climatic hazards (disaster management arrangements)
 - increased demand for development assistance (diplomatic and development agencies)
 - increased violent disputes and crime (the judiciary and the police)